{"title":"Insider Threats: It's the HUMAN, Stupid!","authors":"F. Greitzer","doi":"10.1145/3332448.3332458","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3332448.3332458","url":null,"abstract":"Insider threats refer to threats posed by individuals who intentionally or unintentionally destroy, exfiltrate, or leak sensitive information, or expose their organization to outside attacks. Surveys of organizations in government and industry consistently show that threats posed by insiders rival those posed by hackers, and that insider attacks are even more costly. Emerging U.S. government guidelines and policies for establishing insider threat programs tend to specify only minimum standards for insider threat monitoring, analysis, and mitigation programs. Arguably, one of the most serious challenges is to identify and integrate behavioral (sociotechnical) indicators of insider threat r isk in addition to cyber/technical indicators. That is, in focusing on data that are most readily obtained, insider threat programs most often miss the human side of the problem. This talk briefly describes research aiming to catalog human as well as technical factors associated with insider threat risk and summarizes several recent studies that seek to inform the development of more comprehensive, proactive approaches to insider threat assessment.","PeriodicalId":232970,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Northwest Cybersecurity Symposium","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131897963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
S. Gourisetti, S. Mix, M. Mylrea, C. Bonebrake, M. Touhiduzzaman
{"title":"Secure Design and Development Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (SD2-C2M2): Next-Generation Cyber Resilience by Design","authors":"S. Gourisetti, S. Mix, M. Mylrea, C. Bonebrake, M. Touhiduzzaman","doi":"10.1145/3332448.3332461","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3332448.3332461","url":null,"abstract":"The Secure Design and Development Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (SD2-C2M2) provides a browser-based tool that allows hardware and software developers to assess the maturity level of their design and development processes, allows management to determine desired maturity levels in seven domains, and allows developers to monitor process maturity improvements against management goals. The tool can be used by commercial developers as well as internal development organizations. This paper provides an overview of the tool and domains and presents a hypothetical case study of the tool to reduce software buffer overflow attack vulnerabilities by improving the software development process.","PeriodicalId":232970,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Northwest Cybersecurity Symposium","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129238866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"IoT Threats to the Smart Grid: A Framework for Analyzing Emerging Risks","authors":"D. S. Cardenas, A. Hahn","doi":"10.1145/3332448.3332452","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3332448.3332452","url":null,"abstract":"Internet of Things (IoT) technologies have experienced an unprecedented growth over the last decade due to their wide applicability and low overall costs. These same factors have also allowed IoT deployments to transition into industrial environments which are expected to meet high reliability requirements. These technological-base shifts have raised operational (safety) concerns among researchers, which have been further fueled by high-profile cyber incidents that have exposed vulnerabilities in field devices. Although, multiple IoT cyber security issues are being actively researched, a compelling issue is to identify threats associated with cross-domain devices. A cross-domain vulnerability is any such vulnerability that can cause other non-IT system to experience unintended consequences. Recent research has shown that physical systems, like the electrical grid might be exposed to abnormal conditions if a large set of load-controllable IoT devices are compromised [5]. Although risk reduction methodologies for bulk power components have been proposed these are focused towards SCADA-based systems which are owned, maintained, and operated by the utility under controlled environments. Whereas, IoT devices are owned by customers, spread across a wide service area, without supervised security policies. In this work, a detailed analysis of such threats is performed on large-scale IoT deployments that could allow attackers to control a large amount of aggregated power. Based on our research, future-growth of large-load controllers and smart inverters could pose threats to grid operations due to their rapid load changing capabilities, these changes could exceed steady-state or transient design limits leading to unintended consequences. Therefore utilities need to methodologically analyzing these risks. This paper proposes such a methodology, which includes risk modeling and mitigation strategies.","PeriodicalId":232970,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Northwest Cybersecurity Symposium","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133630367","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Theora Rice, Garret Seppala, Thomas W. Edgar, Daniel Cain, Eric Choi
{"title":"Fused Sensor Analysis and Advanced Control of Industrial Field Devices for Security: Cymbiote Multi-Source Sensor Fusion Platform","authors":"Theora Rice, Garret Seppala, Thomas W. Edgar, Daniel Cain, Eric Choi","doi":"10.1145/3332448.3332455","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3332448.3332455","url":null,"abstract":"Embedded field devices that sense and control physical processes in critical infrastructure are soft targets for cyber-attack because they lack the fundamental features for existing cyber security monitoring and control. In this paper we present a new platform to collect and fuse data across multiple cyber and physical streams from these field devices to enable the host based attack detection and security control capabilities that have become common within IT environments. Experiments of different attack behaviors are discussed and initial machine learning detection approach analysis is presented.","PeriodicalId":232970,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Northwest Cybersecurity Symposium","volume":"166 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131584360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jacob Benjamin, J. Abrahamson, R. Condit, T. McJunkin, Arupjyoti Bhuyan
{"title":"Cybersecurity Recommendations for Spectral Impact in Distributed Antenna Systems for Nuclear Energy","authors":"Jacob Benjamin, J. Abrahamson, R. Condit, T. McJunkin, Arupjyoti Bhuyan","doi":"10.1145/3332448.3332454","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3332448.3332454","url":null,"abstract":"Wireless access to data is a challenge for environments with poor radio frequency (RF) coverage, such as nuclear power plants. An 802.11 Wi-Fi data network often is not a cost-effective solution due to the extensive antenna outlay requirement for large nuclear facilities and poor signal penetration due to thick concrete walls. Combining commercial Long-Term Evolution (LTE) with an existing distributed antenna system (DAS) resources and infrastructure is an attractive solution due to the lower implementation costs, while achieving the needed RF coverage. A 2017 technical report by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) demonstrated that multiple systems such as Land Mobile Radio and LTE can be operated sharing the same DAS, leaky coaxial cabling and indoor antenna systems. Since the RF bands used by the two wireless systems are specified to be non-overlapping, it is believed that the systems are isolated from each other. This paper investigates the assumption of isolation between the two wireless systems and provides empirical testing to evaluate the channelization robustness of a DAS, identify specific vulnerabilities, and potential mitigations. The critical transceiver components were manipulated for the purpose of generating interference to adjacent incumbent protected communications users. This interference presents a direct vector to corrupt all signals being transmitted on the fiber link for the purpose of enabling a cyber-attack.","PeriodicalId":232970,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Northwest Cybersecurity Symposium","volume":"154 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134254017","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Proceedings of the Northwest Cybersecurity Symposium","authors":"","doi":"10.1145/3332448","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3332448","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":232970,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Northwest Cybersecurity Symposium","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116964441","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}