{"title":"All-In Abilities in Context","authors":"Ann Whittle","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192845603.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192845603.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter considers a significant challenge, initially raised in chapter one, that of showing why attributions of all-in abilities are not invariant. This is crucial to the wider project of showing why a contextualist analysis of agential modals has significant implications for both freedom and moral responsibility, since it is highly plausible to think that our attributions of freedom and moral responsibility concern these all-in abilities. The chapter begins by arguing that the notions which comprise the characterizations of an all-in ability should be understood contextually. After answering an objection to the proposed argument for a contextualist account of all-in abilities, semantic evidence in favour of the view is then offered. The chapter ends by discussing the wider philosophical significance of a contextualist account of agential modals which embraces all-in abilities.","PeriodicalId":185337,"journal":{"name":"Freedom and Responsibility in Context","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131449710","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Defending an Ability Analysis of Control","authors":"Ann Whittle","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192845603.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192845603.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter, a defence of the ability analysis of control proposed in chapter six is offered. The chapter begins by outlining some advantages of the analysis; briefly, not only does it explain the deep connection that appears to exist between freedom, moral responsibility, and the ability to do otherwise, it captures our judgements regarding moral responsibility in a wide range of tricky cases. The chapter then examines how to understand the ‘ceteris paribus’ clause in the ability analysis of control, and defends the proposed asymmetry between praise and blameworthy actions. By so doing, the chapter also ties the previous discussion of control more overtly to issues regarding moral responsibility.","PeriodicalId":185337,"journal":{"name":"Freedom and Responsibility in Context","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120949370","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Abilities and Incompatibilism","authors":"Ann Whittle","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192845603.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192845603.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter begins the task of relating a contextualist account of agential modals to questions concerning freedom. In the first two sections, different ways of characterizing abilities and their relationship to freedom are discussed. This helps clarify the framework and assumptions that the subsequent arguments rely upon. Next, an influential argument for incompatibilism, namely the consequence argument, is argued to be problematic. Using the notion of an all-in ability, the question of how best to develop the case for incompatibilism is then considered. After criticizing an argument for incompatibilism based upon all-in abilities, the chapter ends by offering a reformulation of the consequence argument, in light of the characterization of all-in abilities.","PeriodicalId":185337,"journal":{"name":"Freedom and Responsibility in Context","volume":"4 5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124614861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Problem of Unfairness","authors":"Ann Whittle","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192845603.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192845603.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter, a significant objection to contextualist theories of moral responsibility is examined, ‘the problem of unfairness’. After outlining the problem, reasons are offered to support the claim that moving to an invariant analysis of moral responsibility is unwarranted. It is argued that there is good reason, independent of contextualism, to divorce the concept of moral responsibility from that of blame, when the latter is construed as entailing harmful treatment of others. Even if this is denied, however, inter-agential judgements of moral responsibility can still be rendered fair. Consequently, a contextualist theory of moral responsibility can be retained whilst avoiding the problem of unfairness. This undercuts a significant motivation for endorsing an amelioration of our concept of moral responsibility, in either the direction of invariant compatibilism or that of invariant incompatibilism.","PeriodicalId":185337,"journal":{"name":"Freedom and Responsibility in Context","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116768685","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Agential Modal Contextualism","authors":"Ann Whittle","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192845603.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192845603.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"The argument for contextualism regarding freedom and moral responsibility begins with agential modals, the ‘cans’, ‘coulds’, and ‘ables’ of our discourse. Given the evidence from ordinary language, it is argued that all acceptable analyses of agential modals should be committed to contextualism. The chapter begins by introducing the notion of an agential modal and characterizing the commitments of a contextualist analysis. After this, evidence in favour of a contextualist account of agential modals is outlined and responses to data that counts against contextualism are offered. The chapter ends by contrasting contextualism, positively, with two rival views, relativism and the default rival, invariantism.","PeriodicalId":185337,"journal":{"name":"Freedom and Responsibility in Context","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116872552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Contextualist Account of Regulative Freedom","authors":"Ann Whittle","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192845603.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192845603.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter, attention again turns to issues surrounding freedom. In chapter two it was argued that the dual power to do otherwise, to be able to A and to refrain from A-ing, was a necessary condition of a concept of freedom, which was named ‘regulative freedom’. In this chapter, a contextualist analysis of regulative freedom is proposed. The chapter begins by considering different possible formulations of a contextualist account of freedom, after which, semantic evidence both for and against the view is examined. Next, two significant advantages of the contextualist theory are outlined, namely, a response to the (reformulated) consequence argument and the argument from manipulation. Finally, objections to a contextualist account of regulative freedom are answered.","PeriodicalId":185337,"journal":{"name":"Freedom and Responsibility in Context","volume":"216 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116527248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Contextualist Account of Moral Responsibility","authors":"Ann Whittle","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192845603.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192845603.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"If the ability analysis of control is correct, it demonstrates that abilities are pivotal to an account of the control required for moral responsibility. But the precise details do not matter for the argument of the last two chapters. All that requires is the much less contentious claim that abilities to do otherwise are part of an analysis of robust control. If this is so, then the issue of the consequences of a contextualist theory of agential modals for a theory of moral responsibility arises. The aim of this chapter is to begin exploring these consequences. The first four sections outline a positive case for the view that our attributions of moral responsibility have different semantic values relative to different contexts of utterance. This argument draws upon the preceding considerations, semantic evidence, the argument from manipulation, and experimental data regarding our folk intuitions. The chapter ends by contrasting the resulting contextualist analysis of moral responsibility with an alternative proposal, offered by Björnsson and Persson.","PeriodicalId":185337,"journal":{"name":"Freedom and Responsibility in Context","volume":"307 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127391333","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Control","authors":"Ann Whittle","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192845603.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192845603.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter begins relating the rather abstract issues considered so far to the issue of moral responsibility. It introduces the notion of guidance control in the first section, before examining some influential analyses that have been offered of this form of control. In particular, the chapter examines both reasons-sensitivity and hierarchical analyses of this notion. It is argued that there is reason to be sceptical of the claim that such analyses can offer an adequate account independent of considerations regarding abilities to do otherwise. This discussion, in addition to a counterexample offered, challenges the view that we can cleanly divorce the concepts of regulative and guidance control as is often proposed. The chapter ends by sketching an alternative, unified ability analysis of control, which combines elements associated with both regulative and guidance analyses of control.","PeriodicalId":185337,"journal":{"name":"Freedom and Responsibility in Context","volume":"85 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133221810","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Problems for Alternative Analyses","authors":"Ann Whittle","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192845603.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192845603.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter, an inference to the best explanation for a contextualist account of regulative freedom is completed by arguing that this analysis has significant advantages over other views. The chapter begins by looking at rival contextualist analyses, offered by Hawthorne and Rieber. After this, the contextualist account is compared to incompatibilist and compatibilist invariant analyses. In particular, the chapter offers a critical discussion of some recent developments of compatibilist analyses’ of freedom, namely, a new conditional analysis, List’s account of agential possibilities and dispositional compatibilism. It is argued that, in all cases, a contextualist account of regulative freedom is preferable.","PeriodicalId":185337,"journal":{"name":"Freedom and Responsibility in Context","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122534951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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