{"title":"The Normativity of Structural Rationality","authors":"Alex Worsnip","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197608142.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197608142.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter turns to the question of how, if at all, structural rationality (or coherence) is normative, or normatively significant. It spends some time getting clear about what the question at issue here is, then lays out the more pressing challenge for the normativity of structural rationality, which concerns how considerations about structural rationality could fit into our deliberation about what attitudes to have. It then attempts to meet this challenge by arguing that considerations about structural rationality (or coherence) are reasons to structure deliberation in certain ways; more particularly, to treat incoherent combinations of attitudes as off-limits in one’s deliberation and focus one’s deliberative attention on the coherent combinations. It also explores how this account relates to questions about the force or point of charges of structural irrationality.","PeriodicalId":227853,"journal":{"name":"Fitting Things Together","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131123615","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Coda: The Tyranny of Value","authors":"Alex Worsnip","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197608142.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197608142.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"This coda concludes the book by considering the demand to show that it’s valuable to be structurally rational, issuing a brief polemic against this demand and the broader value-centric picture of normativity that underlies it. It suggests that neither the requirements of structural rationality nor the requirements of substantive rationality are best understood in terms of value and that this is just an instance of a more general moral that not all normativity can be understood in terms of value.","PeriodicalId":227853,"journal":{"name":"Fitting Things Together","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121033421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Eliminations and Reductions II","authors":"Alex Worsnip","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197608142.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197608142.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines and argues against attempts to eliminate the category of substantive rationality or reduce it to structural rationality. Together with the previous chapter—which argues against eliminations and reductions of the converse kind—it thereby provides a positive case for dualism about rationality according to which both kinds of rationality are genuine and neither is reducible to the other. On the way, it also argues against ideal attitudes accounts of reasons; neo-Kantian views according to which it’s structurally irrational to be immoral; and radical forms of coherentism and Bayesianism in epistemology.","PeriodicalId":227853,"journal":{"name":"Fitting Things Together","volume":"140 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128975067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Talk About Structural Rationality","authors":"Alex Worsnip","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197608142.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197608142.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter turns to the semantics of our ordinary talk about structural rationality. Such talk is typically conditional in form, and there is a challenge about whether it squares with the account of the fundamental form of the requirements of structural rationality defended in the previous chapter. Some have tried to meet this challenge by saying that ordinary conditional normative utterances express wide-scope claims, but this chapter argues that this theory is not semantically plausible. Instead, it shows how a standard contextualist semantics for modals and conditionals can vindicate the truth of ordinary conditional utterances about rationality and, indeed, how it can say that these utterances come out true in virtue of requirements of structural rationality of the kind defended in the previous chapter.","PeriodicalId":227853,"journal":{"name":"Fitting Things Together","volume":"245 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131777101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Rough Account of Substantive Rationality","authors":"Alex Worsnip","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197608142.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197608142.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter gives a rough account of substantive rationality, the kind of rationality that contrasts with the book’s main topic, structural rationality. On this account, which mirrors some recently popular accounts in the literature, substantive rationality consists in responding to evidence-relative, right-kind reasons. It also argues against further restrictions on the kinds of reasons relevant to structural rationality—such as a “practical condition” and a condition excluding moral reasons—and introduces the distinction between ex ante and ex post substantive rationality. Finally, it explores accounts of structural rationality that closely mirror the offered account of substantive rationality by understanding the former as responsiveness to “subjective” or belief-relative reasons and argues that these accounts fail.","PeriodicalId":227853,"journal":{"name":"Fitting Things Together","volume":"101 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123991097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Upshots for Other Debates","authors":"Alex Worsnip","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197608142.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197608142.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter explores and draws out the consequences of both the dualist view of rationality defended in Part I and the theory of structural rationality defended in Part II for a series of standing debates in (meta)ethics and epistemology—including debates about moral rationalism, rational choice theory, higher-order evidence, the normativity of logic, epistemic permissivism, and conditionalization. It also considers and criticizes some popular ways of trying to account for the existence and force of coherence requirements in the formally inclined philosophical literature—namely, Dutch book and money pump arguments and accuracy dominance arguments.","PeriodicalId":227853,"journal":{"name":"Fitting Things Together","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129000035","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Eliminations and Reductions I","authors":"Alex Worsnip","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197608142.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197608142.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines and argues against attempts to eliminate the category of structural rationality or reduce it to substantive rationality. Together with the following chapter—which argues against eliminations and reductions of the converse kind—it thereby provides a positive case for dualism about rationality, according to which both kinds of rationality are genuine and neither is reducible to the other. On the way, it also argues that there are cases where being substantively rational does not suffice for being structurally rational, and examines the preface paradox and cases of misleading higher-order evidence.","PeriodicalId":227853,"journal":{"name":"Fitting Things Together","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123027033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Getting Structural (Ir)rationality into View","authors":"Alex Worsnip","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197608142.003.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197608142.003.0001","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter introduces the central notion of structural (ir)rationality that the book is concerned with, giving some central examples and hallmarks of the phenomenon. The author defines a lack of “fitting-togetherness” found in some combinations of mental states as incoherence. And he calls the particular kind of irrationality that incoherent states like these display structural irrationality. The author provides an initial case for a “dualist” view of rationality that distinguishes two equally genuine notions of rationality, structural and substantive. He also makes a number of clarifications about structural rationality, coherence, and the relationship between the two. Finally, he previews some of the central challenges for a theory of structural rationality.","PeriodicalId":227853,"journal":{"name":"Fitting Things Together","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133518828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Unifying the Instances of Incoherence","authors":"Alex Worsnip","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197608142.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197608142.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter gives an account of what unifies the diverse list of instances of incoherence. In so doing, it defends a biconditional test for when a combination of attitudinal mental states is incoherent. On the view defended, roughly, a set of states is incoherent iff it’s constitutive of these states that any agent who has them together necessarily has some disposition, when conditions of full transparency are met, to revise them. The chapter also relates the view it defends to constitutivism, according to which mental states are (at least partly) constituted by the norms that govern them, and to the view that rationality is a precondition of interpretation. It also explains how, even on the account offered, it is possible to be incoherent, and defends the contention that instances of incoherence in the sense identified are thereby instances of (structural) irrationality.","PeriodicalId":227853,"journal":{"name":"Fitting Things Together","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126436240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Requirements of Structural Rationality","authors":"Alex Worsnip","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197608142.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197608142.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter turns to the nature and form of requirements of structural rationality. It presents a recipe for generating requirements of structural rationality from verdicts about which states are incoherent (by the account defended in the previous chapter). On the resulting view, requirements of structural rationality are prohibitions on (incoherent) combinations of states. The chapter compares this with the closely related view that the requirements of rationality are “wide-scope” before reframing the debate over the scope of rational requirements and arguing for a view that is wide-scope, rather than narrow-scope, in spirit. It also argues that requirements of structural rationality are synchronic rather than diachronic. Finally, it defends the view that the demands of structural rationality are best thought of as requirements at all against a recent challenge.","PeriodicalId":227853,"journal":{"name":"Fitting Things Together","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126353373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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