ERPN: Information Asymmetry (Sub-Topic)最新文献

Symmetric Ignorance: The Cost of Anonymous Lemons 对称无知:匿名柠檬的代价

ERPN: Information Asymmetry (Sub-Topic) Pub Date : 2019-08-18 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3439105

A. Bhide

引用次数: 3

Crowdfunding, Efficiency, and Inequality 众筹、效率和不平等

ERPN: Information Asymmetry (Sub-Topic) Pub Date : 2018-02-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2886401

Hans Peter Gruener, Christoph Siemroth

引用次数: 16

Group Membership, Relationship Banking and Loan Default Risk: The Case of Online Social Lending 组成员、关系银行与贷款违约风险:以网络社交借贷为例

ERPN: Information Asymmetry (Sub-Topic) Pub Date : 2015-09-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1114428

Craig R. Everett

引用次数: 142

Multi-Stage Investment, Long-Term Asymmetric Information and Pecking Order Revisited 多阶段投资、长期信息不对称与优先顺序再论

ERPN: Information Asymmetry (Sub-Topic) Pub Date : 2011-06-02 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1363480

A. Miglo

引用次数: 12

Optimal Sharing Rules in Repeated Partnerships 重复伙伴关系中的最优共享规则

ERPN: Information Asymmetry (Sub-Topic) Pub Date : 2008-03-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1278344

Hajime Kobayashi, Katsunori Ohta, Tadashi Sekiguchi

引用次数: 3

Asymmetric Information and Conglomerate Discount: Evidence from Spinoffs 信息不对称与企业集团贴现:来自分拆的证据

ERPN: Information Asymmetry (Sub-Topic) Pub Date : 2008-03-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1103724

C. Charoenwong, David K. Ding, Jing Pan

{"title":"Asymmetric Information and Conglomerate Discount: Evidence from Spinoffs","authors":"C. Charoenwong, David K. Ding, Jing Pan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1103724","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1103724","url":null,"abstract":"The existing literature argues that diversified firms may be undervalued due to the information asymmetry between a firm's management and the market. Splitting the firm's divisions into multiple business components is thought to facilitate the market valuation of each component more accurately. We investigate the information hypothesis from corporate spinoffs from 1981 through 2004. We use the post-spinoff data to reconstruct the diversified firm, assess the improvement in value at the combined firm level, and relate the value improvement to the change in the level of information asymmetry. We find that, prior to the spinoff, the sample firms have significantly higher levels of information asymmetry than their industry- and size-matched peers and that the level of information asymmetry decreases to a certain extent following the spinoff. We also find that the sample firms are valued at a substantial discount before the spinoff and that the valuation discount is eliminated after the completion of the spinoff. The matching firms, however, do not trade at a significant discount either pre- or post-spinoff. This is consistent with the view that only undervalued firms divest. More importantly, we find that the change in excess value around the spinoff is significantly and negatively related to the change in the level of information asymmetry. We conclude that information asymmetry is at least partly responsible for the diversification discount.","PeriodicalId":263020,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Information Asymmetry (Sub-Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116248953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Equilibrium Leasing Contracts Under Double-Sided Asymmetric Information 双面信息不对称下的均衡租赁契约

ERPN: Information Asymmetry (Sub-Topic) Pub Date : 2000-03-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.223731

Thomas J. Chemmanur, An Yan

{"title":"Equilibrium Leasing Contracts Under Double-Sided Asymmetric Information","authors":"Thomas J. Chemmanur, An Yan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.223731","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.223731","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a non-tax rationale for leasing in a double-sided asymmetric information setting, and analyze how various contractual provisions in leasing contracts arise in equilibrium. In our model, a manufacturer of capital goods has private information about their quality; entrepreneurs (users of these capital goods) come to learn this quality only over a period of time. Each unit of the capital goods requires a certain level of maintenance in each period. Entrepreneurs differ in their cost of providing this maintenance; this maintenance cost is information private to each entrepreneur. Leasing emerges as an equilibrium solution to this double-sided adverse selection problem. Various contractual provisions in leasing contracts (e.g., short-term versus long-term leases with non-cancellation provisions, option to buy at lease termination, and service leases) also emerge as equilibrium solutions under alternative settings. Leases with metering provisions emerge in equilibrium when, in addition to maintenance cost, entrepreneurs differ in other dimensions such as their intensity of using the capital good, and their degree of risk aversion. Our model has implications for the lease versus sell decision, the situations under which various leasing contract provisions are appropriate, and for the relative magnitudes of sales prices and the leasing costs for leases with different contractual provisions.","PeriodicalId":263020,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Information Asymmetry (Sub-Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125097927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 12