Belén Villalonga, María-Andrea Trujillo, Alexander Guzmán, Neila Cáceres
{"title":"What Are Boards For? Evidence from Closely Held Firms in Colombia","authors":"Belén Villalonga, María-Andrea Trujillo, Alexander Guzmán, Neila Cáceres","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2989359","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2989359","url":null,"abstract":"Using a large survey database on the corporate governance practices of privately held Colombian firms, we investigate why firms have boards, and how that choice and the balance of power among the board, controlling shareholders, and minority shareholders affect the trade‐offs between control, liquidity, and growth and, ultimately, firm performance. We find that the probability of having a board increases with the number of shareholders and in family firms. When the preferences of controlling and minority shareholders diverge, as with respect to capital structure and dividend policy, boards support controlling shareholders’ decisions, thereby exacerbating the agency conflict between the two groups of shareholders.","PeriodicalId":294045,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Ownership (Sub-Topic)","volume":"124 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115022457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A. Achleitner, A. Betzer, M. Goergen, Bastian Hinterramskogler
{"title":"Private Equity Acquisitions of Continental European Firms - The Impact of Ownership and Control on the Likelihood of Being Taken Private","authors":"A. Achleitner, A. Betzer, M. Goergen, Bastian Hinterramskogler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1319836","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1319836","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the motives behind private equity acquisitions of publicly listed firms in continental Europe. As corporate control and ownership in continental Europe tend to be highly concentrated, we argue that it is important to take into account the incentives of the incumbent large shareholder to monitor the management and the private benefits of control the latter may derive from the firm when measuring the likelihood of the firm being taken over by a private equity investor. We find strong and consistent evidence that both have a significant impact on the likelihood of a private equity acquisition.","PeriodicalId":294045,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Ownership (Sub-Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131497341","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Institutional Ownership, Internal Control Material Weakness and Firm Performance","authors":"Alex Tang, Li Xu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1031270","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1031270","url":null,"abstract":"We examine whether a firm's composition of its institutional ownership affects its likelihood of disclosing material weaknesses in its internal control system under SOX 302 and 404 and, hence, its post-disclosure firm performance. The findings indicate that dedicated institutional investors reduce the likelihood of material weaknesses disclosures while transient institutional investors exacerbate the likelihood of material weaknesses disclosures. Firms identified with material weaknesses in internal control have worse operating performance and stock returns in the post-disclosure period than controlling firms, however, the particular types of institutional investors associated with internal control material weakness disclosures have no net impact on post-disclosure firms' performance.","PeriodicalId":294045,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Ownership (Sub-Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129142802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Overhaul of the British Legal System Can Sharpen Competition","authors":"B. Ascher","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1103616","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1103616","url":null,"abstract":"The British legal system is on the verge of sweeping, historic changes. Parliament is expected to act soon on a reform bill, which will transform the legal profession, the legal aid system, and the organizational and financial structure of law firms in England and Wales. Because London is the home of many of the world's largest global law firms, these changes can have widespread effects on the nature of competition, not only in the United Kingdom, but in the European Union and around the world. This paper traces the development of the legislation, describes its contents, and focuses on the possibility of outside ownership of law firms by non-lawyers, and corporations traded publicly on stock exchanges. It reviews the brief experience of outside ownership of law firms in Australia and implications for lawyers and law firms in the United States. The paper observes that, because the potential scope and depth of the regulatory changes and the competitive effects are too important to ignore, developments need to be monitored and studied carefully. The paper concludes that, although the time is not ripe for such regulatory changes in the United States, support can develop as business opportunities materialize. The future is certain to bring further debates and, perhaps, action to allow more flexible business organizations and new ways to dispense legal services to businesses and the general public.","PeriodicalId":294045,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Ownership (Sub-Topic)","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132277079","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Shareholding Concentration and Pyramidal Ownership Structures in Belgium: Stylized Facts","authors":"L. Renneboog","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1395","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1395","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides an overview of the main characteristics of the ownership structures of the Belgian companies quoted on the Brussels stock Exchange. Prior to the changes in corporate law regarding ownership disclosure in 1989 little was know about ownership and control. We show that the Belgian equity market has some similarities with equity markets of its Continental European neighbors : relatively few Belgian companies are listed and there is a high degree of ownership concentration. In addition, control is levered via pyramidal and complex ownership structures. Ultimate owners in such control chains are not only families and industrial companies but predominantly widely held holding companies that with relatively small cash flow rights, exercise substantial control rights.","PeriodicalId":294045,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Ownership (Sub-Topic)","volume":"143 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1996-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131753862","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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