{"title":"Propositions in Wittgenstein and Ramsey","authors":"M. Potter","doi":"10.1515/9783110657883-022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110657883-022","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":259505,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133879545","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Gutes Sehen","authors":"R. Raatzsch","doi":"10.1515/9783110657883-031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110657883-031","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":259505,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122371171","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Frontmatter","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/9783110657883-fm","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110657883-fm","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":259505,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124680284","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Adding 4.0241 to TLP","authors":"F. Berto","doi":"10.1515/9783110657883-025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110657883-025","url":null,"abstract":"Tractatus 4.024 inspired the dominant semantics of our time: truth-conditional semantics. Such semantics is focused on possible worlds: the content of p is the set of worlds where p is true. It has become increasingly clear that such an account is, at best, defective: we need an ‘independent factor in meaning, constrained but not determined by truth-conditions’ (Yablo 2014, p. 2), because sentences can be differently true at the same possible worlds. I suggest a missing comment which, had it been included in the Tractatus , would have helped semantics get this right from the start. This is my 4.0241: ‘Knowing what is the case if a sentence is true is knowing its ways of being true’: knowing a sentence’s truth possibilities and what we now call its topic, or subject matter. I show that the famous ‘fundamental thought’ that ‘the “logical constants” do not represent’ (4.0312) can be understood in terms of ways-based views of meaning. Such views also help with puzzling claims like 5.122: ‘If p follows from q , the sense of “ p ” is contained in the that of “ q ”’, which are compatible with a conception of entailment combining truth-preservation with the preservation of topicality, or of ways of being true. The way history has unrolled, the old containment idea was beaten out by the notion of truth preservation.","PeriodicalId":259505,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics","volume":"133 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130362586","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Assertions and Their Justification: Demonstration and Self-Evidence","authors":"V. D. Schaar","doi":"10.1515/9783110657883-012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110657883-012","url":null,"abstract":"In Frege’s epistemic account of logic, the notions assertion, justification and being evident play a central role. Although the notion of judging agent plays an important role in the explanation of these notions, this does not mean that Frege’s logic is committed to a form of psychologism. How can we use Frege’s account of these notions to illuminate the notions of demonstration and being evident in Constructive Type Theory (CTT)? As the judging agent also plays a role in CTT, how can it prevent a form of psychologism? Although the notion of demonstration cannot be understood without invoking a judging agent, such a judging agent is a first person, which is not to be understood as an empirical subject. And similarly for being evident. The latter notion is often taken to imply a form of psychologism. Although the appeal to the notion of being evident involves a form of fallibilism, the notion is normative, and therefore not psychological. It can thus be used to account for a justification of the inference rules.","PeriodicalId":259505,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics","volume":"111 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133738216","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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