{"title":"Expertise and Discretionary Bonus Decisions","authors":"M. Abernethy, Chung-Yu Hung, L. Lent","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3214065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3214065","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the association between managers’ expertise and their discretionary bonus decisions in a hospital setting. We hypothesize that high-expertise managers make decisions that encourage cooperation among their subordinates. However, low-expertise managers cannot do so because their lower levels of knowledge, experience, and domain expertise prevent them from having sufficient personal influence to persuade other professionals to cooperate. We find that high-expertise managers make two types of bonus decisions: (1) keep a smaller share of the bonus pool than what they are entitled to retain and (2) allocate the remainder to subordinates more evenly after adjusting for the underlying heterogeneity in their productivity. We also find evidence that high-expertise managers whose bonus decisions reflect their support for cooperation have higher department performance than all other managers.","PeriodicalId":154392,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Internal Firm Organization (Topic)","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131025259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"When Do Governance Mechanisms Matter Most?","authors":"Derek Horstmeyer, Kara Wells","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2520942","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2520942","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the interaction of internal and external firm-level governance mechanisms with industry-specific economic conditions to assess when they best serve current shareholders. We find that external governance (shareholder rights) is most valuable during industry upturns, with no differential benefit during downturns. For internal governance, we find that small boards are incrementally more valuable during upturns but that this result weakens/reverses during downturns, and there is inconclusive evidence regarding the state dependent value of institutional ownership. Contributions include showing: governance mechanisms have industry economic state dependent values; small boards may not always be optimal; and managers do not capture these inefficiencies through aggressive policy decisions, nor excessive compensation.","PeriodicalId":154392,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Internal Firm Organization (Topic)","volume":"520 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123067134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Speed of Information Diffusion within Fund Families","authors":"G. Cici, S. Jaspersen, A. Kempf","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2565753","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2565753","url":null,"abstract":"We document that the speed of information dissemination within mutual fund families positively affects the performance of member funds. This suggests that the resulting benefits of higher information precision far outweigh free-riding costs associated with fast internal dissemination. The performance effect intensifies when information travels across managers from different rather than same styles. This is consistent with fast information diffusion aggregating complementary insights that sharpen information precision, but also with fewer free-riding opportunities among managers from different styles. Managers exploit the resulting higher information precision rationally by trading more, relying less on public information, and investing differently from unaffiliated peers.","PeriodicalId":154392,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Internal Firm Organization (Topic)","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115873206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"When Do Insiders Trade? Opportunistic versus Strategic Behaviour","authors":"J. Batten, Igor Lončarski, P. Szilagyi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2653576","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2653576","url":null,"abstract":"Opportunistic inside-traders are known to trade specific financial contracts, such as options, to maximise the economic benefits arising from their private information. However, the recent conviction of inside-traders Kamay and Hill in the foreign exchange markets demonstrates more complex strategic behaviour: only certain information was traded; losses were generated to mask trading activities; and great care was exercised when placing trades to minimise losses that may arise from offsetting price movements due information shocks occurring in other financial markets. These results are therefore consistent with insiders acting strategically to maximise the value of their information, while also trying to minimise the risk of detection. The analysis also did not reveal leakage of inside information to other traders, likely due to the size of the markets in which the inside trading occurred. This suggests limitations to regulatory surveillance in over-the-counter markets and reinforces the importance of measures to prevent or discourage insider-trading prior to trade execution.","PeriodicalId":154392,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Internal Firm Organization (Topic)","volume":"530 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123073202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An Empirical Investigation of Internal Governance","authors":"Rajesh Aggarwal, Huijing Fu, Yihui Pan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1571740","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1571740","url":null,"abstract":"Acharya, Myers, and Rajan (2011) theorize that CEO rent extraction is constrained by subordinate managers. This internal governance works best when the relative contributions of CEOs and managers to output are balanced. Consistent with the theory, we find a hump-shaped relation between relative contributions and corporate investment, and between relative contributions and firm performance. These hump-shaped relations are stronger for firms with older CEOs, for firms more likely to promote insiders to CEO, for firms with non-founder CEOs, and for firms in growing industries. Other forms of governance do not diminish the importance of internal governance, and the results are robust to endogeneity concerns.","PeriodicalId":154392,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Internal Firm Organization (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-12-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133501560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The American Accounting Association: Issues in Governance and Internal Control","authors":"W. Huber","doi":"10.1504/IJCA.2013.055482","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1504/IJCA.2013.055482","url":null,"abstract":"This article first presents a review and assessment of the American Accounting Association’s (AAA) governance and internal control. Second, it reports the results of a survey of members of the AAA that was conducted just prior to its annual meeting in August 2011 to solicit their opinions concerning the governance and internal control of the AAA. Thirty-seven and one-half percent of the respondents remained dissatisfied with the nomination, election and voting processes even after amendments to the bylaws were passed in spring 2011. Furthermore, although the AAA is a co-sponsor of the COSO framework of internal control, there is no indication that the AAA has adopted the COSO framework. Over 56% of the respondents believe the AAA should adopt COSO recommendations. The paper concludes that substantial reforms must be undertaken to improve the corporate governance and internal control functions of the AAA.","PeriodicalId":154392,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Internal Firm Organization (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127719048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Peoples, BCE, and the Good Corporate 'Citizen'","authors":"Edward J. Waitzer, Johnny Jaswal","doi":"10.60082/2817-5069.1138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.1138","url":null,"abstract":"This article considers the use of various legal instruments to advance a more expansive but well-defined view of directors’ duties and discretion - a view which focuses on the longer term interests of the corporation. We begin with an attempt to clarify the nature of directors’ statutory duties under Canadian corporate law. We then consider the recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise and BCE v. 1976 Debenture holders, in which the Court took a broad view of corporate purpose, but failed to provide clear logic or operational guidance as to consequential directorial responsibilities. As a result, the Court may have afforded directors increased deference, provided they comply with prescribed procedural steps, but without a clearly stated legal rationale. We then outline various legal theories that courts might consider help advance and clarify some of the concepts averted to by the Supreme Court and discuss opportunities for complementary legislative or shareholder-initiated reform.","PeriodicalId":154392,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Internal Firm Organization (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132807492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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