Character Trouble最新文献

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No Excuses 没有借口
Character Trouble Pub Date : 2021-11-18 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198719601.003.0008
Santiago Amaya, J. Doris
{"title":"No Excuses","authors":"Santiago Amaya, J. Doris","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198719601.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198719601.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophical accounts of moral responsibility are standardly framed by two platitudes: blame requires (1) the presence of a moral defect in the agent and (2) the absence of excuses. In this essay, this kind of approach is challenged. It is argued that (a) people sometimes violate moral norms due to performance mistakes, (b) it often appears reasonable to hold them responsible for it, and (c) their mistakes cannot be traced to their moral qualities or to the presence of excuses. In the end, the implications for discussions of moral responsibility are discussed.","PeriodicalId":204612,"journal":{"name":"Character Trouble","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125061465","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Future of Character 性格的未来
Character Trouble Pub Date : 2021-11-18 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198719601.003.0011
J. Doris
{"title":"The Future of Character","authors":"J. Doris","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198719601.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198719601.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter advances and refines the author’s character skepticism in light of the extensive commentary in philosophy, and significant developments in psychology, that have emerged since his original contributions to the debate (e.g., Doris, 1998, 2002). Among the topics discussed are methodological issues in philosophy and psychology; controversy concerning classic studies; the interpretation of effect sizes; theory choice and revision; a pluralistic conception of ethical thought.","PeriodicalId":204612,"journal":{"name":"Character Trouble","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123474090","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Evidence and Sensibility 证据与感性
Character Trouble Pub Date : 2021-11-18 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198719601.003.0002
J. Doris
{"title":"Evidence and Sensibility","authors":"J. Doris","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198719601.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198719601.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter derives from a book symposium on Doris’ (2002), Lack of Character, and responds to commentary by Annas, Arplay, and Solomon. The responses defend Doris’ situationist skepticism about character from a variety of objections. Among the topics considered are: standards of evidence in moral psychology, the role of empirical considerations in normative thought, the role of traits in psychological explanation, the appropriate conceptualization of character, the role of character in interpersonal relationships, and the relation of culture and character.","PeriodicalId":204612,"journal":{"name":"Character Trouble","volume":"22 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127264547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
From My Lai to Abu Ghraib 从美莱村到阿布格莱布
Character Trouble Pub Date : 2021-11-18 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198719601.003.0005
J. Doris, Dominic Murphy
{"title":"From My Lai to Abu Ghraib","authors":"J. Doris, Dominic Murphy","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198719601.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198719601.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter argues that difficult-to-plausibly-deny observations about human psychology and the conditions of warfare indicate that combatants typically occupy excusing conditions, and are therefore not morally responsible for military misconduct. The thesis is illustrated with attention to atrocities at My Lai and Abu Ghraib. Implications for responding to war crimes are considered.","PeriodicalId":204612,"journal":{"name":"Character Trouble","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116361403","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Heated Agreement 激烈的协议
Character Trouble Pub Date : 2021-11-18 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198719601.003.0006
J. Doris
{"title":"Heated Agreement","authors":"J. Doris","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198719601.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198719601.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter was originally a contribution to a book symposium on Robert Adams’ A Theory of Virtue (2006), which develops an extended response to the arguments for character skepticism put forth in Doris’ Lack of Character (2002). It is argued that despite the differences between them, the works are actually in considerable agreement, both methodologically and substantively, when it comes to the fundamentals of moral psychology. Both sides agree that philosophical moral psychology ought to be empirically informed, and both sides agree that traditional conceptions of character traits require revision in light of empirical information.","PeriodicalId":204612,"journal":{"name":"Character Trouble","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126926930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Out of Character 不符合性格
Character Trouble Pub Date : 2021-11-18 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198719601.003.0003
J. Doris
{"title":"Out of Character","authors":"J. Doris","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198719601.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198719601.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter is a critical appraisal of the “character theory of excuses” in legal philosophy, which maintains that an excuse is available to a defendant when their action is not a manifestation of their character. The essay argues, using a strategy derived from the skeptical position in the virtue ethics-situationism debate, that the moral psychology underlying the character theory of excuses is empirically inadequate. It is further suggested that yoking excuses to character assessment threatens to make determining excuses epistemically intractable in legal contexts, given the many practical obstacles to definitive character assessment.","PeriodicalId":204612,"journal":{"name":"Character Trouble","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126279653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Variantism about Responsibility 关于责任的变异论
Character Trouble Pub Date : 2007-12-01 DOI: 10.1111/J.1520-8583.2007.00125.X
J. Doris, J. Knobe, R. Woolfolk
{"title":"Variantism about Responsibility","authors":"J. Doris, J. Knobe, R. Woolfolk","doi":"10.1111/J.1520-8583.2007.00125.X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1520-8583.2007.00125.X","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter argues that experimental assessment of intuition pumps in the moral responsibility literature presses a dilemma on philosophically orthodox approaches to moral responsibility, which frequently maintain both invariantism and conservativism. Invariantist approaches maintain that there are exceptionlessly relevant criteria for responsibility attribution, while conservative approaches maintain that folk theories of responsibility are (defeasible, but substantial) constraints of philosophical theories of responsibility. However, the experimental record suggests that folk theory is conspicuously variantist (or pluralist) and evinces little commitment to exceptionlessly relevant attribution criteria. Therefore, invariantism and conservativism cannot be simultaneously maintained. Implications for theory choice and revision are discussed.","PeriodicalId":204612,"journal":{"name":"Character Trouble","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131152951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics 人物,情境和道德伦理
Character Trouble Pub Date : 1998-12-01 DOI: 10.1111/0029-4624.00136
J. Doris
{"title":"Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics","authors":"J. Doris","doi":"10.1111/0029-4624.00136","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/0029-4624.00136","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter is one of the initial contributions to philosophy’s virtue ethics-situationism debate, referencing psychology’s person-situation debate to argue that traditional conceptions of character and virtue in philosophical moral psychology are empirically inadequate. The chapter also examines the normative implications of this argument, defending a revisionary position: ethical thought would be best served by reduced reliance on traditional notions of character. This conjunction of empirical and normative theses later became known as character skepticism.","PeriodicalId":204612,"journal":{"name":"Character Trouble","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125966844","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 166
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