FEEM: Coalition Theory Network (Topic)最新文献

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Multiple Membership and Federal Sructures 多成员制和联邦制
FEEM: Coalition Theory Network (Topic) Pub Date : 2008-05-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1140632
A. Savvateev, M. Le Breton, V. Makarov, Shlomo Weber
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引用次数: 5
Many-to-One Matching When Colleagues Matter 当同事重要时,多对一匹配
FEEM: Coalition Theory Network (Topic) Pub Date : 2007-09-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1014549
Pablo Revilla
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引用次数: 32
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