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PSN: Ballot Structure最新文献

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The Role of the Weighted Voting System in Investments in Local Public Education: Evidence from a New Historical Database 加权投票制度在地方公共教育投资中的作用:来自一个新的历史数据库的证据
PSN: Ballot Structure Pub Date : 2020-01-27 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3680498
E. Lindgren, Per Pettersson-Lidbom, Björn Tyrefors
{"title":"The Role of the Weighted Voting System in Investments in Local Public Education: Evidence from a New Historical Database","authors":"E. Lindgren, Per Pettersson-Lidbom, Björn Tyrefors","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3680498","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3680498","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we analyze how a weighted voting system introduced in 1862, which shifted the distribution of political power from landowners to industrialists at local town meetings, affected investments in local public education. We use an event study design based on a newly constructed panel data set with annual observations of nearly 2,200 Swedish local governments over 28 years, i.e., more than 60,000 observations. Most importantly, there is no pre-trend in educational spending in our event study but rather a sharp change in the dynamic treatment effects exactly at the date when the treatment occurs, i.e., when industrialists receive more political power at town meetings. The estimated cumulative treatment effect is also economically substantial. For example, per capita spending on education increased by approximately 37% within 6 years in local governments where industrialists came to political power. Our findings are therefore consistent with the idea that political institutions are a key determinant of human capital accumulation and long-run economic development.","PeriodicalId":187528,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Ballot Structure","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126374988","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Strictly Sincere Best Responses under Approval Voting and Arbitrary Preferences 在批准投票和任意偏好下严格真诚的最佳回答
PSN: Ballot Structure Pub Date : 2018-10-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3265187
Carlos Alós-Ferrer, J. Buckenmaier
{"title":"Strictly Sincere Best Responses under Approval Voting and Arbitrary Preferences","authors":"Carlos Alós-Ferrer, J. Buckenmaier","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3265187","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3265187","url":null,"abstract":"Approval voting allows voters to support as many candidates as they wish. One advantage of the method is that voters have weak or no incentives to vote insincerely. However, the exact meaning of this statement depends on how the voters' preferences over candidates are extended to sets. We show that, under a combination of standard, well-established assumptions on the extended preferences, voters will always have a strictly sincere best response (that is, a best response ballot such that every approved candidate is strictly preferred to every disapproved one) given the ballots of other voters. The result holds for arbitrary preferences over candidates, allowing for indifferences but covering the extreme cases of dichotomous or strict preferences. As a corollary, we show that the classical strategy-proofness result for the case of dichotomous preferences on alternatives (Brams and Fishburn, 1978) holds for a larger class of preferences on sets than originally assumed.","PeriodicalId":187528,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Ballot Structure","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122586245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Effect of Handicaps on Turnout for Large Electorates: An Application to Assessment Voting 障碍对大选民投票率的影响:一个在评估投票中的应用
PSN: Ballot Structure Pub Date : 2017-12-14 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3088530
H. Gersbach, A. Mamageishvili, O. Tejada
{"title":"The Effect of Handicaps on Turnout for Large Electorates: An Application to Assessment Voting","authors":"H. Gersbach, A. Mamageishvili, O. Tejada","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3088530","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3088530","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze Assessment Voting, a new two-round voting procedure that can be applied to binary decisions in democratic societies. In the first round, a randomly-selected number of citizens cast their vote on one of the two alternatives at hand, thereby irrevocably exercising their right to vote. In the second round, after the results of the first round have been published, the remaining citizens decide whether to vote for one alternative or to ab- stain. The votes from both rounds are aggregated, and the final outcome is obtained by applying the majority rule, with ties being broken by fair randomization. Within a costly voting framework, we show that large elec- torates will choose the preferred alternative of the majority with high prob- ability, and that average costs will be low. This result is in contrast with the literature on one-round voting, which predicts either higher voting costs (when voting is compulsory) or decisions that often do not represent the preferences of the majority (when voting is voluntary).","PeriodicalId":187528,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Ballot Structure","volume":"208 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127145106","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 26
