First International IEEE Security in Storage Workshop, 2002. Proceedings.最新文献

{"title":"On a new way to read data from memory","authors":"David Samyde, S. Skorobogatov, Ross J. Anderson, J. Quisquater","doi":"10.1109/SISW.2002.1183512","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SISW.2002.1183512","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explains a new family of techniques to extract data from semiconductor memory, without using the read-out circuitry provided for the purpose. What these techniques have in common is the use of semi-invasive probing methods to induce measurable changes in the analogue characteristics of the memory cells of interest. The basic idea is that when a memory cell, or read-out amplifier, is scanned appropriately with a laser, the resulting increase in leakage current depends on its state; the same happens when we induce an eddy current in a cell. These perturbations can be carried out at a level that does not modify the stored value, but still enables it to be read out. Our techniques build on it number of recent advances in semi-invasive attack techniques, low temperature data remanence, electromagnetic analysis and eddy current induction. They can be used against a wide range of memory structures, from registers through RAM to FLASH. We have demonstrated their practicality by reading out DES keys stored in RAM without using the normal read-out circuits. This suggests that vendors of products such as smartcards and secure microcontrollers should review their memory encryption, access control and other storage security issues with care.","PeriodicalId":183673,"journal":{"name":"First International IEEE Security in Storage Workshop, 2002. Proceedings.","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133989870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Encryption and key management in a SAN","authors":"A. Baldwin, S. Shiu","doi":"10.1109/SISW.2002.1183508","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SISW.2002.1183508","url":null,"abstract":"Many important security properties can be gained by encrypting stored data. However, these properties can be significantly undermined if the encryption keys are not well managed. This paper discusses how encryption strategies can be used to provide stronger segregation of data, remove \"back door\" access to data, and to reduce the reliance and trust placed in administrators of SAN systems. The focus is on the key management that necessarily forms a part of a secure encryption strategy. The work described is based on the use of a hardware security appliance (HSA) which augments traditional HSMs with additional functionality to control the way keys are used rather than just providing a secure environment for crypto functions. This allows security critical components or services to be pushed into trusted hardware thereby providing wider application or system level security. The paper shows how the HSA can. be applied to securely managing the keys for the encryption strategies needed for SAN security.","PeriodicalId":183673,"journal":{"name":"First International IEEE Security in Storage Workshop, 2002. Proceedings.","volume":"241 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122431233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Network security and storage security: symmetries and symmetry-breaking","authors":"Donald Beaver","doi":"10.1109/SISW.2002.1183504","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SISW.2002.1183504","url":null,"abstract":"It has been hypothesized that storage security and network security are essentially the same, at least insofar as mapping solutions from one domain in a straightforward manner to the other We discuss similarities and differences that shed some doubt on the propriety of equaling the two. While there are many ways to apply methods from one domain to another, there are fundamental differences between data at rest and data in motion. Storage is often an endpoint as well as a link and it requires different treatment under such circumstances.","PeriodicalId":183673,"journal":{"name":"First International IEEE Security in Storage Workshop, 2002. Proceedings.","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134206498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Verifiable secret redistribution for archive systems","authors":"T. Wong, Chenxi Wang, Jeannette M. Wing","doi":"10.1109/SISW.2002.1183515","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SISW.2002.1183515","url":null,"abstract":"We present a new verifiable secret redistribution protocol for threshold sharing schemes that forms a key component of a proposed archival storage system. Our protocol supports redistribution from (m,n) to (m',n') threshold sharing schemes without requiring reconstruction of the original data. The design is motivated by archive systems for which the added security of threshold sharing of data must be accompanied by the flexibility of dynamic shareholder changes. Our protocol enables the dynamic addition or removal of shareholders, and also guards against mobile adversaries. We observe that existing protocols either cannot be extended readily to allow redistribution between different access structures, or have vulnerabilities that allow faulty old shareholders to distribute invalid shares to new shareholders. Our primary contribution is that in our protocol, new shareholders can verify the validity of their shares after redistribution between different access structures.","PeriodicalId":183673,"journal":{"name":"First International