Proceedings of the 3rd Annual Industrial Control System Security Workshop最新文献

Secure Data Provenance in Home Energy Monitoring Networks 家庭能源监测网络中的安全数据来源

Proceedings of the 3rd Annual Industrial Control System Security Workshop Pub Date : 2017-12-05 DOI: 10.1145/3174776.3174778

M. H. Chia, S. Keoh, Zhaohui Tang

引用次数: 11

Securing SCADA Applications Using OpenPLC With End-To-End Encryption 使用端到端加密的OpenPLC保护SCADA应用程序

Proceedings of the 3rd Annual Industrial Control System Security Workshop Pub Date : 2017-12-05 DOI: 10.1145/3174776.3174777

Thiago Alves, Thomas H. Morris, S. Yoo

{"title":"Securing SCADA Applications Using OpenPLC With End-To-End Encryption","authors":"Thiago Alves, Thomas H. Morris, S. Yoo","doi":"10.1145/3174776.3174777","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3174776.3174777","url":null,"abstract":"During its nascent stages, Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) were made robust to sustain tough industrial environments, but little care was taken to raise defenses against potential cyberthreats. The recent interconnectivity of legacy PLCs and SCADA systems with corporate networks and the internet has significantly increased the threats to critical infrastructure. To counter these threats, researchers have put their efforts in finding defense mechanisms that can protect the SCADA network and the PLCs. Encryption is a critical component of security and therefore has been used by many organizations to protect data on the network. However, since PLC vendors don't make available information about their hardware or software, it becomes challenging to embed encryption into their devices, especially if they rely on legacy protocols. This paper describes an alternative design using an open source PLC that was modified to encrypt all data it sends over the network, independently of the protocol used. Experimental results indicated that the encryption layer increased the security of the link without causing a significant overhead.","PeriodicalId":224503,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 3rd Annual Industrial Control System Security Workshop","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130175214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 11

DoS Exploitation of Allen-Bradley's Legacy Protocol through Fuzz Testing 通过模糊测试的DoS利用Allen-Bradley的遗留协议

Proceedings of the 3rd Annual Industrial Control System Security Workshop Pub Date : 2017-12-05 DOI: 10.1145/3174776.3174780

Francisco Tacliad, Thuy D. Nguyen, Mark A. Gondree

引用次数: 10

Timing Performance Profiling of Substation Control Code for IED Malware Detection 用于IED恶意软件检测的变电站控制代码时序性能分析

Proceedings of the 3rd Annual Industrial Control System Security Workshop Pub Date : 2017-12-05 DOI: 10.1145/3174776.3174779

J. Rrushi

{"title":"Timing Performance Profiling of Substation Control Code for IED Malware Detection","authors":"J. Rrushi","doi":"10.1145/3174776.3174779","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3174776.3174779","url":null,"abstract":"We present a binary static analysis approach to detect intelligent electronic device (IED) malware based on the time requirements of electrical substations. We explore graph theory techniques to model the timing performance of an IED executable. Timing performance is subsequently used as a metric for IED malware detection. More specifically, we perform a series of steps to reduce a part of the IED malware detection problem into a classical problem of graph theory, namely finding single-source shortest paths on a weighted directed acyclic graph (DAG). Shortest paths represent execution flows that take the longest time to compute. Their clock cycles are examined to determine if they violate the real-time nature of substation monitoring and control, in which case IED malware detection is attained. We did this work with particular reference to implementations of protection and control algorithms that use the IEC 61850 standard for substation data representation and network communication. We tested our approach against IED exploits and malware, network scanning code, and numerous malware samples involved in recent ICS malware campaigns.","PeriodicalId":224503,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 3rd Annual Industrial Control System Security Workshop","volume":"87 (2017) 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133309962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Proceedings of the 3rd Annual Industrial Control System Security Workshop 第三届工业控制系统安全研讨会论文集

Proceedings of the 3rd Annual Industrial Control System Security Workshop Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.1145/3174776

引用次数: 0