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Corporate Governance 1最新文献

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Political Connections and Allocative Distortions 政治关系与配置扭曲
Corporate Governance 1 Pub Date : 2015-12-27 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2480261
David Schoenherr
{"title":"Political Connections and Allocative Distortions","authors":"David Schoenherr","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2480261","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2480261","url":null,"abstract":"This paper exploits a unique institutional setting to examine the effects of firms' political connections on the allocation of government procurement contracts. After winning the presidential election in Korea in 2007, the new president, Lee Myung Bak, appoints several members of his networks as CEOs of state-owned firms. In turn, these state firms allocate significantly more procurement contracts to private firms with a CEO from the same network. The systematically poor execution of contracts allocated to connected firms suggests that contracts are misallocated. Back of the envelope calculations suggest that each dollar in contract volume transferred from non-connected to connected firms leads to a cost of 17-26 cents to the economy, resulting in a total annual cost of about 0.21-0.32% of GDP.","PeriodicalId":142491,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance 1","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128305655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 162
Does Board "Independence" Destroy Corporate Value? 董事会“独立性”会破坏公司价值吗?
Corporate Governance 1 Pub Date : 2014-08-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2312325
P. Swan, David Forsberg
{"title":"Does Board \"Independence\" Destroy Corporate Value?","authors":"P. Swan, David Forsberg","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2312325","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2312325","url":null,"abstract":"The Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council (CGC) has required all listed firms to either adopt a majority of \"independent\" board members without links either to management or to substantial shareholders or explain \"if not, why not\". While this close to a global standard, it is the opposite to US exchanges who also require \"independence from management\" but are explicit in stating that significant shareholding need be no barrier to independence. Within a framework of both fixed firm and combined industry-year effects such that each firm is compared with itself, we show that firm performance declines significantly as affected outside directors depart the firm to make way for \"Independents\". Regular Gray directors make better acquisition decisions, increase the proportion of incentives in CEO pay, and raise dividend payouts. The presence of more executives on the board significantly reduces the CEO’s pay, while combining the role of CEO and chair adds to firm value.","PeriodicalId":142491,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance 1","volume":"156 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124380145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12
Liquidity Dynamics between REIT and Property Markets 房地产投资信托基金与房地产市场之间的流动性动态
Corporate Governance 1 Pub Date : 2014-04-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2391025
Sumit Agarwal, M. Hu
{"title":"Liquidity Dynamics between REIT and Property Markets","authors":"Sumit Agarwal, M. Hu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2391025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2391025","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the relationship between the liquidity of the real estate property market and that of the REIT market from the perspective of liquidity dynamics and transformation. Our results indicate that there is a lead-lag relationship between the liquidity of these two markets. The Granger Causality test shows that property market liquidity leads that of the REIT market. In addition, returns in the property market have a causal effect on the liquidity and returns of the REIT market. We estimate VAR models and compute impulse response functions to examine the dynamics of the cross-market relationships in liquidity and return between the two markets. The impulse responses show that REIT liquidity responds to property market liquidity, especially after the structure change in the REIT industry in the early 1990s. Our results also demonstrate that shocks to macroeconomic variables have significant effects on the liquidity of the two markets. Overall, our study sheds light on the contemporaneous commonality between the liquidity of the unsecuritized property market and that of the securitized REIT market.","PeriodicalId":142491,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance 1","volume":"179 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124448825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
Stock Option Awards: Effects on Firm Performance and Risk-Taking after Japan’s Corporate Governance Reforms 日本公司治理改革后股票期权奖励对公司绩效和风险承担的影响
Corporate Governance 1 Pub Date : 2012-08-27 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2136944
Hyonok Kim, Y. Yasuda, Nobuhisa Hasegawa
{"title":"Stock Option Awards: Effects on Firm Performance and Risk-Taking after Japan’s Corporate Governance Reforms","authors":"Hyonok Kim, Y. Yasuda, Nobuhisa Hasegawa","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2136944","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2136944","url":null,"abstract":"We empirically investigate the adoption of stock option plans in Japan after the corporate governance reforms of the early 2000s. We examine the determinants of stock option grants, especially focusing on the effects of herding behavior among Japanese firms and the change of accounting treatment of stock option grants. We also investigate the effects of stock option awards on firm performance, using propensity score matching. Then, following Hayes et al. (2012) identification strategy, we provide new evidence on causal relation between managerial incentives and risk-taking. We find that the adoption of stock option plans is more likely in firms that compete with the other firms that have extensively adopted stock option plans in the same industry, indicating that there is a kind of ‘spillover’ effect among those firms. We find that firms that introduce stock option plans generally face liquidity constraint and their option usage declines significantly after the adoption of accounting standards. We also find some evidences that do not support the view that providing incentives for risk-taking is a primary purpose for the use of stock options. This paper provides some new evidence of the adverse implications of stock option plans in the scheme of equity-based compensation.","PeriodicalId":142491,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance 1","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117236716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Promotion Incentives, CEO Appointments and Firm Performance 晋升激励、CEO任命与公司绩效
Corporate Governance 1 Pub Date : 2012-08-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2136249
Maria Strydom, Michaela Rankin