IEEE Security in Storage Workshop, 2002. Proceedings.","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121440530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Exposure-resilience for free: the hierarchical ID-based encryption case","authors":"Y. Dodis, M. Yung","doi":"10.1109/SISW.2002.1183509","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SISW.2002.1183509","url":null,"abstract":"In the problem of gradual key exposure, the secret key is assumed to be slowly compromised over time, so that more and more information about a secret key is eventually leaked. This models the general situation in the real world where memory, storage systems and devices cannot perfectly hide all information for long time. In this setting, in order to protect against exposure threats, the secret key is represented in an \"exposure- resilient\" form, which is periodically refreshed with the following guarantee: as long as the adversary does not learn \"too much\" information about the current representation of the secret between successive refreshes, the system should remain secure. To measure the efficiency of a given solution, one considers the \"natural\" secret key representation A, the \"exposure- resilient\" representation B, and examines the following three measures: (1) space loss which is the extra space required by B over A; (2) time loss which is the operation slowdown when B is used in place of A: and (3) exposure-resilience which is the fraction of B which can be \"safely leaked\". All the current solutions to the problem - including proactive secret sharing, all-or-nothing transforms and exposure-resilient functions - always suffered from non-trivial losses in both space and time in order to achieve varying levels of exposure-resilience. It was, therefore, informally believed that these losses are inevitable in even, reasonable application, since a \"natural\" representation A is unlikely to offer any exposure-resilience. We show this belief is false for the elegant \"hierarchical identity-based encryption\" (HIBE) of Gentry and Silverberg (2002), which is the only known fully junctional HIBE up to date. Specifically, we show that the natural secret key representation for the HIBE admits a simple and efficient refresh operation, which offers very high level of exposure-resilience, while incurring absolutely no space or time losses for decryption. We argue that this simple fact is quite powerful from a key storage security perspective, is highly applicable for such tasks as threshold decryption, and that it further makes HIBE a much more attractive alternative in various real life scenarios. On a philosophical level, while previous techniques protected against gradual key exposure in a generic way, oblivious to the application, we show that in certain situations one might achieve much better parameters by concentrating on the application at hand.","PeriodicalId":183673,"journal":{"name":"First International IEEE Security in Storage Workshop, 2002. Proceedings.","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121820307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Security considerations when designing a distributed file system using object storage devices","authors":"B. Reed, Mark A. Smith, D. Diklic","doi":"10.1109/SISW.2002.1183507","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SISW.2002.1183507","url":null,"abstract":"We present the design goals that led us to developing a distributed object-based secure file system, Brave. Brave uses mutually authenticated object storage devices, SCARED, to store file system data. Rather than require a new authentication infrastructure. we show how we use a simple authentication protocol that is bridged into existing security infrastructures, even if there is more than one authentication protocol or domain present. We position our work in the context of some of the current work going on in distributed secure file systems and present our implementation of our file system. We also present some security weaknesses that are shared with other distributed file systems that may not be apparent when designing these systems.","PeriodicalId":183673,"journal":{"name":"First International IEEE Security in Storage Workshop, 2002. Proceedings.","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127400928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A two layered approach for securing an object store network","authors":"A. Azagury, R. Canetti, M. Factor, S. Halevi, E. Henis, D. Naor, N. Rinetzky, O. Rodeh, J. Satran","doi":"10.1109/SISW.2002.1183506","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SISW.2002.1183506","url":null,"abstract":"Storage Area Networks (SAN) are based on direct interaction between clients and storage servers. This unmediated access exposes the storage server to network attacks, necessitating a verification, by the server, that the client requests conform with the system protection policy. Solutions today can only enforce access control at the granularity of entire storage servers. This is an outcome of the way storage servers abstract storage: an array of fixed size blocks. Providing access control at the granularity of blocks is infeasible there are too many active blocks in the server of entire servers is used. Object, stores (e.g, the NASD system) on the other hand provide means to address these issues. An object store control unit presents an abstraction of a dynamic collection of objects, each can be seen as a different array of blocks, thus providing the basis for Protection at the object level. In