{"title":"Bulgaria","authors":"R. Kolarova, M. Spirova","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198844372.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198844372.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"Democracy in Bulgaria came as a result of a pact that preserved the role of the communist successor party to a larger degree than in many other post-communist countries in Central Eastern Europe (CEE). That had an impact on the nature of coalition government as well as an important but rarely noted aspect of the legacy of the successor party, the Bulgarian Socialist party (BSP). Because of the dominant position of the BSP, its personalized and centralized vision and practice of governing have remained characteristic of the political system. Coalition government is the dominant pattern in Bulgarian democratic politics: of the eleven party-based cabinets since 1990, only four were single-party ones. There are several major features of coalition government in Bulgaria: one is that party-building and coalition-making have been deeply intertwined over the entire period. Further, coalitions have been based on the understanding that parties divide the power and accompanying privileges, rather than that they share responsibility for government. Thus, in contrast to some longer-standing democracies the coalition formation process rarely involves detailed agreements on policy, and has mostly revolved around personalities and portfolios. As a result, coalition agreements have been minimal and the periods of coalition bargaining have been relatively short. Conflict resolution mechanisms are centralized and personalized, and coalitions have broken down because of narrow party political interests rather than because of principled conflicts over public policy.","PeriodicalId":224064,"journal":{"name":"Coalition Governance in Central Eastern Europe","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133773758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hungary","authors":"G. Ilonszki","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198844372.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198844372.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"The core features of coalition politics in Hungary are majority coalitions and stable governments. A small number of parliamentary parties are strongly divided both on cultural and economic cleavage lines. This does not offer much flexibility in coalition formation. Before 2010 coalitions were controlled by alternating senior parties of either conservative or left orientation, thereafter coalitions have been characterized by one-party conservative dominance. The coalitions of the left were based on more equal partnership, deeper policy consciousness, and more established party organization than the conservative coalitions. Hungary has developed in to a case of prime ministerial government built on constitutional, legal, political, and occasionally personal grounds. Secured by the constructive no-confidence vote, enjoying authority in the nomination and dismissal of ministers, being party leader, and not facing strong political rivals or institutional veto points, most prime ministers have enjoyed unquestionable power. Over the decades, governance has become increasingly centralized and politicized. The management of coalition conflicts has moved away from Parliament and cabinet to narrow circles of party political or personal nominees. Publicly available coalition agreements, with few exceptions, have not been policy-oriented and have not provided much guidance on coalition governance or conflict resolution techniques. Still, disciplined legislative and parliamentary behaviour has been common and early elections have never taken place. Government termination has rarely occurred due to policy conflicts between the coalition partners. Junior coalition parties have paid huge electoral costs for their participation in government.","PeriodicalId":224064,"journal":{"name":"Coalition Governance in Central Eastern Europe","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130752591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}