{"title":"Subsentential Metasemantics","authors":"Neil Sinclair","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198866107.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198866107.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"A subsentential metasemantics provides an explanation of the meaning of subsentential parts. Practical expressivism holds that moral predicates’ contribution to the explanation of meaning is a function from the subject of a sentence to a moral attitude directed at that subject. Similarly, non-moral or descriptive predicates contribute a function from the subject of a sentence to a descriptive representation (a belief) that attributes a property to that subject. These claims are consistent with standard views of quantifiers as allowing us to make claims about the scope of the correct application of the predicates they govern, and tenses as delineating the range of subjects to which those predicates apply. The explanation of meaning provided by practical expressivism is potentially compatible with truth-conditional semantic theories so long as practical expressivists can claim that moral sentences are truth-apt.","PeriodicalId":279987,"journal":{"name":"Practical Expressivism","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127716521","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Conclusion","authors":"Neil Sinclair","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198866107.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198866107.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"This appendix compares the theory of practical expressivism developed in this book with two recent developments of expressivism: those developed by Schroeder in his book Being For, and by Ridge in his book Impassioned Belief. Practical expressivism rejects what Schroeder labels ‘The Basic Expressivist Maneuver’ and ‘Mentalism’. It also rejects the hybrid expressivist idea that all moral judgements express both beliefs and desire-like states. Other authors have raised problems for both these alternatives; the purpose of this appendix is simply to show that practical expressivism is a distinct alternative (and therefore avoids the known difficulties of the alternative views).","PeriodicalId":279987,"journal":{"name":"Practical Expressivism","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132408024","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}