Accounting: Financial Accounting最新文献

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Weak Creditor Rights and Insider Opportunism: Evidence from an Emerging Market 弱势债权人权利和内部机会主义:来自新兴市场的证据

Accounting: Financial Accounting Pub Date : 2017-08-04 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3010001

R. Gopalan, Xiumin Martin, K. Srinivasan

引用次数: 3

Target Performance Goals in CEO Compensation Contracts and Management Earnings Guidance CEO薪酬合同中的目标绩效目标与管理层盈余指导

Accounting: Financial Accounting Pub Date : 2017-03-11 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2931372

Xiumin Martin, Hojun Seo, Jun Yang, D. Kim

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引用次数: 2

Accounting Manipulation, Peer Pressure, and Internal Control 会计操纵、同业压力与内部控制

Accounting: Financial Accounting Pub Date : 2016-04-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2767829

Pingyang Gao, Gaoqing Zhang

引用次数: 60