Lost in Translation. How Different Electoral Systems Transform the Voting Gender Gap into Gender Inequality 迷失在翻译中。不同的选举制度如何将投票性别差距转化为性别不平等
PSN: Ballot Structure Pub Date : 2016-05-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2776549
Matteo Migheli
{"title":"Lost in Translation. How Different Electoral Systems Transform the Voting Gender Gap into Gender Inequality","authors":"Matteo Migheli","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2776549","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2776549","url":null,"abstract":"Voting gender gap characterises several countries, and it is likely to translate into the composition of elected assemblies and governments. Starting from given preferences of the electors, different electoral rules may translate this gap into different outcomes in terms of composition of the parliament. To amplify or to attenuate this gap results in generating a sort of gender inequality. In this work, I inquiry if and to which extent the different electoral rules may generate gender inequality when translating votes into seats. First, I present a theoretical framework to capture the potential of an electoral system to amplify or attenuate the voting gender gap. Then, using survey data and different indices of representativeness and of governability, I provide some empirical test for the theoretical framework. Both the theory and the simulations indicate that majority systems magnify the gender gap, while proportional rules are likely to reproduce it with minimal distortions.","PeriodicalId":187528,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Ballot Structure","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123737969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Optimal Ballot Structure for Double-Member Districts 双议员选区的最优投票结构
PSN: Ballot Structure Pub Date : 2013-09-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2347118
M. Gregor
{"title":"The Optimal Ballot Structure for Double-Member Districts","authors":"M. Gregor","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2347118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2347118","url":null,"abstract":"The Anglo-American double-member districts employing plurality-at-large are frequently criticized for giving a large majority premium to a winning party. In this paper, we demonstrate that the premium stems from a limited degree of voters' discrimination associated with only two positive votes on the ballot. To enhance voters' ability to discriminate, we consider rules that give voters more positive and negative votes. We identify voting equilibria of alternative scoring rules in a situation where candidates differ in binary ideology and binary quality; strategic voters are of two ideology types; and a candidate's ideology is more salient than quality. The most generous rules such as approval voting and combined approvaldisapproval voting only replicate the outcomes of plurality-at-large. The highest minority representation and the highest quality is achieved by a rule that assigns two positive votes and one negative vote to each voter.","PeriodicalId":187528,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Ballot Structure","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128962297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
ПРАВОВЫЕ МЕХАНИЗМЫ ЭЛЕКТРОННОЙ ДЕМОКРАТИИ ДЛЯ МИНИМИЗАЦИИ КОРРУПЦИОННЫХ ПРОЯВЛЕНИЙ В ОТНОШЕНИЯХ МЕЖДУ БИЗНЕСОМ И ГОСУДАРСТВОМ (Legal Mechanisms of Electronic Democracy for Minimizing Corruption Manifestations in Relations between Business and State)
PSN: Ballot Structure Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3293656
Antonov Jaroslav Valerievich
{"title":"ПРАВОВЫЕ МЕХАНИЗМЫ ЭЛЕКТРОННОЙ ДЕМОКРАТИИ ДЛЯ МИНИМИЗАЦИИ КОРРУПЦИОННЫХ ПРОЯВЛЕНИЙ В ОТНОШЕНИЯХ МЕЖДУ БИЗНЕСОМ И ГОСУДАРСТВОМ (Legal Mechanisms of Electronic Democracy for Minimizing Corruption Manifestations in Relations between Business and State)","authors":"Antonov Jaroslav Valerievich","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3293656","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3293656","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Russian Abstract:</b> Исследованы возможности электронной демократии в контексте минимизации коррупционных проявлений между государством и бизнесом, в том числе посредством внедрения электронного документооборота.<br><br><b>English Abstract:</b> It considers the possibilities of e-democracy in the context of minimizing corruption between the state and business, including through the implementation of electronic workflow.","PeriodicalId":187528,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Ballot Structure","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127302018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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