{"title":"Introduction to Part VI","authors":"W. Alford","doi":"10.1017/9781108622851.024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108622851.024","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":138093,"journal":{"name":"Disability, Health, Law, and Bioethics","volume":"268 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122822631","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introduction to Part I","authors":"I. Cohen","doi":"10.4324/9780429057298-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429057298-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":138093,"journal":{"name":"Disability, Health, Law, and Bioethics","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121540300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introduction to Part V","authors":"C. Shachar","doi":"10.1017/9781108622851.020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108622851.020","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":138093,"journal":{"name":"Disability, Health, Law, and Bioethics","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128496389","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introduction to Part III","authors":"C. Shachar","doi":"10.1017/9781108622851.011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108622851.011","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":138093,"journal":{"name":"Disability, Health, Law, and Bioethics","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128697844","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introduction to Part II","authors":"I. Cohen","doi":"10.1017/9781108622851.007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108622851.007","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":138093,"journal":{"name":"Disability, Health, Law, and Bioethics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128822448","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Destigmatizing Disability in the Law of Immigration Admissions","authors":"Medha D. Makhlouf","doi":"10.1017/9781108622851.021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108622851.021","url":null,"abstract":"In U.S. immigration law, disability has historically been associated with deviance, and has served as the basis for legal barriers to entry and eventual citizenship. For example, immigrants with actual and perceived physical and intellectual disabilities, mental illness, and other health conditions have been deemed “inadmissible” to the United States based on the belief that they are likely to become dependent on the government for support. Although the law has evolved to accommodate immigrants with disabilities in some ways, significant legal barriers still exist on account of the widespread, persistent characterization of disability as a “bad difference” from the norm. This chapter contributes to the scholarly literature on disability rights and immigration by examining the strengths and limitations of adopting a destigmatizing account of disablement in the context of immigration admissions. Such an approach, which characterizes disablement as a “mere difference” as opposed to a “bad difference,” would build on the momentum that has liberalized disability-related immigration exclusions over the years. Framing disability as a valued form of diversity, while acknowledging its inherent costs, would be a promising first step toward characterizing immigrants with disabilities as valuable and contributing members of society, and supporting a more just societal allocation of the economic costs of disability.","PeriodicalId":138093,"journal":{"name":"Disability, Health, Law, and Bioethics","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129601265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Abortion, the Disabilities of Pregnancy, and the Dignity of Risk","authors":"M. Case","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3366444","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3366444","url":null,"abstract":"When abortion is discussed in the context of destigmatizing disability, it is usually in connection with the potential disabilities of the fetus. Disability rights activists increasingly encourage both lawmakers setting abortion policy and women contemplating abortion not to think that a life with disabilities is not worth living. In particular, they argue that a fetus diagnosed with Down syndrome, let alone one with a cleft palate, should not for that reason be aborted. While taking this line of argument into account, this chapter will shift the frame of reference to various ways in which the law and bioethics of abortion treat the pregnant woman as disabled. \u0000 \u0000The examples presented come from the abortion jurisprudence of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. In the U.S. Supreme Court decision of Gonzalez v. Carhart, a decision about so-called late-term partial birth abortions often undertaken after a diagnosis of fetal disability, Justice Kennedy’s emphasis on the human dignity at stake infamously did not center on the dignity of either the disabled fetus or the pregnant woman, but on the abstract dignity of the human being, which he saw as imperiled by allowing physicians to elect a method of abortion that could be seen too closely to resemble childbirth. Even more infamously, Kennedy used the opinion to validate the claim that women might come to regret their abortion and should therefore perhaps be legally disabled from obtaining it. Using concepts developed by disability rights advocates, I shall argue that what Kennedy is denying to women is the dignity of risk: even assuming arguendo that women are indeed likely to regret their abortion, treating them as incompetent to make this potentially regrettable decision denies them their full human dignity. \u0000 \u0000German abortion law, which also centers on human dignity, treats the pregnant woman contemplating a late-term abortion because of diagnosed fetal disabilities as disabled in a somewhat different way—it presumes women carrying fetuses with disabilities are under sufficient mental strain (or will be once their disabled child is born) that they qualify for a legal abortion because of the pregnancy’s effect on the mental health of the mother. Although more of a legal workaround than a well-thought out jurisprudential or bioethical position, this approach, like Kennedy’s, works to disable (pun intended) the pregnant woman albeit in service of facilitating rather than preventing her access to a legal abortion. \u0000 \u0000Kennedy’s retirement from the Supreme Court might call the continuing viability of his approach into question. But, in cases heading toward the Court and in the approach of his successor, there are worrisome echoes of Kennedy in Carhart. For example, two now pending cert. petitions deal with statutory schemes potentially inspired by Kennedy’s Carhart opinion. And Kavanagh, Kennedy’s replacement, wrote, while a circuit court judge, opinions in two cases whose fact patter","PeriodicalId":138093,"journal":{"name":"Disability, Health, Law, and Bioethics","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125051512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Algorithmic Disability Discrimination","authors":"Mason Marks","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3338209","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3338209","url":null,"abstract":"Prior to the Digital Age, disability-related information flowed between people with disabilities and their doctors, family members, and friends. However, in the 21st century, artificial intelligence tools allow corporations that collect and analyze consumer data to bypass privacy and antidiscrimination laws, such as HIPAA and the ADA, and infer consumers’ disabilities without their knowledge or consent. When people make purchases, browse the Internet, or post on social media, they leave behind trails of digital traces that reflect where they have been and what they have done. Companies aggregate and analyze those traces using AI to reveal details about people’s physical and mental health. I describe this process as mining for “emergent medical data” (EMD) because digital traces have emergent properties; when analyzed by machine learning, they reveal information that is greater than the sum of their parts. \u0000 \u0000EMD collected from disabled people can serve as a means of sorting them into categories that are assigned positive or negative weights before being used in automated decision making. Negatively weighted categories can stigmatize disabled people and contribute to the narrative that disabilities are bad. Moreover, by negatively weighting categories into which disabled people are sorted, algorithms may stigmatize disabled people and screen them out of life opportunities without considering their desires or qualifications. \u0000 \u0000This chapter explains how AI disrupts the traditional flow of disability-related data to promote algorithmic disability discrimination. It presents and analyzes four legislative solutions to the problem: Amend Title III of the ADA to include internet business within the law’s definition of places of public accommodation, expand the scope of HIPAA’s covered entities to include companies that mine for EMD, impose fiduciary duties on internet platforms and other businesses that infer health data, and establish general data protection regulations in the US inspired by the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the California Consumer Protection Act of 2018 (CCPA). \u0000 \u0000Regardless of the regulatory path chosen, we must evolve our understanding of health information and disability-related data. Whether it is exchanged between patients and doctors or pieced together by AI from the digital traces scattered throughout the Internet, the data of people with disabilities deserves protection. Health data has the potential to harm people if used to exploit rather than to heal, and companies can increasingly mine EMD and use it to reduce the autonomy of people with disabilities. Members of this group should be able to control when and how their data is used to draw conclusions about them and make decisions for them. Otherwise, AI-based inferences will contribute to the obstacles that people with disabilities must overcome in their daily lives.","PeriodicalId":138093,"journal":{"name":"Disability, Health, Law, and Bioethics","volume":"136 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122911532","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}