Columbia: Decision最新文献

Lack of Competition in the Financial Market in Israel: The Conflict between the Needs of P2P Lenders and the Platforms’ Intentions 以色列金融市场缺乏竞争:P2P贷款人的需求与平台意图之间的冲突

Columbia: Decision Pub Date : 2020-09-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3700107

Galit Klein, Ze'ev Shtudiner, M. Zwilling

{"title":"Lack of Competition in the Financial Market in Israel: The Conflict between the Needs of P2P Lenders and the Platforms’ Intentions","authors":"Galit Klein, Ze'ev Shtudiner, M. Zwilling","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3700107","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3700107","url":null,"abstract":"Peer-to-peer (P2P) lending began as a kind of sharing economy within the field of finance. Using internet platforms, P2P lending attempts to offer an alternative to traditional financial institutions like banks. However, the P2P sector plays only a minor role in the finance industry in Israel, compared to the traditional banking system that suffers from an oligopoly structure. We conducted two studies in order to investigate this gap, comparing the dual connection between lenders and the platforms. In the first study, we conducted a conjoint analysis to examine the attributes that have higher utility for the lenders, and impact their decision to invest through the P2P platforms. In the second study, we shift the research prism toward the platforms, and examine the factors they use to determine the lending interest rate for loans, other than the borrowers’ financial condition. We found that although lenders wish to decrease their risk and guarantee their investment, P2P companies encourage borrowers, thereby increasing the risk inherit in lending to strangers. This contradiction between the priorities of the lenders and the platforms, may explain why the general public considers P2P lending highly risk, and avoids this financial tool. Based on our results, we offer a number of suggestions to increase the attractiveness of the industry.","PeriodicalId":142352,"journal":{"name":"Columbia: Decision","volume":"37 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124842753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Evaluating Bank Performing Management on Banking Industry 银行业银行绩效管理评价

Columbia: Decision Pub Date : 2018-12-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3301927

Mahmud Mohd Samsudin

引用次数: 0

A Model for Queue Position Valuation in a Limit Order Book 极限订单簿中排队位置评估模型

Columbia: Decision Pub Date : 2016-12-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2996221

C. Moallemi, Kai Yuan

{"title":"A Model for Queue Position Valuation in a Limit Order Book","authors":"C. Moallemi, Kai Yuan","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2996221","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2996221","url":null,"abstract":"Many financial markets operate as electronic limit order books under a price-time priority rule. In this setting, among all resting orders awaiting trade at a given price, earlier orders are prioritized for matching with contra-side liquidity takers. This creates a technological arms race among high-frequency traders and other automated market participants to establish early (and hence advantageous) positions in the resulting first-in-first-out (FIFO) queue. We develop a model for valuing orders based on their relative queue position that incorporates both eco- nomic (informational) and stochastic modeling (queueing) aspects. Our model identifies two important components of positional value: (i) a static component that relates to the trade-off at an instant of trade execution between earning a spread and incurring adverse selection costs, and incorporates the fact that adverse selection costs are increasing with queue position; (ii) a dynamic component, that captures the optionality associated with the future value that accrues by locking in a given queue position. Our model offers predictions of order value at different positions in the queue as a function of market primitives, and can be empirically calibrated. We validate our model by comparing it with estimates of queue value realized in backtesting simulations and find the predictions to be accurate. Moreover, for some large tick-size stocks, we find that queue value can be of the same order of magnitude as the bid-ask spread. This suggests that accurate valuation of queue position is a necessary and important ingredient in considering optimal execution or market-making strategies for such assets.","PeriodicalId":142352,"journal":{"name":"Columbia: Decision","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115904591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 28

Purchase Order Financing: Credit, Commitment, and Supply Chain Consequences 采购订单融资:信用、承诺和供应链后果

Columbia: Decision Pub Date : 2015-04-04 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2616812

M. Reindorp, Fehmi Tanrısever, A. Lange

{"title":"Purchase Order Financing: Credit, Commitment, and Supply Chain Consequences","authors":"M. Reindorp, Fehmi Tanrısever, A. Lange","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2616812","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2616812","url":null,"abstract":"We study a supply chain where a retailer buys from a supplier who cannot fully ﬁnance her production. Informational problems about the supplier’s demand prospects and production capabilities restrict her access to capital. By committing to a minimum purchase quantity, the retailer can mitigate these informational problems and expand the supplier’s feasible production set. We assume a newsvendor model of operations and analyze the strategic interaction of the two parties as a sequential game. Key parameters in our model are the supplier’s ex-ante credit limit; her informational transparency (which conditions the amount of additional capital released by the commitment); and the demand characteristics of the ﬁnal market. We show that in equilibrium the supplier can benefit from a lower ex-ante credit limit or lower informational transparency. The retailer always benefits from an increase in these parameters. Moreover, the supplier’s ex-ante credit limit and informational transparency may be substitutes or complements with respect to her own proﬁt, but are always substitutes with respect to the retailer’s proﬁt. Our study provides a novel perspective on capital market frictions in supply chain contracting.","PeriodicalId":142352,"journal":{"name":"Columbia: Decision","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115906074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 53

On the (Surprising) Sufficiency of Linear Models for Dynamic Pricing with Demand Learning 考虑需求学习的动态定价线性模型的(惊人)充分性

Columbia: Decision Pub Date : 2014-03-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1983274

Omar Besbes, A. Zeevi

引用次数: 171

Competition Under Generalized Attraction Models: Applications to Quality Competition Under Yield Uncertainty 广义吸引力模型下的竞争:产量不确定条件下质量竞争的应用

Columbia: Decision Pub Date : 2009-12-01 DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1090.1073

A. Federgruen, N. Yang

引用次数: 90

The Execution Game 执行游戏

Columbia: Decision Pub Date : 2008-04-28 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1916298

C. Moallemi

引用次数: 6