STICERD: Theoretical Economics (TE) (Topic)最新文献

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The Wrong Kind of Transparency 错误的透明度
STICERD: Theoretical Economics (TE) (Topic) Pub Date : 2002-10-01 DOI: 10.1257/0002828054201297
A. Prat
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引用次数: 616
Collective Bargaining Under Complete Information 完全信息下的集体谈判
STICERD: Theoretical Economics (TE) (Topic) Pub Date : 2000-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/S0147-9121(04)23011-4
C. Díaz-Moreno, J. Galdon-Sanchez
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引用次数: 12
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