LSN: Payday Lending (Sub-Topic)最新文献

{"title":"The Power of Community Action: Anti‐Payday Loan Ordinances in Three Metropolitan Areas","authors":"R. N. Mayer, N. Martin","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2910683","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2910683","url":null,"abstract":"Local ordinances that restrict payday lending constitute an important strategy in the overall attack on this problematic form of lending. In this report, made possible by the generous support of Silicon Valley Community Foundation, we describe and analyze campaigns in three locales that differ markedly in the opportunities and challenges faced by ordinance advocates. The locales are Santa Clara and San Mateo counties in California (“Silicon Valley”); Dallas, Denton, and Tarrant counties in Texas; and Salt Lake County in Utah. This report finds both commonalities and important variations among these campaigns. While there is no single recipe for a successful ordinance campaign, our comparative analysis suggests the following ten lessons for payday lending opponents and other advocates of social reform via local action.","PeriodicalId":210915,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Payday Lending (Sub-Topic)","volume":"26 7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126052279","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Payday Peonage: Thirteenth Amendment Implications In Payday Lending","authors":"Z. Lees","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2009022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2009022","url":null,"abstract":"During the recent economic downturn, payday lenders’ business and profits have soared while traditional banks have tightened up their lending practices and experienced plummeting stock values. Payday lenders thrive in depressed economic climates. They do so by making short term, high interest loans to the underclass, generally the poor in urban and immigrant communities who need money to meet basic needs and who are without the sophistication to properly assess the risks of payday loans. Members of the underclass, therefore, are especially vulnerable to and ideal targets for predatory practices and exploitive loans. As the underclass, almost by definition, do not have the resources to pay back payday loans, they must “rollover” the loans and must eventually owe exponentially more than the terms of their original loan. In effect, payday loans enrich lenders while perpetuating the limited economic and social position of the underclass. As a result, the payday lending industry must be regulated. This article argues that the Thirteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution – which formally ended slavery – is the proper vehicle for Congress to impose federal usury caps on payday loans. In order to make this case, this Article provides an overview of payday lending practices; describes the underclass; discusses the Thirteenth Amendment, including its ratification, judicial history, and modern development; and then applies the Thirteenth Amendment to payday lending and the underclass. Much has been written on the subject of payday lending practices, notably Professor Nathalie Martin’s work on the predatory nature of payday lenders. Yet, the Thirteenth Amendment implications of payday lending have not been addressed and little has been done to address the conditions faced by the underclass. This paper makes clear that the Thirteenth Amendment is triggered by payday lenders’ targeting of a vulnerable social and economic people and that the Amendment provides an appropriate avenue for regulating this particular industry.","PeriodicalId":210915,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Payday Lending (Sub-Topic)","volume":"112 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128078949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"How the Payday Predator Hides Among Us: The Predatory Nature of the Payday Loan Industry and its Use of Consumer Arbitration to Further Discriminatory Lending Practices","authors":"Michael A Satz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1687404","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1687404","url":null,"abstract":"This Article argues that Payday lending is a predatory lending practice that disproportionately targets minority customers, and that the Payday lending industry utilizes consumer arbitration agreements to further the industry’s discriminatory lending practices. The Article further argues that the protections afforded military members in the FY 2007 Defense Authorization Act should be applied globally in the form of federal legislation. While there is no bright line definition of what constitutes predatory lending, there are certain badges that tend to be present in a predatory lending transaction, which include high interest rates, limited or confusing disclosures, deceptive acts and practices utilized in drawing in would-be customers, and often the targeting of particularly vulnerable classes of persons. The Payday lending industry makes effective use of these predatory practices to target vulnerable classes of customers, particularly targeting African-American and Latino populations, and engages in lending practices that can lead to loans with interest rates in excess of 500%. Concurrent with the rise of the Payday lending industry in the United States, consumer arbitration agreements became popular. These arbitration agreements require consumers with a legal claim against a business to submit that claim to binding, final arbitration. Although arbitrators in such cases are ostensibly supposed to be neutral, recent evidence indicates that such arbitrators favor lenders in consumer disputes and, in addition, the arbitration of consumer disputes is replete with other problems including issues with fairness, financial costs, other transaction costs, and lack of knowledge on the consumer’s part. Payday lenders take advantage of the benefits that consumer arbitration offers to repeat business players to shield their predatory actions from the public eye, thereby lessening the chance that a state or federal regulatory authority will learn of these actions and consequently take regulatory action or steps in civil court to curb the questionable conduct. Likewise, when dealing with individual consumers, the arbitration agreements tend to dissuade consumers from pressing a claim, prevent consumers with similar claims from learning about previous cases, and prevent consumers from joining forces as members of a class in a class action law suit. Because one of the predicates of the Payday lending industry is predatory lending that targets minority customers, the use of arbitration agreements to shield the industry from liability and accountability make these arbitration agreements effective tools that allow the Payday lending industry to further propagate its discriminatory lending practices. This Article concludes with a call for a ban of the use of arbitration agreements in the Payday lending field, and further seeks more equitable and representative drafting and application of legislation to protect all constituencies from predatory lending practices.","PeriodicalId":210915,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Payday Lending (Sub-Topic)","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115849101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}