{"title":"Telecom Growth Trajectory in India","authors":"Hiranmoy Roy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1458908","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1458908","url":null,"abstract":"Today, India’s telephone network is one of the largest communication network in the world which containues to grow at blisteing pace. The indian Telecommunications network with over 190 million connections is the third largest in the world and the second largest among the emerging econimies of Asia. This paper is designed to analyse the position of telecom in India. The paper is scattered in to different sections including history of telecom in India, Methodology, Survey of Literature, India as a major player, modern growth story of telecom in India, teledensity, mobile technology growth, present scenario, internet usage and concluding observations","PeriodicalId":225028,"journal":{"name":"USC Institute of Economic Policy Research (IEPR) Working Paper Series","volume":"54 3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116832916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"S-Shaped Transition and Catapult Effects","authors":"Hyeok Jeong, Y. Kim","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.916784","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.916784","url":null,"abstract":"Among the rich economies of the world today, per capita output levels had typically diverged before converging to the per capita output level of the frontier economy. Since frontier economies have grown at stable rates, non-frontier economies display an S-shape aggregate transition path. Along this transition, there are \"catapult effects\": longer episodes of divergence are associated with faster subsequent rates of convergence to the frontier. In this paper, we construct and quantitatively assess a model of S-shaped transition with catapult effects. Deviations in per capita output from frontier economy levels are endogenous, while conventional growth accounting would classify these deviations as TFP differences","PeriodicalId":225028,"journal":{"name":"USC Institute of Economic Policy Research (IEPR) Working Paper Series","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121504825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Panel Data Analysis - Advantages and Challenges","authors":"C. Hsiao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.902657","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.902657","url":null,"abstract":"We explain the proliferation of panel data studies in terms of (i) data availability, (ii) the more heightened capacity for modeling the complexity of human behavior than a single cross-section or time series data can possibly allow, and (iii) challenging methodology. Advantages and issues of panel data modeling are also discussed.","PeriodicalId":225028,"journal":{"name":"USC Institute of Economic Policy Research (IEPR) Working Paper Series","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130364367","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Boosting Your Instruments: Estimation with Overidentifying Inequality Moment Conditions","authors":"H. Moon, F. Schorfheide","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.954741","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.954741","url":null,"abstract":"This paper derives limit distributions of empirical likelihood estimators for models in which inequality moment conditions provide overidentifying information. We show that the use of this information leads to a reduction of the asymptotic mean-squared estimation error and propose asymptotically valid confidence sets for the parameters of interest. While inequality moment conditions arise in many important economic models, we use a dynamic macroeconomic model as data generating process and illustrate our methods with instrumental variable estimators of monetary policy rules. The assumption that output does not fall in response to an expansionary monetary policy shock leads to an inequality moment condition that can substantially increase the precision with which the policy rule is estimated. The results obtained in this paper extend to conventional GMM estimators.","PeriodicalId":225028,"journal":{"name":"USC Institute of Economic Policy Research (IEPR) Working Paper Series","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122956693","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An Equilibrium Model of Managerial Compensation","authors":"M. Magill, M. Quinzii","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.716450","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.716450","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies a general equilibrium model with two groups of agents, investors (shareholders) and managers of firms, in which managerial effort is not observable and influences the probabilities of firms' outcomes. Shareholders of each firm offer the manager an incentive contract which maximizes the firm's market value, under the assumption that the financial markets are complete relative to the possible outcomes of the firms. The paper studies two sources of inefficiency of equilibrium. First, when investors are risk averse and effort influences probability, market-value maximization differs from maximization of expected utility. Second, because the optimal contract exploits all sources of information for inferring managerial effort, when firms' outputs are correlated the contract of a manager depends on the outcomes of other firms. This leads to an external effect of the effort of one manager on the compensation of other managers, which market-value maximization ignores. We show that under typical conditions these two effects lead to an under-provision of effort in equilibrium. These inefficiencies disappear however if each firm is replicated, and in the limit there is a continuum of firms of each type.","PeriodicalId":225028,"journal":{"name":"USC Institute of Economic Policy Research (IEPR) Working Paper Series","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134002661","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Common Shocks and Relative Compensation Schemes","authors":"M. Magill, M. Quinzii","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.716443","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.716443","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies qualitative properties of an optimal contract in a multi-agent setting in which agents are subject to a common shock. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the optimal reward of an agent to be a decreasing (increasing) function of the outputs of the other agents, under the assumption that the agents' outputs are informative signals of the value of the common shock. The condition is that the likelihood ratio of a given outcome with high versus low effort be a decreasing (increasing) function of the common shock. We derive conditions on the way the common shock affects the marginal product of effort under which the likelihood ratio is decreasing for all output levels, or increasing for some output levels and decreasing for others.","PeriodicalId":225028,"journal":{"name":"USC Institute of Economic Policy Research (IEPR) Working Paper Series","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123179412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}