2017 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC)最新文献

A Practical Fault Attack on ARX-Like Ciphers with a Case Study on ChaCha20 类arx密码的实际故障攻击——以ChaCha20为例

2017 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC) Pub Date : 2017-12-01 DOI: 10.1109/FDTC.2017.14

S. V. Dilip Kumar, Sikhar Patranabis, J. Breier, Debdeep Mukhopadhyay, S. Bhasin, A. Chattopadhyay, Anubhab Baksi

引用次数: 29

Escalating Privileges in Linux Using Voltage Fault Injection Linux下使用电压故障注入升级权限

2017 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC) Pub Date : 2017-09-01 DOI: 10.1109/FDTC.2017.16

N. Timmers, Cristofaro Mune

{"title":"Escalating Privileges in Linux Using Voltage Fault Injection","authors":"N. Timmers, Cristofaro Mune","doi":"10.1109/FDTC.2017.16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/FDTC.2017.16","url":null,"abstract":"Today's standard embedded device technology is not robust against Fault Injection (FI) attacks such as Voltage Fault Injection (V-FI). FI attacks can be used to alter the intended behavior of software and hardware of embedded devices. Most FI research focuses on breaking the implementation of cryptographic algorithms. However, this paper's contribution is in showing that FI attacks are effective at altering the intended behavior of large and complex code bases like the Linux Operating System (OS) when executed by a fast and feature rich System-on-Chip (SoC). More specifically, we show three attacks where full control of the Linux OS is achieved from an unprivileged context using V-FI. These attacks target standard Linux OS functionality and operate in absence of any logical vulnerability. We assume an attacker that already achieved unprivileged code execution. The practicality of the attacks is demonstrated using a commercially available V-FI test bench and a commercially available ARM CortexA9 SoC development board. Finally, we discuss mitigations to lower probability and minimize impact of a successful FI attack on complex systems like the Linux OS.","PeriodicalId":227188,"journal":{"name":"2017 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114715951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 50

Exploiting Bitflip Detector for Non-invasive Probing and its Application to Ineffective Fault Analysis 利用位翻转检测器进行无创探测及其在无效故障分析中的应用

2017 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC) Pub Date : 2017-09-01 DOI: 10.1109/FDTC.2017.17

T. Sugawara, Natsu Shoji, K. Sakiyama, Kohei Matsuda, N. Miura, M. Nagata

引用次数: 4

Laser-Induced Fault Injection on Smartphone Bypassing the Secure Boot 绕过安全启动的智能手机激光诱导故障注入

2017 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC) Pub Date : 2017-09-01 DOI: 10.1109/FDTC.2017.18

Aurélien Vasselle, Hugues Thiebeauld, Q. Maouhoub, A. Morisset, S. Ermeneux

引用次数: 43

CAMFAS: A Compiler Approach to Mitigate Fault Attacks via Enhanced SIMDization CAMFAS:一种通过增强simization来减轻错误攻击的编译器方法

2017 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC) Pub Date : 2017-09-01 DOI: 10.1109/FDTC.2017.10

Zhi Chen, Junjie Shen, A. Nicolau, A. Veidenbaum, N. F. Ghalaty, Rosario Cammarota

引用次数: 17

AutoFault: Towards Automatic Construction of Algebraic Fault Attacks 自动故障:代数故障攻击的自动构造

2017 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC) Pub Date : 2017-09-01 DOI: 10.1109/FDTC.2017.13

Jan Burchard, Mael Gay, Ange-Salomé Messeng Ekossono, J. Horácek, B. Becker, Tobias Schubert, M. Kreuzer, I. Polian

引用次数: 20

Practical Fault Attack against the Ed25519 and EdDSA Signature Schemes Ed25519和EdDSA签名方案的实用故障攻击

2017 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC) Pub Date : 2017-09-01 DOI: 10.1109/FDTC.2017.12

