CGN: General (Shareholders) (Sub-Topic)最新文献

{"title":"A Theoretical Review on Corporate Tax Avoidance: Shareholder Approach versus Stakeholder Approach","authors":"N. Mohanadas, A. Salim, S. Ramasamy","doi":"10.35609/jfbr.2019.4.3(1)","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35609/jfbr.2019.4.3(1)","url":null,"abstract":"Objective - Although corporate tax avoidance is a widely discussed topic in the literature, conflicts do emerge when it is analyzed through the context of primary corporate duty. Should companies, in managing their taxes, solely honor their obligation to increase shareholders' wealth or should they cater to the interests of all their stakeholders? Such conflicts are especially evident in the inconsistent empirical observations on how corporate tax avoidance relate to corporate social responsibility (CSR), which makes the dearth of theoretical analysis on this issue even more conspicuous. Taking into account the socio-political nature and human elements in corporate tax avoidance, theoretical analyses from social sciences' perspectives are becoming markedly crucial.\u0000\u0000Methodology/Technique – This paper critically reviews the extant literature for discussions on how corporate tax avoidance is influenced by the dissenting approaches towards primary corporate duty.\u0000\u0000Findings – By allowing an insight into how people act and the world they live in, these analyses form a constructive tool to rationalize and foretell managerial actions towards shareholders and stakeholders alike.\u0000\u0000Novelty – It focuses particularly on the theories that are widely used to lend supports for such approaches. These theories are the agency theory, stakeholder theory, and legitimacy theory.\u0000\u0000Type of Paper - Review.\u0000\u0000Keywords: Corporate Tax Avoidance; Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR); Theoretical Analysis; Shareholder Approach; Stakeholder Approach; Agency Theory; Stakeholder Theory; Legitimacy Theory.\u0000\u0000JEL Classification: G30, G32, G39.","PeriodicalId":210480,"journal":{"name":"CGN: General (Shareholders) (Sub-Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115345220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"ESG Shareholder Engagement and Downside Risk","authors":"Andreas G. F. Hoepner, Ioannis Oikonomou, Z. Sautner, L. Starks, Xiaoyan Zhou","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2874252","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2874252","url":null,"abstract":"Direct institutional shareholder engagement on environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues has become increasingly important. We show that ESG shareholder engagement reduces downside risk, measured using lower partial moments and value at risk. We document this effect by exploiting proprietary access to the complete engagement database of one of the world’s largest institutional shareholder activist. We document a risk-reduction effect only for engagements where portfolio firms respond with real actions to the investor’s demands. The risk effect of ESG engagement varies across engagement themes. It is effective when governance or strategy & risk topics are addressed, and if changes in firms’ environmental policies are coupled with governance improvements.","PeriodicalId":210480,"journal":{"name":"CGN: General (Shareholders) (Sub-Topic)","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124656403","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"From Shareholder Stewardship to Shareholder Duties: Is the Time Ripe?","authors":"I. Chiu, D. Katelouzou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2731241","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2731241","url":null,"abstract":"In the context of the increasing institutionalisation of global equity, this chapter examines the development of the soft law of shareholder stewardship originating in the UK Stewardship Code and provides insights into its prospective evolution into hard law standards of behaviour for institutional shareholders. We argue that the time is ripe for the development of shareholder duties on the part of institutional investors. We contend that the proposed Shareholder Rights Directive is already taking a step towards that direction by introducing a semi-hard law of a fiduciary duty to demonstrate engagement at a pan-European level. We argue that such a duty is relevant to different European jurisdictions; even if ownership structures are still rather different across the EU there is a shifting balance between traditional blockholders, such as families, and institutional investors.","PeriodicalId":210480,"journal":{"name":"CGN: General (Shareholders) (Sub-Topic)","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128229154","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Shareholder Empowerment in Controlled Companies: The Case of Singapore","authors":"Luh Luh Lan, Umakanth Varottil","doi":"10.4337/9781782546856.00044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781782546856.00044","url":null,"abstract":"Prevailing corporate governance literature has incontrovertibly identified the agency problems in controlled companies as those between the controlling shareholders (agent) and the minority shareholders (principal) or the “controller-minority” or “horizontal” agency problem While several corporate governance strategies have