CGN: Employee Involvement in Corporate Governance (Topic)最新文献

The Revised Shareholder Rights Directive 2017: Policy Implications for Workers 2017年修订的股东权利指令:对工人的政策影响

CGN: Employee Involvement in Corporate Governance (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-04-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3179973

Andrew Johnston, P. Morrow

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引用次数: 0

Mandatory Worker Representation on the Board and Its Effect on Shareholder Wealth 职工在董事会的强制代表权及其对股东财富的影响

CGN: Employee Involvement in Corporate Governance (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-04-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2421061

Stefan Petry

引用次数: 11

Dynastic Cycle: A Resource Allocation Theme for Addressing Dissent in Universities 动态循环:解决大学异议的资源配置主题

CGN: Employee Involvement in Corporate Governance (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-03-18 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2465025

R. Zaini, K. Saeed, M. Elmes, O. Pavlov

{"title":"Dynastic Cycle: A Resource Allocation Theme for Addressing Dissent in Universities","authors":"R. Zaini, K. Saeed, M. Elmes, O. Pavlov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2465025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2465025","url":null,"abstract":"This paper utilizes the dynastic cycle framework proposed in (K. Saeed & Pavlov, 2008) to explain the role of dissent in universities. By combining the dissent expression framework (Kassing, 2011) and the dynastic cycle structure, we construct a generic model for dissent in organizations. The work is rooted in the literature of organizational communication, research and development, and higher education management. Using system dynamics methodology, we illustrate the dynamic interaction of composition, climate, and performance to simulate and explain how organizations evolve with regard to dissent. This model provides a platform for experimentation with different policy scenarios focusing on growth and productivity. The research suggests that as universities attempt to improve their performance through growth, despite initial short-term performance improvements, they are likely to devolve into low performance institutions with degraded management responsiveness and organizational productivity. Regardless of having high dissent tolerance, they could become dominated by high control and silence climates. When organizations invest in cultivating a dissent aware climate, and strive to improve their dissent processing capability, we suggest that the university and its members will be more productive and engaged.","PeriodicalId":300782,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Employee Involvement in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117153490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Shareholder Rights and Employment 股东权利与雇佣

CGN: Employee Involvement in Corporate Governance (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-08-08 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1909598

C. Hall

引用次数: 0

Value Creation and Value Destruction in the Societas Europaea: Evidence from the New Legal Form 欧洲社会的价值创造与价值破坏:来自新法律形式的证据

CGN: Employee Involvement in Corporate Governance (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-04-27 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1728162

F. Lamp

引用次数: 3

Labor Unions as Shareholder Activists: Champions or Detractors? 工会作为股东积极分子:支持者还是反对者?

CGN: Employee Involvement in Corporate Governance (Topic) Pub Date : 2009-02-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1119328

Andrew K. Prevost, R. Rao, Melissa A. Williams

引用次数: 59