Jennifer M. Pacella, Leora F. Eisenstadt, Jeffrey R. Boles
{"title":"Whistleblowing in the Compliance Era","authors":"Jennifer M. Pacella, Leora F. Eisenstadt, Jeffrey R. Boles","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3536680","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3536680","url":null,"abstract":"International events over the last several months have propelled the importance of whistleblowers to the forefront. It is increasingly evident that a whistleblower’s information has immense value for society. Yet, for years, such individuals have been the victims of retaliation, as they commonly experience threats, discrimination, and termination from employment as a result of their reporting. Against the backdrop of a current society heavily defined by compliance-focused initiatives across organizations and industries that construct robust compliance programs, internal policies, and codes of conduct, this Article highlights a significant gap in legal protections for would-be whistleblowers. While compliance initiatives demonstrate how active self-regulation is increasingly becoming a staple of organizational governance, we pinpoint in this Article the problems that arise when such initiatives extend beyond applicable legal thresholds for retaliation protection. This extension exposes vulnerable employees and potential whistleblowers to adverse employment actions without legal recourse even if they comply with their employers’ internal policies and compliance programs. We examine this gap in legal protections in the context of compliance initiatives within the following three domains: equal employment opportunity and sexual harassment; securities fraud; and anti-corruption. We then compare these initiatives with the legal and regulatory compliance postures under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, respectively, to illustrate the ways in which most compliance initiatives fall short of mirroring the retaliation protections applicable to these statutes. To remedy this gap in protections, we propose complementary solutions under contract and tort law frameworks, coupled with soft law initiatives.","PeriodicalId":265131,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Employment Discrimination (Topic)","volume":"78 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125006477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Limited Legal Recourse for Older Women's Intersectional Discrimination Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act","authors":"J. McLaughlin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3141269","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3141269","url":null,"abstract":"Older women compose a large share of labor force in the U.S. There are two federal statutes that can provide protection for older women against employers’ discriminatory behavior: the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII). Theories and empirical evidence suggest that older women are more discriminated against for being old and female, but there is a concerning policy implication that current legislation does not provide adequate protection for older women. The main reason for this concern is that older women’s intersectional discrimination invokes age-plus-sex or sex-plus-age cause of action. However, the courts do not recognize this cause of action under the ADEA and they have mixed views on this issue under Title VII. This article discusses evidence of older women’s intersectional discrimination and the importance of recognizing this intersectionality in proof structure. It also reviews case laws and the effectiveness of the age discrimination laws on older women’s labor market outcomes. The findings indicate that the ADEA does not provide equal employment opportunities for older women. Older women’s legal recourse for their unique intersectional discrimination for being old and female is constrained under the ADEA and Title VII strictly due to legislative peculiarities in statutes intended to solve this exact problem.","PeriodicalId":265131,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Employment Discrimination (Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116737376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What is a 'Transitory and Minor' Impairment?","authors":"F. Brickfield","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2553977","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2553977","url":null,"abstract":"2008 revisions to the Americans with Disabilities Act included changes to the standard for a claim of discrimination because an individual was regarded as disabled. The revisions included an exception to a claim if the impairment in question was \"transitory and minor,\" but the statute and subsequent guidance from EEOC failed to exactly define the term. The EEOC advised that an employer must show that the impairment in question was both transitory (defined in the statute as lasting less than 6 months 0 and minor. This article reviews twenty judicial decisions issued since 2011 that addressed the issue of \"transitory and minor.\" The decisions show wide disparity in application of the statute and guidance, with fully half the courts applying the term as an either/or requirement to defeat a claim of discrimination, and frequently basing their decisions solely on duration of impairment. Some trends in how the courts have viewed categories of disabilities are described. The paper recommends ways forward for advocates to align court decisions with EEOC guidance.","PeriodicalId":265131,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Employment Discrimination (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127704935","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Getting to Deuce: Professional Tennis and the Need for Expanding Coverage of Federal Antidiscrimination Laws","authors":"Collin R. Flake","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2566820","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2566820","url":null,"abstract":"In 2007, Wimbledon became the last Grand Slam tournament to equalize prize money payouts for male and female players. But research shows the persistence of a gender pay gap in tennis where women earn less than men. If this is the case, why haven’t women filed suit against their employers for unlawful sex discrimination? The answer is simple: because federal statutes prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex — such as Title VII and the Equal Pay Act — only apply to employees. Tennis players are independent contractors. The distinction between employees and independent contractors is perhaps the most litigated issue in employment law. Federal statutes define the term “employee” circularly and courts have applied the common law agency test, which is useful for adjudicating tort liability but not employment discrimination. The underinclusiveness of current antidiscrimination laws is especially problematic for high-paid independent contractors, like professional tennis players, because unequal treatment can mean the difference between hundreds of thousands of dollars in earnings. To effectuate the broad remedial purposes of the antidiscrimination laws, Congress and the courts should expand the laws' coverage. This Note takes a novel approach by using a socio-legal framework, with tennis as a case study, to argue that some independent contractors should be protected under federal law. The most practical and effective approach for expanding coverage is returning to the \"economic realities\" test. Courts have had no trouble applying the test in employment discrimination cases in the past, and it would enable the federal statutes to protect independent contractors who do not have employees, have unequal bargaining power, and exercise relatively little control over the manner in which they perform their work.","PeriodicalId":265131,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Employment Discrimination (Topic)","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128021832","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Positive Action for Women in Employment: Time to Align with Europe?","authors":"N. Burrows, M. Robison","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-6478.2006.00345.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6478.2006.00345.x","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years positive action to improve women's position in the labour market has risen up the political agenda, with measures ranging from quotas to special training. The legal framework has been slower to change. Initially seeking to eliminate all forms of discrimination, it now reflects a more sophisticated approach, attempting to achieve substantive equality. This may encompass measures which appear to disadvantage men but are aimed at rectifying women's structural, economic or historical disadvantage. We investigate the limits imposed on EU member states' ability to take positive action under Community law, and examine the much narrower provisions of the Sex Discrimination Act. We argue that the time is now ripe, with the ongoing review of equality law, to reappraise domestic law and to use the freedom provided under Community law to expand the scope of positive action under the Sex Discrimination Act.","PeriodicalId":265131,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Employment Discrimination (Topic)","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128288648","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Title VII Disparate Impact Liability Makes Almost Everything Presumptively Illegal","authors":"Gail L. Heriot","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3482015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3482015","url":null,"abstract":"This is a draft. The final version is forthcoming in the New York University Journal of Law and Liberty. \u0000 \u0000In Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971), the Supreme Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 went far beyond prohibiting intentional discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. According to the Court, it also presumptively outlawed job actions that have a “disparate impact,” regardless of whether the employer had an intent to discriminate. \u0000 \u0000The evidence that this was a misinterpretation of both the text and Congressional intent is overwhelming. Up until 1991, Griggs would have been an excellent candidate for an outright and explicit overruling. But the Civil Rights Act of 1991’s backhanded recognition of the disparate impact cause of action makes that more difficult than it otherwise might be. \u0000 \u0000This article discusses various ways in which disparate impact liability has been bad policy and various arguments for its unconstitutionality.","PeriodicalId":265131,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Employment Discrimination (Topic)","volume":"102 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115248222","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}