{"title":"Coaches on Fire or Firing the Coach? Evidence of the Impact of Coach Changes on Team Performance from Italian Serie A","authors":"A. Argentieri, Luciano Canova, M. Manera","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3475379","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3475379","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, football data from the 2007/2008 to 2016/2017 seasons of the Italian Serie A were used to identify the effects of replacing a coach mid-season due to poor team performance. We used an instrumental variable approach to correlate coach turnover within a season with player productivity and found a very low positive impact of the coach change in the short term but a significant negative impact in the long term. Our findings are also relevant to the literature on management replacement in small-size firms.","PeriodicalId":259927,"journal":{"name":"FEEM: Economic Theory & Applications (Topic)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133254785","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Uncertainty and Risk-aversion in a Dynamic Oligopoly with Sticky Prices","authors":"Edilio Valentini, Paolo Vitale","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3364170","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3364170","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we present a dynamic discrete-time model that allows to investigate the impact of risk-aversion in an oligopoly characterized by a homogeneous non-storable good, sticky prices and uncertainty. Our model nests the classical dynamic oligopoly model with sticky prices by Fershtman and Kamien (Fershtman and Kamien, 1987), which can be viewed as the continuous-time limit of our model with no uncertainty and no risk-aversion. Focusing on the continuous-time limit of the infinite horizon formulation we show that the optimal production strategy and the consequent equilibrium price are, respectively, directly and inversely related to the degrees of uncertainty and risk-aversion. However, the effect of uncertainty and risk-aversion crucially depends on price stickiness since, when prices can adjust instantaneously, the steady state equilibrium in our model with uncertainty and risk aversion collapses to Fershtman and Kamien’s analogue.","PeriodicalId":259927,"journal":{"name":"FEEM: Economic Theory & Applications (Topic)","volume":"81 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116023794","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Three Layers of Uncertainty: An Experiment","authors":"I. Aydogan, L. Berger, V. Bosetti, Ning Liu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3209174","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3209174","url":null,"abstract":"We experimentally explore decision-making under uncertainty using a framework that decomposes uncertainty into three distinct layers: (1) physical uncertainty, entailing inherent randomness within a given probability model, (2) model uncertainty, entailing subjective uncertainty about the probability model to be used and (3) model misspecification, entailing uncertainty about the presence of the true probability model among the set of models considered. Using a new experimental design, we measure individual attitudes towards these different layers of uncertainty and study the distinct role of each of them in characterizing ambiguity attitudes. In addition to providing new insights into the underlying processes behind ambiguity aversion -failure to reduce compound probabilities or distinct attitudes towards unknown probabilities- our study provides the first empirical evidence for the intermediate role of model misspecification between model uncertainty and Ellsberg in decision-making under uncertainty.","PeriodicalId":259927,"journal":{"name":"FEEM: Economic Theory & Applications (Topic)","volume":"397-400 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129826157","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Compact or Spread-Out Cities: Urban Planning, Taxation, and the Vulnerability to Transportation Shocks","authors":"F. Gusdorf, Stéphane Hallegatte","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.965650","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.965650","url":null,"abstract":"This paper shows that cities made more compact by transportation taxation are more robust than spread-out cities to shocks in transportation costs. Such a shock, indeed, entails negative transition effects that are caused by housing infrastructure inertia and are magnified in low-density cities. Distortions due to a transportation tax, however, have in absence of shock detrimental consequences that need to be accounted for. The range of beneficial tax levels can, therefore, be identified as a function of the possible magnitude of future shocks in transportation costs. These taxation levels, which can reach significant values, reduce city vulnerability and prevent lock-ins in under-optimal situations.","PeriodicalId":259927,"journal":{"name":"FEEM: Economic Theory & Applications (Topic)","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122429478","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Choosing to Have Less Choice","authors":"Maria Seuanez-Salgado","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.889311","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.889311","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates choice between opportunity sets. I argue that individuals may prefer to have fewer options for two reasons: First, smaller choice sets may provide information and reduce the need for the agent to contemplate the alternatives. Second, contemplation costs may be increasing in the size of the choice set, making smaller sets more desirable even when they do not provide any information to the agent. I identify which of these reasons drives individual behavior in a laboratory experiment. I find strong support for both the information and cognitive overload arguments. The effects do not disappear as participants gain experience with the task. Applications of these results include firms' choices of product variety, as costs increase with the number of products offered, and the design of government policies, such as the Medicare Drug Discount Card Program, in which older citizens can choose among numerous cards for discounts in prescription drugs.","PeriodicalId":259927,"journal":{"name":"FEEM: Economic Theory & Applications (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126374297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What Determines Board of Directors' Turnover in Italy?","authors":"G. Brunello, Clara Graziano, Bruno Parigi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.200132","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.200132","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyses the turnover of board of directors members on a sample of companies listed on the Milan Stock Exchange in the period 1988-1996. Our aim is to investigate if board members change more frequently when company performance is poor, as the literature suggests, if this relationship is similar for C.E.O.s and other board members, and if and how the ownership structure of Italian companies affects these relationships. We use three different measures of board of directors turnovers: turnover A is the turnover of all board members; turnover B is the turnover of the President, Vice-President, C.E.O. and General Manager; finally turnover C is the turnover of C.E.O.s only. We find that changes in ownership affect turnover and that the relationship between turnover and performance is stronger in companies that have experienced a change in the controlling shareholder.","PeriodicalId":259927,"journal":{"name":"FEEM: Economic Theory & Applications (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116625651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}