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Game Theory, Diplomatic History and Security Studies最新文献

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A General Explanation of the Cuban Missile Crisis 古巴导弹危机的一般解释
Game Theory, Diplomatic History and Security Studies Pub Date : 2019-01-10 DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198831587.003.0006
F. Zagare
{"title":"A General Explanation of the Cuban Missile Crisis","authors":"F. Zagare","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198831587.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198831587.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter develops a new explanation of the Cuban missile crisis, from a general escalation model of interstate conflict. Specifically, the equilibrium structure of the Asymmetric Escalation Game with incomplete information is used to explain the initiation, development, and resolution of the crisis. This model brings with it a clear set of theoretical expectations about the conditions under which a limited conflict can occur. It also explains why intense interstate disputes occur and, if and when they do, they are successfully resolved (or not). Answers to all three of the foundational questions traditionally associated with the crisis are derived from an examination of the model’s strategic dynamic. The model’s applicability to the strategic relationship of the United States and North Korea is also discussed.","PeriodicalId":295953,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory, Diplomatic History and Security Studies","volume":"53 40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129568228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Explaining the Long Peace 解释长久的和平
Game Theory, Diplomatic History and Security Studies Pub Date : 2019-01-10 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198831587.003.0009
F. Zagare
{"title":"Explaining the Long Peace","authors":"F. Zagare","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198831587.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198831587.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter addresses the charge made by some behavioral economists (and many strategic analysts) that game theory is of limited utility for understanding interstate conflict behavior. Using one of perfect deterrence theory’s constituent models, a logically consistent game-theoretic explanation for the absence of a superpower conflict during the Cold War era is provided. As well, the chapter discusses a prescription based on an incorrect prediction attributed to John von Neumann, one of the cofounders of game theory. It also examines a logically inconsistent explanation of the long peace offered by Thomas Schelling, the game theorist many consider the most important strategic thinker in the field of security studies. The argument is made that a predictively inaccurate or logically inconsistent game model in no way undermines the utility of game theory as a potentially powerful methodological tool.","PeriodicalId":295953,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory, Diplomatic History and Security Studies","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126947084","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Game Theory and Security Studies 博弈论与安全研究
Game Theory, Diplomatic History and Security Studies Pub Date : 2019-01-10 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198831587.003.0002
F. Zagare
{"title":"Game Theory and Security Studies","authors":"F. Zagare","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198831587.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198831587.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter describes the basic assumptions of game theory and illustrates its major concepts, using examples drawn from the security studies literature. An arms race game is used as an example of a strategic form game, illustrating the meaning of an equilibrium outcome and the definition of a dominant strategy. Backward induction and the definition of subgame perfection are explained in the context of an extensive form game that features threats. Nash equilibrium and the Bayesian equilibrium are discussed, and a short review of the many applications of game theory in international politics is provided. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the usefulness of game theory in generating insights about deterrence.","PeriodicalId":295953,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory, Diplomatic History and Security Studies","volume":"191 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123533565","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Moroccan Crisis of 1905–6 1905 - 1906年的摩洛哥危机
Game Theory, Diplomatic History and Security Studies Pub Date : 2019-01-10 DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198831587.003.0004
F. Zagare
{"title":"The Moroccan Crisis of 1905–6","authors":"F. Zagare","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198831587.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198831587.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter focuses on the Moroccan crisis of 1905–6, which was the first in a series of early twentieth-century confrontations that are generally considered to have led to World War I. The chapter interprets this crisis in the context of an incomplete information game model, the Tripartite Crisis Game, and one of its proper subgames, the Defender–Protégé subgame. British support of France during the 1906 Algeciras Conference, which ended the crisis, the firm stand that France took at the conference, and the German decision to press for a conference, are explained in terms of the model’s principal variables. In addition, the chapter discusses the Entente Cordiale and the “deterrence vs. restraint dilemma” associated with it, and similar strategic relationships. While the analysis is not necessarily at odds with the conclusions of some historians, it is more powerful because it is explicit about the causal mechanisms at work.","PeriodicalId":295953,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory, Diplomatic History and Security Studies","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129622908","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Game Theory and Diplomatic History 博弈论和外交史
Game Theory, Diplomatic History and Security Studies Pub Date : 2019-01-10 DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198831587.003.0003
F. Zagare
{"title":"Game Theory and Diplomatic History","authors":"F. Zagare","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198831587.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198831587.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter explores a number of issues connected with the use of game-theoretic models to organize analytic narratives. First, a causal explanation of the 1936 Rhineland crisis is developed within the confines of a game-theoretic model of asymmetric or unilateral deterrence with incomplete information. In this context, the chapter then introduces the concept of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Then, some methodological obstacles that may arise in a more complex case, such as the 1879 Austro-German alliance, are discussed, and suggestions for overcoming them are offered. Finally, the advantages of using game models to more fully understand real world events are highlighted.","PeriodicalId":295953,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory, Diplomatic History and Security Studies","volume":"46 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126231287","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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