CGA: GovernancePub Date : 2010-03-16DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1086687
Jiekun Huang
{"title":"Hedge Funds and Shareholder Wealth Gains in Leveraged Buyouts","authors":"Jiekun Huang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1086687","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1086687","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the effect of hedge funds on target shareholder gains in leveraged buyouts (LBOs). I find that the buyout premium is increasing in the preannouncement presence of hedge funds, measured as the fraction of equity held by hedge funds in the target firm before the announcement. This effect is driven primarily by hedge funds with activism agendas. This effect is stronger for LBOs with management participation than for third-party LBOs, and is stronger for club deal LBOs than for solo-sponsored LBOs. Using a geographic instrument for the presence of hedge fund, I find that this relationship persists even after controlling for endogeneity. These findings indicate that hedge funds protect target shareholder interests in LBOs.","PeriodicalId":309210,"journal":{"name":"CGA: Governance","volume":"2010 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129152864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
CGA: GovernancePub Date : 2010-03-01DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1633871
Oleg Badunenko, Christopher F. Baum, Dorothea Schaefer
{"title":"Does the Tenure of Private Equity Investment Improve the Performance of European Firms?","authors":"Oleg Badunenko, Christopher F. Baum, Dorothea Schaefer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1633871","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1633871","url":null,"abstract":"The paper investigates whether the presence and tenure of Private Equity (PE) investment in European companies improves their performance. Previous studies documented the unambiguous merit of a buyout during the 1980s and 1990s for listed firms in the US and UK markets. This study analyzes such influences in both listed and unlisted European firms during 2002-2007. Our analysis suggests that short-term PE investments have, on average, a detrimental effect on firm performance. The performance of a firm that has PE backing is lower than that of a firm without PE backing in the first year of PE investment. Such an effect disappears if PE investments remain in the firm for an uninterrupted six-year term.","PeriodicalId":309210,"journal":{"name":"CGA: Governance","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133013902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
CGA: GovernancePub Date : 2005-11-02DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.686845
Kai Li, J. Harford
{"title":"Decoupling CEO Wealth and Firm Performance: The Case of Acquiring CEOS","authors":"Kai Li, J. Harford","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.686845","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.686845","url":null,"abstract":"We explore how compensation policies following mergers affect a CEO's incentives to pursue a merger. We find that even in mergers where bidding shareholders are worse off, bidding CEOs are better off three quarters of the time. Following a merger, a CEO's pay and overall wealth become insensitive to negative stock performance, but a CEO's wealth rises in step with positive stock performance. Corporate governance matters; bidding firms with stronger boards retain the sensitivity of their CEOs' compensation to poor performance following the merger. In comparison, we find that CEOs are not rewarded for undertaking major capital expenditures. Copyright 2007 by The American Finance Association.","PeriodicalId":309210,"journal":{"name":"CGA: Governance","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130172741","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
