{"title":"Consumers Waiting in Queues: The Role of First-Order and Second-Order Justice","authors":"Rongrong Zhou, D. Soman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.875660","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.875660","url":null,"abstract":"Past research on queuing has identified social justice as an important determinant of consumers' waiting experiences. In queuing settings, people's perception of social justice depends on whether or not the principle of first in and first out (FIFO) has been violated. In this research, we argue that, aside from and independent of the order of service, consumers also care about whether everyone spends approximately equal amount of time waiting before availing of the product or service. When consumers perceive that they have spent more time waiting than others and when they could attribute this injustice to the service provider, they would be less satisfied with the waiting experience. We also argue that adherence to the FIFO principle is a more salient concern to consumers (\"first-order\" justice), and equal waiting time (\"second-order\" justice) matters only when first-order justice is not an issue. Three experiments support the predictions.","PeriodicalId":158337,"journal":{"name":"Hong Kong: Marketing (Topic)","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129473139","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Behavioral Strategies in Repeated Pure Coordination Games","authors":"R. Zwick, A. Rapoport, Alison King Chung Lo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.287805","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.287805","url":null,"abstract":"We study experimentally a class of pure coordination games as a special case of the Consumer Choice of Prizes game developed by Rapoport et al. (2000). We find a high level of group coordination coupled with considerable switching in the choice of locations. Two models are proposed and tested to account for the results, one postulating the formation of conventions, and the other invoking the mixed strategy equilibrium solution for risk-neutral players. We reject both models as possible candidates to describe the behavioral regularities that we observe in the data. A third model that allows individual perturbations of commonly shared choice probabilities is proposed and tested. It accounts for the major results on the individual and aggregate levels.","PeriodicalId":158337,"journal":{"name":"Hong Kong: Marketing (Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133257988","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}