{"title":"Coalitional equilibria in non-cooperative games with strategic substitutes : Self-enforcing coalition deviations and irreversibility","authors":"Ryusuke Shinohara","doi":"10.15002/00023140","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15002/00023140","url":null,"abstract":"Introducing a coalitional equilibrium with restricted deviations, we examine how effectively equilibria based on coalitional stability refineNash equilibria in gameswithσ -strategic substitutes andσ -monotone externalities. From the existing equilibria such as coalition-proof Nash equilibria and near-strong Nash equilibria, we can consider several ways to restrict coalitional deviations. We incorporate two natural self-enforcing conditions of coalition deviations, Nash stability and irreversibility, into the coalitional equilibrium and provide a more general analysis than earlier studies. We find it impossible that in each of the two stability concepts, the coalitional equilibrium effectively refines the Nash equilibrium for all games with σ -strategic substitutes and σ -monotone externalities. JEL classification numbers. C72; D62","PeriodicalId":225152,"journal":{"name":"Journal of international economic studies","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133261737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}