Yolan Romailler, Sylvain Pelissier

引用次数: 35

Safety != Security: On the Resilience of ASIL-D Certified Microcontrollers against Fault Injection Attacks 安全=安全:ASIL-D认证微控制器对故障注入攻击的弹性

2017 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC) Pub Date : 2017-09-01 DOI: 10.1109/FDTC.2017.15

Nils Wiersma, Ramiro Pareja

{"title":"Safety != Security: On the Resilience of ASIL-D Certified Microcontrollers against Fault Injection Attacks","authors":"Nils Wiersma, Ramiro Pareja","doi":"10.1109/FDTC.2017.15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/FDTC.2017.15","url":null,"abstract":"With the ever increasing amount of electronic components in vehicles and in particular the amount of complex autonomous actions that these components perform, security topics become more and more important in the automotive industry. Not only from a business point of view, as valuable IP assets are contained within these components, but also from a safety point of view, especially when vulnerabilities lead to remotely exploitable attacks. Logical attacks in this field are abundant, but attacks using hardware centered techniques such as fault injection are underrepresented. Researchers and professionals often pay no attention in these attacks because they require physical access to the chip, ignoring that the assets obtained (e.g. firmware, keys, etc.) can be used later to prepare a remote attack.This work aims to address the lack of attention on fault injection attacks by investigating two modern microcontroller units that receive the highest safety assurance rating (ASIL-D) of the ISO 26262 automotive standard. This is done in both a theoretical characterization setup and a more realistic setup where debugging interfaces are targeted. The results obtained from these setups show that the mechanisms implemented to adhere to this maximum safety rating do not adequately protect against fault injection attacks and are therefore insufficient to ensure security by themselves — additional countermeasures are required. Each setup required approximately one week of preparation, but once the attacker finds the optimal fault injection parameters, the attack can be repeated in less than an hour. We provide some recommendations on what type of countermeasures should be considered to improve the security with respect to fault injection attacks and also provide several pointers to continue the security research in this area.","PeriodicalId":227188,"journal":{"name":"2017 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129671255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 22

One Plus One is More than Two: A Practical Combination of Power and Fault Analysis Attacks on PRESENT and PRESENT-Like Block Ciphers 一加一大于二:对PRESENT和类PRESENT分组密码的功率和故障分析攻击的实用组合

2017 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC) Pub Date : 2017-09-01 DOI: 10.1109/FDTC.2017.11

Sikhar Patranabis, J. Breier, Debdeep Mukhopadhyay, S. Bhasin

{"title":"One Plus One is More than Two: A Practical Combination of Power and Fault Analysis Attacks on PRESENT and PRESENT-Like Block Ciphers","authors":"Sikhar Patranabis, J. Breier, Debdeep Mukhopadhyay, S. Bhasin","doi":"10.1109/FDTC.2017.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/FDTC.2017.11","url":null,"abstract":"We present the first practically realizable sidechannel assisted fault attack on PRESENT, that can retrieve the last round key efficiently using single nibble faults. The attack demonstrates how side-channel leakage can allow the adversary to precisely determine the fault mask resulting from a nibble fault injection instance. We first demonstrate the viability of such an attack model via side-channel analysis experiments on top of a laser-based fault injection setup, targeting a PRESENT-80 implementation on an ATmega328P microcontroller. Subsequently, we present a differential fault analysis (DFA) exploiting the knowledge of the output fault mask in the target round to recover multiple last round key nibbles independently and in parallel. Both analytically and through experimental evidence, we show that the combined attack can recover the last round key of PRESENT with 4 random nibble fault injections in the best case, and around 7- 8 nibble fault injections in the average case. Our attack sheds light on a hitherto unexplored vulnerability of PRESENT and PRESENT-like block ciphers that use bit-permutations instead of maximum distance separable (MDS) layers for diffusion.","PeriodicalId":227188,"journal":{"name":"2017 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC)","volume":"277 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134449100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 24