{"title":"Incorporating Embodiment","authors":"J. Veldman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2731565","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2731565","url":null,"abstract":"The history of the corporate form shows that it is a problematic construct, which allows for the simultaneous use of multiple referents. The necessary use of these multiple referents, particularly in the construction of the economic ‘agent’ with contractual agency, provides the background for the necessary ontological understanding of all economic ‘agents’ and legal ‘subjects’ as ‘homo economicus’. The continued use of the corporate form, therefore, leads to the necessary evacuation of ontological content from the category of the legal ‘subject’ and the economic ‘agent’. I will show how this structural evacuation of embodied content relates to and affects the status of embodied human beings in these domains.","PeriodicalId":239134,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Governance in Earlier Eras (Topic)","volume":"89 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115654205","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Story of the United States' Laws of Corporations: Historical Perspective","authors":"Dr. Ahmed Alzaabi","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2267524","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2267524","url":null,"abstract":"There is no doubt that business corporations in the United States of America experienced many developments throughout history, as well as laws of corporations. Because current Laws of corporations are not the same as they were five centuries ago, this paper examines the evolution of corporation laws in the history of the United States of America, in chronological order. Since the origin of the United States laws was strongly linked with the Motherland laws, the first topic of this paper discusses briefly the English law by providing a background. The second topic is about corporation laws during the colonial period, while the third topic examines corporation laws from the American Revolution up to the end of the nineteenth century. The final topic of this paper discuses corporation law during the twentieth century.","PeriodicalId":239134,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Governance in Earlier Eras (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131856054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Law and Finance C. 1900","authors":"A. Musacchio","doi":"10.3386/W16216","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W16216","url":null,"abstract":"How persistent are the effects of legal institutions adopted or inherited in the distant past? A substantial literature argues that legal origins have persistent effects that explain clear differences in investor protections and financial development around the world today (La Porta et al, 1998, 1999 and passim). This paper examines the persistence of the effects of legal origins by examining new estimates of different indicators of financial development in more than 20 countries in 1900 and 1913. The evidence presented does not yield robust results that can sustain the hypothesis of persistence effects of legal origin, but it is not powerful enough to reject it either. Then the paper examines if there were systematic differences in the extent of investor protections across countries, since that is the main channel through which legal origin affects financial development, and shows that all the evidence supports the idea of relative convergence in corporate governance practices across legal families circa 1900. The paper concludes that, if the evidence presented is representative, the variation observed in financial development around the world today is likely a product of events of the twentieth century rather than a consequence of long-term (and persistent) differences occasioned by legal traditions.","PeriodicalId":239134,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Governance in Earlier Eras (Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130471071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Creating Order in the Absence of Formal Regulations and Law: A Historical Perspective on Corporate Governance and the Joint Stock Company","authors":"D. Tobin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2991572","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2991572","url":null,"abstract":"The legal and political explanations that underpin the contemporary literature on corporate governance have focused how the prevailing political or legal system determines how large corporations are governed. They imply that in order to facilitate good corporate practices, emerging economies should converge towards governance systems that offer strong legal protection for investors. Distinguishing itself from this approach, this paper adopts a historical account of the major political economy factors that either impeded or facilitated the evolution of the Anglo American Joint Stock Company (JSC). This illustrates how the JSC did note merge by blueprint or design as is implied in the literature. It also describes the implicit costs associated with the JSC including political rent seeking, the expropriation of small investors, market crises and monopolies. Under these circumstances legal and political developments often enhanced corporate power at the expense of the public interest. This account suggests that the JSC is better viewed as an adaptive and innovative organisational form that has thrived in the absence of formal regulations and law, rather than as a nexus of contracts arising from market failure. The evolution of the JSC and its corporate governance structures are therefore best understood within a political economy framework that accounts for market developments, political and legal interventions and the rise of the regulatory state. For developing economies the main lesson is not that they should replicate either the US or UK, but rather they can draw on the factors that allowed both countries to lessen the costs of mobilising finance, and adapt them to suit local market structures.","PeriodicalId":239134,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Governance in Earlier Eras (Topic)","volume":"162 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115997881","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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