Local Accountability and National Coordination in Fiscal Federalism最新文献

Introduction: decentralization and parties 简介:分权与各方

Local Accountability and National Coordination in Fiscal Federalism Pub Date : 2019-11-01 DOI: 10.4337/9781788972178.00007

Charles R. Hankla, J. Martínez-Vázquez, R. A. P. Rodríguez

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Building the theory: proportional representation and closed party lists 建立理论:比例代表制和封闭政党名单

Local Accountability and National Coordination in Fiscal Federalism Pub Date : 2019-11-01 DOI: 10.4337/9781788972178.00010

Charles R. Hankla, J. Martínez-Vázquez, R. A. P. Rodríguez

引用次数: 0

Building the theory: majoritarian electoral systems and non-integrated parties 构建理论:多数选举制度和非整合政党

Local Accountability and National Coordination in Fiscal Federalism Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.4337/9781788972178.00009

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Building the theory: proportional representation and open party lists 建立理论:比例代表制和公开政党名单

Local Accountability and National Coordination in Fiscal Federalism Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.4337/9781788972178.00011

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Conclusion: a fine balance 结论:一个很好的平衡

Local Accountability and National Coordination in Fiscal Federalism Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.4337/9781788972178.00015

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Decentralization and integrated parties: summarizing the models 分权与整合:模型总结

Local Accountability and National Coordination in Fiscal Federalism Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.4337/9781788972178.00012

引用次数: 0