been proffered to address these agency problems in the broader milieu, here we raise and discuss two specific strategies that may be potentially deployed to address the agency problems in controlled companies. These are: (i) the participative strategy, wherein shareholders (particularly the minority) are enabled and encouraged to exercise greater participation in companies in which they have invested so as to strengthen shareholder democracy; and (ii) controlling strategy, wherein the focus is on controlling or regulating the actions of the controlling shareholders rather than empowering the minority shareholders. The core argument in this chapter is that given the predominant ownership and control exercised by the controlling shareholders in controlled companies, the participative strategy is sure to be met with impediments. Any amount of additions to the powers of the minority shareholders in corporate democracy would not be meaningful if they are required to exercise it in the shadow of a controlling shareholder’s dominance. Given the ineffectiveness of the participative strategy, the corporate governance efforts in controlled companies may instead be better spent on the controlling strategy. A system of greater monitoring of controlling shareholders, especially on matters where such shareholders may be interested, such as self-dealing transactions, would augur to the benefit of the minority shareholders. We explore these strategies by concentrating on one jurisdiction, i.e. Singapore. The study of Singapore is interesting because it ranks highly among Asian economies against indicators for corporate governance and investor protection. At the same time, the corporate sphere is replete with controlled companies, where dominant control is exercised either by business families or the state. Singapore thus provides an eminently suitable case study for when the participative strategy might work (if at all) and how that might be bolstered through the operation of the controlling strategy so as to protect the minority shareholders and address the agency problem relevant to controlled companies.","PeriodicalId":210480,"journal":{"name":"CGN: General (Shareholders) (Sub-Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116747746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Shareholders Wealth Effects of Joint Venture Strategies","authors":"G. Schut, R. van Frederikslust","doi":"10.17578/8-3/4-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17578/8-3/4-3","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the shareholder wealth effects of 233 joint venture announcements of Dutch public companies in the period 1987 till 1998. The research shows that, on average, establishing joint ventures has a positive effect on the market value of Dutch companies. Using the strategic characteristics of joint ventures it is possible to explain and understand these wealth effects. Our research shows that the factors of strategic intention, the context in which the strategy is unfolded and the extent to which the company has control over the implementation strongly explains the extent to which a joint venture can create value.","PeriodicalId":210480,"journal":{"name":"CGN: General (Shareholders) (Sub-Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133162126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Expropriation of Minority Shareholders in Politically Connected Firms","authors":"Meijun Qian, Hongbo Pan, B. Yeung","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1719335","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1719335","url":null,"abstract":"The conflict of interests between controlling and minority shareholders is an important issue in firms with concentrated ownership. We document that the controlling shareholders’ expropriation behavior through tunneling or self-dealing is much severer in politically connected firms. The results are not due to firms with high tendency of expropriation establishing connection for protection, but because of a less concern of capital market punishment. We show that expropriation is severer only in firms whose political connection secures bank loan access. These findings are consistent with the view that the firms’ financing condition is an important dimension that influences corporate governance.","PeriodicalId":210480,"journal":{"name":"CGN: General (Shareholders) (Sub-Topic)","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114248029","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Stakeholder Theory in Corporate Law: Has It Got What It Takes?","authors":"A. Keay","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1531065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1531065","url":null,"abstract":"There has been much debate for many years as to what should be the objective of the large public company. This issue is important for a number of reasons, not least of which is that the theory nominated will underpin corporate governance and dictate to a large extent the kind of corporate governance system that will exist. As far as the objective of the company is concerned, two theories have been dominant. They are the shareholder primacy and stakeholder theories. The former is said to be operative in what can be called “Anglo-American jurisdictions.” Notwithstanding the fact that it has been regularly said that the US and the UK and other Anglo-American