Ross: Operations & Management Science (pre-July 2012) (Topic)最新文献

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Pre-Auction Investments by Type-Conscious Agents 有类型意识的代理人在拍卖前的投资

Ross: Operations & Management Science (pre-July 2012) (Topic) Pub Date : 2006-09-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.940669

Yingying Li, W. Lovejoy, Sudheer Gupta

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引用次数: 7