Proceedings 2016 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium最新文献

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ProTracer: Towards Practical Provenance Tracing by Alternating Between Logging and Tainting ProTracer:通过伐木和染色交替进行实际的溯源
Proceedings 2016 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.14722/NDSS.2016.23350
Shiqing Ma, X. Zhang, Dongyan Xu
{"title":"ProTracer: Towards Practical Provenance Tracing by Alternating Between Logging and Tainting","authors":"Shiqing Ma, X. Zhang, Dongyan Xu","doi":"10.14722/NDSS.2016.23350","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14722/NDSS.2016.23350","url":null,"abstract":"—Provenance tracing is a very important approach to Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attack detection and investigation. Existing techniques either suffer from the depen- dence explosion problem or have non-trivial space and run-time overhead, which hinder their application in practice. We propose ProTracer, a lightweight provenance tracing system that alternates between system event logging and unit level taint propagation. The technique is built on an on-the-fly system event processing infrastructure that features a very lightweight kernel module and a sophisticated user space daemon that performs concurrent and out-of-order event processing. The evaluation with different realistic system workloads and a number of attack cases show that ProTracer only produces 13MB log data per day, and 0.84GB(Server)/2.32GB(Client) in 3 months without losing any important information. The space consumption is only < 1.28% of the state-of-the-art, 7 times smaller than an off-line garbage collection technique. The run-time overhead averages < 7% for servers and < 5% for regular applications. The generated attack causal graphs are a few times smaller than those by existing techniques while they are equally informative.","PeriodicalId":177835,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 2016 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134109967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 175
FLEXDROID: Enforcing In-App Privilege Separation in Android FLEXDROID:在Android中强制应用内特权分离
Proceedings 2016 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.14722/NDSS.2016.23485
Jaebaek Seo, Daehyeok Kim, Donghyun Cho, I. Shin, Taesoo Kim
{"title":"FLEXDROID: Enforcing In-App Privilege Separation in Android","authors":"Jaebaek Seo, Daehyeok Kim, Donghyun Cho, I. Shin, Taesoo Kim","doi":"10.14722/NDSS.2016.23485","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14722/NDSS.2016.23485","url":null,"abstract":"—Mobile applications are increasingly integrating third-party libraries to provide various features, such as advertising, analytics, social networking, and more. Unfortunately, such integration with third-party libraries comes with the cost of potential privacy violations of users, because Android always grants a full set of permissions to third-party libraries as their host applications. Unintended accesses to users’ private data are underestimated threats to users’ privacy, as complex and often obfuscated third-party libraries make it hard for application developers to estimate the correct behaviors of third-party libraries. More critically, a wide adoption of native code (JNI) and dynamic code executions such as Java reflection or dynamic code reloading, makes it even harder to apply state-of- the-art security analysis. In this work, we propose F LEX D ROID , a new Android security model and isolation mechanism, that provides dynamic, fine-grained access control for third-party libraries. With F LEX D ROID , application developers not only can gain a full control of third-party libraries (e.g., which permissions to grant or not), but also can specify how to make them behave after detecting a privacy violation (e.g., providing a mock user’s information or kill). To achieve such goals, we define a new notion of principals for third-party libraries, and develop a novel security mechanism, called inter-process stack inspection that is effective to JNI as well as dynamic code execution. Our usability study shows that developers can easily adopt F LEX D ROID ’s policy to their existing applications. Finally, our evaluation shows that F LEX D ROID can effectively restrict the permissions of third-party libraries with negligible overheads.","PeriodicalId":177835,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 2016 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium","volume":"115 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133768725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 91
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