jurisdictions embrace shareholder primacy, there are many who feel that, due to a number of factors (mentioned in the paper), some of these jurisdictions are moving towards more of a stakeholder approach to corporate governance. After setting out what stakeholder theory stands for, this paper analyses whether stakeholder theory should overtake shareholder primacy as the leading theory in Anglo-American jurisdictions. Specifically, the paper examines the arguments propounded in support of stakeholder theory and evaluates the strength of these arguments with the aim of determining if there is sufficient justification for the theory to be wholeheartedly embraced in Anglo-American jurisdictions. The two major parts of the paper involve, first, an examination of the rationale given for the theory’s existence as well as the leading arguments that are put forward for it being embraced by all companies. The second part identifies and analyses some of the concerns raised about the theory and the primary points that are directed against the theory. The paper concludes that while the stakeholder theory is attractive in a number of ways, it is lacking in many respects, and it cannot be justified as a theory of the objective of large corporations.","PeriodicalId":210480,"journal":{"name":"CGN: General (Shareholders) (Sub-Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122296373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Shareholder after the Crisis","authors":"E. Wymeersch","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1524249","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1524249","url":null,"abstract":"Shareholders call for more attention after the crisis: confidence will have to be restored to convince them to recapitalise the financial firms. Five topics are addressed here: shareholders should be able to effectively exercise their rights, especially their voting rights. They should be protected against being sidelined by empty voters. Long termism is called for by calling on more stable, active institutional shareholders, an objective that may be at odds with “one share, one vote”. Finally, also the state rescuing financial institutes should not intervene without paying any attention to the shareholders’ rights.","PeriodicalId":210480,"journal":{"name":"CGN: General (Shareholders) (Sub-Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130268735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Banks as Lenders and Shareholders: Evidence from Japan","authors":"Wenlian Gao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1700262","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1700262","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the effects of the main bank's equity-debt structure, (i.e., equity stakes and debt claims) on firm performance and financial policies in Japan over the period 1977-1987. Results show that firms with main bank equity stakes have lower performance than those without. However, among firms with main bank equity stakes, the equity-debt structure of claims has a positive effect on firm performance. The positive effect of the main bank's equity-debt structure is found to be greater in group-affiliated firms than in independent firms. The main bank maximizes its own interests by charging a higher interest rate when its equity stakes are relatively less than its debt claims and by prompting firms to pay more dividends when its equity stakes are relatively high.","PeriodicalId":210480,"journal":{"name":"CGN: General (Shareholders) (Sub-Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115053849","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Eurostoxx 50: 1997-2004. Shareholder Value Creation in Europe.","authors":"Pablo Fernández, Alvaro Villanueva","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.664472","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.664472","url":null,"abstract":"2004 was a good year for the shareholders of the companies in the Euro Stoxx 50: the shareholder value creation of these 50 companies was 42,880 million euros, however, not as good as 2003 when their value creation reached a bit over 160,000 euros. The companies that created more value for their shareholder were Enel (13,364 million euros), Eni (11,855) and Tim (9,891). The companies that destroyed more value were Nokia (-15,239 million euros), L'Oreal (-9,095) and Philips (-7,823). In 2004, the Euro Stoxx 50 was much more volatile than the S&P 500 or the Dow Jones. Shareholder value destruction in the three-year period 2002-2004 was -0.9 trillion euros. The market value included in the EuroStoxx 50 of the 50 companies was 1.5 trillion euros in 2004, and 1.4 trillion euros in 2003. We also calculate the created shareholder value of the 50 companies during the seven-year period 1997-2004. Eni was the top shareholder value creator and Vivendi the top shareholder value destroyer during the seven-year period. A portfolio long in the companies that entered the index and short in the companies that abandoned the index had on average a 7.2% return in the 20 days prior to the index recomposition and a 2.3% return in the 20 days after the index recomposition.","PeriodicalId":210480,"journal":{"name":"CGN: General (Shareholders) (Sub-Topic)","volume":"184 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121723009","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}