{"title":"Hearing God’s Command","authors":"G. Mckenny","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192845528.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192845528.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"When we claim that the command of God as a moral norm is rationally intelligible, we mean that it is in principle knowable, that we can reason about it, and that we can hold one another accountable to it. Barth’s theological ethics accommodates all three of these requisites. He holds that although we do not strictly know the specific action God will command, we have an approximate knowledge of it, and that in our asking it of God we stand in the space where it can be heard. He also holds that although our moral reasoning does not give us a definitive answer to what God requires and that we must bring our reasons before God’s ultimate verdict on them, the consideration of reasons for and against a proposed action or course of action is essential to hearing God’s command. Finally, he holds that human beings are bound to one another in relations of mutual speaking and hearing God’s commands, and these relations are at least implicitly relations of mutual accountability for what we hear as God’s command.","PeriodicalId":187463,"journal":{"name":"Karl Barth's Moral Thought","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127054174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Divine Action and Human Action","authors":"G. Mckenny","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192845528.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192845528.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"Throughout his work, Barth is determined to consider human action in relation to divine action, and not in itself. This determination poses three questions. First, can Barth make human action intelligible as the agent’s own action? Second, does he leave human action unstable, lacking anything that secures its continuity throughout its engagements with divine action? Third, is the agent who encounters divine action a fully and genuinely human agent with the full range of agential capacities? Barth adequately answers all three questions, but it is unclear that he can answer any of them in a fully satisfactory way without the notion of habits as persistent tendencies of action. Without such a notion, Barth cannot account for morally good action as a persistent tendency enabled by grace—that is, as virtue. This limitation limits the plausibility of this theological ethics.","PeriodicalId":187463,"journal":{"name":"Karl Barth's Moral Thought","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124960770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Continuity of God’s Commands","authors":"G. Mckenny","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192845528.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192845528.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"For Barth, the command of God is a moral norm, which pertains to human action as such, and not only to a particular way of acting or form of life. As a moral norm, so understood, it should be rationally intelligible. A minimum condition of its rational intelligibility is its continuity from one instance of divine commanding to another. Yet Barth seems to deny the continuity of God’s commands by insisting that they are irreducibly particular requirements issued by God in distinct events of encounter with a human being. However, Barth also insists that particular commands are all specifications of what is finally the one command of God and that they thereby exhibit a formal consistency in their multiplicity. And he insists that God’s commands exhibit the constancy of what he takes to be the character or standards that will always pertain to them. Nevertheless, Barth’s effort to demonstrate the constancy of God’s commands fails, leaving him vulnerable to the charge that God’s particular commands are arbitrary.","PeriodicalId":187463,"journal":{"name":"Karl Barth's Moral Thought","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122166945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Conclusion","authors":"G. Mckenny","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192845528.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192845528.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"“The task of theological ethics,” Barth asserts, “is to understand the Word of God as the command of God.”1 The Word of God is the revelation and work of God’s grace to human beings in Jesus Christ, and the command of God is the summons, direction, and empowerment of human beings to be in their conduct what they are by God’s grace. In Jesus Christ, God acts for human beings and in their place. Human beings confirm God’s grace, so understood, in their actions that directly or indirectly correspond to it. The action God commands is thus a likeness to God’s action. Ethics takes form as an analogy of grace....","PeriodicalId":187463,"journal":{"name":"Karl Barth's Moral Thought","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116553613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Responsibility and the Moral Subject","authors":"G. Mckenny","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192845528.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192845528.