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Expropriation Risk and Firm Growth: A Corporate Transparency Channel 征用风险与企业成长:一个公司透明渠道
Corporate Finance (incl. behavioral) Pub Date : 2011-05-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1020476
A. Durnev, S. Guriev
{"title":"Expropriation Risk and Firm Growth: A Corporate Transparency Channel","authors":"A. Durnev, S. Guriev","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1020476","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1020476","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a new channel through which expropriation risk reduces capital allocation efficiency and decreases firm growth. We build an agency model of corporate disclosure when companies face risks of expropriation. The model predicts that in countries with insecure property rights, corporations mitigate the risk of expropriation by reducing transparency. We test this channel by employing a difference-in-difference approach. Using a panel of over 16,000 firms from 84 countries, we find that transparency of companies prone to expropriation is lower in countries with insecure property rights. The reduced transparency has an adverse effect on the efficiency of capital allocation and corporate growth.","PeriodicalId":190360,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance (incl. behavioral)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129360961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 15
Can Earnings Manipulation Create Value? 盈余操纵能创造价值吗?
Corporate Finance (incl. behavioral) Pub Date : 2007-12-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1107286
A. Miglo
{"title":"Can Earnings Manipulation Create Value?","authors":"A. Miglo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1107286","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1107286","url":null,"abstract":"Existing literature usually considers earnings manipulation to be a negative social phenomenon. We argue that earnings manipulation can be a part of the equilibrium relationships between firm's insiders and outsiders. We consider an optimal contract between an entrepreneur and an investor where the entrepreneur is subject to a double moral hazard problem (one being the choice of production effort and the other being intertemporal substitution, which consists of transferring cash flows between periods). Investment and production effort may be below socially optimal levels because the entrepreneur cannot entirely capture the results of his effort. The opportunity to manipulate earnings protects the entrepreneur against the risk of a low payoff when the results of production are low. Ex-ante, this provides an incentive for the entrepreneur to increase his level of effort and invest efficiently.","PeriodicalId":190360,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance (incl. behavioral)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121322759","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
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