{"title":"Promotion Incentives, CEO Appointments and Firm Performance","authors":"Maria Strydom, Michaela Rankin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2136249","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2136249","url":null,"abstract":"Executive remuneration is often criticised as being excessive and not clearly linked to firm performance. This study further examines the link between pay and performance by examining the impact of promotion-based tournament incentives. Our hypotheses draw on tournament theory of labour economics which argues that the ‘gap’ between the remuneration of CEO and other senior executives creates a tournament-style competition for promotion amongst ambitious senior executives. The efforts of these highly motivated executives have a positive influence on overall firm performance. Whilst tournament theory is well studied in the US and UK (Conyon et al. 2001; Kale et al. 2009; Gong et al. 2011), Australian evidence is sparse. Our empirical analysis therefore seeks to better understand the determinants of tournament incentives, particularly surrounding the appointment of a new CEO. Further, we test whether firm performance is influenced by the magnitude of tournament incentives. Our results suggest that tournament incentives play a significant role in enhancing firm performance, but that this positive impact is somewhat reduced after a change in CEO. We also find that closer alignment of CEO pay (through equity compensation) is positively associated with firm performance. In regards to the determinants of tournament incentives we find that tournament incentives are lowest after a change in CEO. This study therefore contributes to the topical debate on executive compensation by providing evidence on the effectiveness of tournament incentives and their relationship to firm performance in the Australian environment. It is one of the first to examine whether tournament incentives play any role in the pay-for-performance relationship in Australia and findings are likely to be of interest to researchers, policy makers, corporations and their shareholders, given the increased current focus on executive compensation and the lack of clear alignment with firm performance.","PeriodicalId":142491,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance 1","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127148729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Effect of Bank Monitoring as an Alternative of Corporate Governance Mechanism on the Borrowers’ Firm Value: Evidence from Indonesian Listed Firms 银行监管作为公司治理机制的替代对借款人企业价值的影响:来自印尼上市公司的证据
Corporate Governance 1 Pub Date : 2011-10-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1914444
A. Hermawan, Alexandra Ryan Ahmad Dina
{"title":"The Effect of Bank Monitoring as an Alternative of Corporate Governance Mechanism on the Borrowers’ Firm Value: Evidence from Indonesian Listed Firms","authors":"A. Hermawan, Alexandra Ryan Ahmad Dina","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1914444","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1914444","url":null,"abstract":"The objective of this research is to examine the effect of bank monitoring as an alternative of corporate governance mechanisms on the borrowers’ firm value. The strengths of bank monitoring on the borrowers are measured based on the magnitude of the bank loan, the size of the loan from banks with high monitoring quality, the length of a bank loan outstanding period, and the number of lenders. The research hypotheses were tested using multiple regression model with a sample of 230 companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2009. The empirical results show that only the size of the loan from banks with high monitoring quality and the number of lenders significantly influences the borrowers’ firm value. These findings imply that only banks with high monitoring quality could play an important role in the corporate governance and therefore increasing the firm value by their monitoring function. Furthermore, bank monitoring is less effective if a company borrows from many banks, and therefore decreasing the firm value.","PeriodicalId":142491,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance 1","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131662806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Corporate Governance, Diversification, and Firm Value: Evidence from 'Spin-Ins' 公司治理、多元化与公司价值:来自“分拆”的证据
Corporate Governance 1 Pub Date : 2011-08-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1913453
Yoon Choi, S. Han
{"title":"Corporate Governance, Diversification, and Firm Value: Evidence from 'Spin-Ins'","authors":"Yoon Choi, S. Han","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1913453","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1913453","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the impact of corporate restructuring on firm value using a unique internal corporate restructuring created between the years of 2001 and 2003 in Japan. We show that excess value significantly increases after the internal restructuring even when the degree of diversification has not changed. This result supports the argument that diversification itself may not drive “discounts” or “premiums.” We also explore these events to examine the effect of bank governance and keiretsu affiliation. Our results are consistent with the argument that recent Japanese restructuring reduces information asymmetries and agency problems, thus improving the efficiency of internal capital markets and firm value.","PeriodicalId":142491,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance 1","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124504225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Impact of Residual Government Ownership in Privatized Firms: New Evidence from China 民营化企业剩余国有股权的影响:来自中国的新证据
Corporate Governance 1 Pub Date : 2011-05-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1842643
Jing Liao, M. Young
{"title":"The Impact of Residual Government Ownership in Privatized Firms: New Evidence from China","authors":"Jing Liao, M. Young","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1842643","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1842643","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates the determinants of residual government ownership and the impact of such ownership on post-privatization performance in China. Using panel data on 514 firms for the period from 1999 to 2004, the similar sample period with previous studies, we find that government shareholders are more likely to be present in small firms, while large firms are more likely to have politically connected CEOs on their boards. Contrary to the \"political interference\" hypothesis, our results show that residual government ownership has a positive impact on Tobin’s Q. This study indicates that when the risk of expropriation by parent companies is high, government shareholders can add value to firms by signaling their commitment to privatization.","PeriodicalId":142491,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance 1","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122084245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 36
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