{"title":"The Life Cycle of Family Ownership: International Evidence","authors":"J. Franks, C. Mayer, P. Volpin, Hannes F. Wagner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1102475","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1102475","url":null,"abstract":"We show that in countries with strong investor protection, developed financial markets, and active markets for corporate control, family firms evolve into widely held companies as they age. In countries with weak investor protection, less developed financial markets, and inactive markets for corporate control, family control is very persistent over time. While family control in high investor protection countries is concentrated in industries that have low investment opportunities and low merger and acquisition (M&A) activity, the same is not so in countries that have low investor protection, where the presence of family control in an industry is unrelated to investment opportunities and M&A activity. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.","PeriodicalId":198034,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Empirical","volume":"115 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122456178","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Value of Independent Directors: Evidence from Sudden Deaths","authors":"B. Nguyen, K. Nielsen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1342354","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1342354","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate contributions of independent directors to shareholder value by examining stock price reactions to sudden deaths in the US from 1994 to 2007. We find, first, that following director death stock prices drop by 0.85% on average. Second, the degree of independence and board structure determine the marginal value of independent directors. Third, independence is more valuable in crucial board functions. Finally, controlling for director-invariant heterogeneity using a fixed effect approach, we identify the value of independence over and above the value of individual skills and competences. Overall, our results suggest that independent directors provide a valuable service to shareholders.","PeriodicalId":198034,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Empirical","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133480473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Dividends and Stakeholder Conflicts: A Cleaner Test","authors":"P. E. Steen, Morten G. Josefsen, Øyvind Bøhren","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1343418","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1343418","url":null,"abstract":"This paper compares the dividend policy of firms controlled by owners to firms where owners have a minority stake relative to non-owning employees, customers, and the local community. We find that regardless of whether owners or non-owners control the firm, the strong stakeholder uses the dividend decision to mitigate rather than intensify the conflict with the weak stakeholder. This result is inconsistent with the outcome model and consistent with the substitution model of payout policy, which argues that power abuse in dividend decisions is discouraged by costly effects at a later stage. Indirect evidence supports this interpretation.","PeriodicalId":198034,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Empirical","volume":"145 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125884359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What Gives? A Study of Firms' Reactions to Cash Shortfalls","authors":"Tor-Erik Bakke, Toni M. Whited","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1325582","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1325582","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the relative magnitude of financial versus real frictions by looking at how firms react to cash shortfalls. We use a regression discontinuity design in which the discontinuity is the point of violation of underfunding of corporate defined benefit pension plans. We reexamine the puzzling evidence in Rauh (2006) that mandatory pension contributions cause investment declines, finding that these results are likely due to the endogeneity that this study is trying to avoid. We also compare firm-year observations in which the firm's pension assets are just barely less than its pension liabilities to observations in which assets are just greater than liabilities. In this quasi-experimental setting, we find little evidence that firms cut back on investment. Instead, they mostly use a variety of financial tools, such as receivables factoring and payout cuts, to fund their pension liabilities.","PeriodicalId":198034,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Empirical","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130122310","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Management Quality and Anti-Takeover Provisions","authors":"Thomas J. Chemmanur, Imants Paeglis, K. Simonyan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.966342","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.966342","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We present the first empirical analysis of the relationship between a firm’s management quality and the prevalence of antitakeover provisions in its corporate charter and their influence on initial public offering (IPO) valuation and post-IPO performance. We test the implications of the managerial entrenchment hypothesis, which implies that antitakeover provisions serve only to enhance the control benefits of incumbent management, and the long-term value creation hypothesis, which implies that such provisions can enhance value in the hands of higher quality management. We find that, first, firms with higher quality management and greater growth options are associated with a greater number of antitakeover provisions. Second, firms with higher management quality and a greater number of antitakeover provisions outperform other firms in the sample in terms of post-IPO operating and stock return performance and obtain higher IPO valuations. Our findings reject the managerial entrenchment hypothesis an...","PeriodicalId":198034,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Empirical","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115575576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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