{"title":"Grounding the Beneficiary Pays Principle","authors":"S. Bazargan-Forward","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192856906.003.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192856906.003.0001","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter develops a novel foundation for the beneficiary pays principle (BPP). Suppose a wrongdoer wrongs a victim by compelling labor from her. The wrongdoer owes the victim compensation. Suppose a third party innocently benefits from that wrongdoing. By benefiting, he, in effect, adds to the value of the labor that the wrongdoer compelled from the victim. And by adding to the value of the victim’s labor, the beneficiary ipso facto increases the amount of non-consensual labor compelled from the victim. The beneficiary thus exacerbates the wrong that the wrongdoer committed. Since the victim is owed by way of compensation the value of the labor forcibly extracted from her, the beneficiary, by keeping the benefits, is responsible for increasing what the victim is owed by way of compensation. And this is just to say that the beneficiary has a compensatory duty toward the victim, which is what the BPP states.","PeriodicalId":291332,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy Volume 8","volume":"124 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134447976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Humanitarian Intervention, Other-Defense, and Consent","authors":"J. Bowen","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192856906.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192856906.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines the role that the consent of intended beneficiaries plays in the moral permissibility of humanitarian intervention. When consent is not unanimous among a group to be defended, many doubt that consent has any bearing on the permissibility of defending others. It is held that allowing the refusal of consent to bear on the permissibility of other-defense wrongly enables some subset of the group to control whether the group as a whole is saved. This chapter argues that this view is mistaken. By refusing to consent to intervention, people leave in deliberation their rights against being subjected to risk and make it impermissible for interveners to appeal to the good of saving them. This makes it harder to justify intervention. Conversely, by consenting, people allow interveners to appeal to the prospective good of saving them to justify intervention. This makes it easier to justify intervention.","PeriodicalId":291332,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy Volume 8","volume":"144 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116430101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}