this paper we present a security model for the object store which leverages on existing security infrastructure. We give a simple generic mechanism capable of enforcing an arbitrary access control policy at object granularity. This mechanism is specifically designed to achieve low overhead by minimizing the cost of validating an operation along the critical data path, and lends itself for optimizations such as caching The key idea of the model is to separate the mechanisms for transport security from the one used for access control and to maximize the use standard security protocols when possible We utilize a standard industry protocol for authentication, integrity and privacy on the communication channel (IPSec for IP networks) anti fine a proprietary protocol for authorization on top of the secure communication layer.","PeriodicalId":183673,"journal":{"name":"First International IEEE Security in Storage Workshop, 2002. Proceedings.","volume":"59 4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129528480","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Secure group services for storage area networks","authors":"Yongdae Kim, M. Narasimha, F. Maino, G. Tsudik","doi":"10.1109/SISW.2002.1183514","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SISW.2002.1183514","url":null,"abstract":"Storage Area Networks, with their ability to offer high data availability, reliability and scalability, are a promising solution for the large scale storage needs of many enterprises. As with any distributed storage system, a major design challenge for a Storage Area Network (SAN) is to provide data integrity and confidentiality. In this paper we propose a solution which addresses these core security requirements. In particular, we focus on mechanisms that enable efficient key distribution to allow scalable data sharing. Our scheme uses strong cryptographic techniques to achieve data security and integrity. Further, we delegate the bulk of the cryptographic processing to the SAN entities (e.g., switches, routers or other network elements), thereby removing bottlenecks at the disks and causing minimal inconvenience to the hosts. By recognizing the peer nature of the group of SAN entities, we propose efficient group key mechanisms that do not involve any centralized key distribution servers. This allows our scheme to be scalable and be free from any single point of failure or attack.","PeriodicalId":183673,"journal":{"name":"First International IEEE Security in Storage Workshop, 2002. Proceedings.","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134216418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Performance study of software-based iSCSI security","authors":"Shuang-Yi Tang, Yingping Lu, D. Du","doi":"10.1109/SISW.2002.1183513","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SISW.2002.1183513","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we study possible iSCSI security different security requirements. To evaluate the performance of different security schemes, we conduct performance experiments using a software-based iSCSI implementation with proper security extensions. In data encryption schemes, we consider two alternatives, IP Security Protocol (IPSec) and Secure Socket Layer (SSL), and compare the resulting iSCSI performances with these two schemes. We find that the software-based iSCSI implementation offers reasonable throughput with a 2 GHz CPU at the network speed of 100Mbps; however, with a 1 GHz CPU, the software implementation is not capable of providing sufficient throughput with triple-DES encrypted storage data. In addition, we also find that IPSec ESP scheme has better performance when the requested data size is small, compared to SSL. Given that both performance and security are critical issues in the deployment of iSCSI, it is important to understand the tradeoffs between them. We believe that this study sheds some helpful light on this understanding.","PeriodicalId":183673,"journal":{"name":"First International IEEE Security in Storage Workshop, 2002. Proceedings.","volume":"130 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123444755","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Streamed or detached triple integrity for a time stamped secure storage system","authors":"A. Apvrille, J. Hughes, Vincent Girier","doi":"10.1109/SISW.2002.1183510","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SISW.2002.1183510","url":null,"abstract":"Organizations and companies with integrity concerns for their archivals are currently left with very few and unconvenient solutions. To cope with those needs, a Time Stamped Virtual WORM system has been proposed previously, but only its concepts and theory have been examined yet. Hence, this paper focuses on defining practical block formats to help implement this system in reality. But there are several pitfalls on the path of implementation, and this paper has to be extremely cautious not to introduce any limit - or security flaw into virtual WORMs. With such requirements, two different block formats are successfully defined: a streamed format where security data is inserted within user's documents, and a detached format where security information is written in a different location. Finally, the detached format is studied in the sample case of a tamper-evident FTP server.","PeriodicalId":183673,"journal":{"name":"First International IEEE Security in Storage Workshop, 2002. Proceedings.","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114801845","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}