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"For Barth, responsibility is the characteristic feature of the human being as the hearer of God’s command. In its address to human beings, God’s command constitutes them as subjects who are answerable to it. Jesus Christ is the one to whom the command of God is addressed and who answers it; as such, he is the responsible subject on behalf of and in the place of other human beings. Yet in taking responsibility for other human beings in this way, God also makes them responsible—for being in their conduct those for whom God has taken responsibility. Insofar as God has taken responsibility for our responsibility, Barth rejects the tendency of modern responsibility to presume that everything is up to us. Yet insofar as God also makes us responsible, and thereby constitutes us as subjects, Barth retains another key feature of modern responsibility, which is its urgency. While answerability or accountability is the key aspect of responsibility, Barth also leaves room for the imputability of actions to agents and the liability of persons for the effects of their actions. One problem with Barth’s account of responsibility is that his insistence that we are constituted as responsible from outside ourselves, by God’s command, he leaves unclear how it is truly we who are responsible. Another problem is that if we are made responsible by the responsibility Jesus Christ has taken for us, it appears that only Christians know themselves to be responsible.","PeriodicalId":187463,"journal":{"name":"Karl Barth's Moral Thought","volume":"126 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131892614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Command of God as a Moral Norm","authors":"G. Mckenny","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192845528.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192845528.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"Barth’s divine command ethics claims that God’s grace to human beings in Jesus Christ is the norm of human action. In Jesus Christ, God both poses and answers the question of the good of human action, which is the question of its conformity to grace. Rather than a norm of a distinctively Christian way of acting or form of life, Barth argues that this is a moral norm that pertains to human action as such. When moral philosophy considers the question of conformity to the good that is posed to human action, it implicitly attests the grace of God which poses this question. And when moral philosophy considers the answers to the question of the good that derive from reason or experience, it implicitly attests the grace of God as the answer to the question. In its explicit attestation of the grace of God as the norm of human action, theological ethics makes use of this implicit attestation in moral philosophy. Barth thus endorses the traditional position according to which theology articulates the moral norm with the assistance of philosophy. However, Barth’s claim that the norm of human action is a revealed norm, and not a rational norm that is clarified, specified, and extended by revelation, qualifies the goodness of the human creature, fails to secure the mutual accountability of those who are inside and outside the circle of revelation, and limits the grounds on which Christians and others cooperate with one another in moral endeavors.","PeriodicalId":187463,"journal":{"name":"Karl Barth's Moral Thought","volume":"119 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131293365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Karl Barth’s Theological Ethics","authors":"G. Mckenny","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192845528.003.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192845528.003.0001","url":null,"abstract":"Barth’s theological ethics is a version of divine command ethics. However, it is a highly unusual version. Its premise is that the Word of God—the revelation and work of God’s grace to human beings in Jesus Christ—is also the command of God, that gospel is also law. What God commands, therefore, is that human beings confirm in their conduct what they already are by virtue of God’s grace to them. Human beings confirm grace in their conduct by performing actions that correspond to grace, so that the moral life is lived as a human analogy to divine grace. The problem with Barth’s divine command ethics is that the claim that grace is the norm of human action fails to do justice to human beings as creatures. For Barth, God’s resolution from eternity to be gracious to human beings and God’s realization of this eternal resolution in time determines human beings as creatures, not just as those who have fallen into sin. It follows that the human creature exists for the actualization of grace, not grace for the perfection of the creature.","PeriodicalId":187463,"journal":{"name":"Karl Barth's Moral Thought","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129991936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Command of God as a Morally Binding Norm","authors":"G. Mckenny","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192845528.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192845528.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"As a version of divine command ethics, Barth’s theological ethics answers the two fundamental questions posed to every divine command ethics, namely, how is it that God’s command determines the good of human action, and why is it that human beings must accept what God determines as good? Barth’s answer to both question is that in Jesus Christ, God both poses the question of the good to human beings and answers it in their place. In him, God’s goodness both confronts other human beings as the norm of their goodness and fulfills that norm in their place. It therefore determines the good of human action insofar as Jesus Christ is the human being who takes the place of other human beings. And other human beings must accept what God thereby determines as their good because—again, insofar as Jesus Christ has taken their place—their good is already a reality in him, in whom they exist as the human beings they are. The problem is that while the grace of God in Jesus Christ is the genuinely human good of other human beings insofar as they exist in Jesus Christ, it is, precisely as grace, a good that constitutes them from outside and not a good that fulfills them as the kind of creature they are.","PeriodicalId":187463,"journal":{"name":"Karl Barth's Moral Thought","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131084822","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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