{"title":"The New Institutional Economics","authors":"D. Barković, I. Ferenčak","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv131bw26.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv131bw26.8","url":null,"abstract":"Although the organization of economics relations is of crucial importance, the traditional micro-economics is restricted to the theory of expenses on a single market, without transaction expenses. Throught the application of neo-classical instruments, new institutional economics extends the micro-economic field by putting the organization of economy into its congnitive object. In this article the authors present some important fields of the new institutional economics. From the point of view of institutional economics it is important that market economy does not operate only according to the principle that on one hand the state has set the legal regulations well, and that, on the other hand there are business operations between \"impersonal\" individuals. Personal contact and relational contracts between individuals play a very important role.It is true that markets - in one of their parts - really are organizations built up of individual economic subjects. We might say that the free market with a developed liberal competition is a highly developed organization of human cooperation, a system of individual co-operation, both in terms of the development of the rules of the game as well as in the terms of their keeping and successful implementation. Within the framework of institutional economics as a constituent part of microeconomics there is the intention to introduce premises close to reality which would analytically support the fields of organization, delegating, co-ordination, information, legal safeguarding. The new institutional economics includes, in particular, the analysis of property rights, economics of transaction expenses, and agency theory, which analyse institutions by means of the application of analytical instruments of neo-classical microeconomics.","PeriodicalId":262927,"journal":{"name":"Economics and the Law","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127543925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Public Choice Theory","authors":"P. Black","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv131bw26.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv131bw26.6","url":null,"abstract":"P ublic choice should be understood as a research program rather than a discipline or even a subdiscipline of economics. Its origins date to the mid-20th century, and viewed retrospectively, the theoretical “gap” in political economy that it emerged to fill seems so large that its development seems to have been inevitable. Nations emerging from World War II, including the Western democracies, were allocating between one-third and one-half of their total product through political institutions rather than through markets. Economists, however, were devoting their efforts almost exclusively to understanding and explaining the market sector. My own piddling first entry into the subject matter, in 1949, was little more than a call for those economists who examined taxes and spending to pay some attention to empirical reality, and thus to politics. Initially, the work of economists in this area raised serious doubts about the political process. Working simultaneously, but independently, Kenneth Arrow and Duncan Black proved that democracy, interpreted as majority rule, could not work to promote any general or public interest. The now-famous “impossibility theorem,” as published in Arrow’s book Social Choice and Individual Values (1951), stimulated an extended discussion. What Arrow and Black had in fact done was to discover or rediscover the phenomenon of “majority cycles,” whereby election results rotate in continuous cycles, with no equilibrium or stopping point. The suggestion of this analysis was that majoritarian democracy is inherently unstable.","PeriodicalId":262927,"journal":{"name":"Economics and the Law","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133790352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Index","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv131bw26.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv131bw26.12","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":262927,"journal":{"name":"Economics and the Law","volume":"91 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129013534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Institutional Law and Economics","authors":"Steven G. Medema, Nicholas J. Mercuro, W. Samuels","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv131bw26.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv131bw26.7","url":null,"abstract":"From its beginnings in the late nineteenth century, institutional economics has been concerned with the analysis of the interrelations between legal and economic processes. The institutional approach to law and economics examines both the influence of economy upon law and legal reasoning and the influence of law and legal change upon economic activity and performance. This essay examines the central tenants of institutional law and economics, dating from the early work of individuals such as Robert Lee Hale and John R. Commons and through its modern manifestations. As such, it emphasizes the evolutionary nature of law and economy, the tension between continuity and change, the problem of order, the reciprocal nature of legal-economic problems and the attendant dual nature of rights, the problematic nature of efficiency, and the need for a comparative institutional approach to the practice of law and economics. By recognizing the multiplicity of potential solutions to legal-economic problems and the underlying value premises attending each, the comparative institutional approach to law and economics attempts to flesh out both what is actually going on within the legal-economic nexus and the alternative possibilities open to society within the legal-economic decision-making process.","PeriodicalId":262927,"journal":{"name":"Economics and the Law","volume":"281 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122537649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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