{"title":"Messaging and the bomb: public attitudes toward nuclear proliferation","authors":"Jamie Kwong","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2024.2314832","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2024.2314832","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":118564,"journal":{"name":"The Nonproliferation Review","volume":" 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140683376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How fear of entrapment shapes South Korean public opinion on conflicts with North Korea under US extended deterrence","authors":"S. Son, Hyeongpil Ham, Man-Sung Yim","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2024.2306020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2024.2306020","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":118564,"journal":{"name":"The Nonproliferation Review","volume":"2019 45","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140718316","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Nuclear archaeology to assess fissile-material inventories for nuclear safety and security, transparency, and disarmament","authors":"Malte Göttsche","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2024.2314371","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2024.2314371","url":null,"abstract":"Uncertainties of fissile material stockpiles are large; states observe differences between physical and book inventories. Nuclear archaeology can reduce these uncertainties. A new integrated approach would make use of data analysis techniques that take into account direct fissile material measurements, a variety of forensic measurements in shut-down facilities and of radioactive wastes, and fuel cycle operation records with related simulations. Beyond reducing uncertainties, this approach offers tools with a potential to probe declared histories and detect falsifications. This article reviews past efforts to fully capture fissile materials. Future scenarios where methods of nuclear archaeology could be used or will be required are discussed. These include improving nuclear safety and security by better knowledge on fissile materials and radioactive waste. Regarding transparency, international exercises are proposed, which could be carried out in the near term either in weapon or non-weapon states. Concerning disarmament in the longer term, fissile material baseline declarations will need to be verified to assess the potential of warhead build-up for stability during arsenal reductions, and to verify that eventually all weapons-related fissile materials are disposed of. “Historical records are used to estimate the initial load of waste in the tank because an assay of the residue can be extremely difficult. Some of the residue is sludge or solids trapped in difficult-to-reach locations of the structures; some is caught on or in the corroded carbon steel surface of the tank interior. Thorough, direct sampling and characterization are not really possible in a practical sense.”","PeriodicalId":118564,"journal":{"name":"The Nonproliferation Review","volume":"13 22","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140374712","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Malaysia’s path to the Strategic Trade Act","authors":"Paul Winter","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2023.2245653","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2023.2245653","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTIn 2010, six years after news broke that the A. Q. Khan nuclear smuggling ring was making components for Libya’s nuclear program a short distance from Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia adopted comprehensive export controls. Because Malaysia, like many developing and middle-income countries, had little to gain in security terms from such controls and potentially much to lose economically, its decision to introduce them seems puzzling. Drawing on a series of interviews with Malaysian officials and civil society, this article contributes to a growing literature on states’ nonproliferation policies by exploring that puzzle. The article considers the existing literature that purports to explain why states impose export controls and identifies three plausible factors behind Malaysia’s decision to do so: international norms, side payments, and political leadership. The article then details Kuala Lumpur’s development of export controls and assesses the role of each factor. Consistent with recent studies of the international nonproliferation order, the article concludes that Malaysia’s decision to introduce export controls was driven mainly by the promise of political and economic side payments from external actors, especially the United States, and by domestic changes in political leadership.KEYWORDS: export controlsMalaysiastrategic trade controldual-use goods and technology AcknowledgmentsThe author would like to thank Dr. Hoo Chiew Ping of the Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia for her support, the interviewees for their contributions, and Daniel Horner and the two anonymous reviewers of the Nonproliferation Review for their suggestions. The author is grateful to the Asia New Zealand Foundation for a research grant to carry out this project.Notes1 See, for example, Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins, The Nuclear Jihadist: The True Story of the Man Who Sold the World’s Most Dangerous Secrets … And How We Could Have Stopped Him (New York: Twelve, 2007).2 Douglas Stinnett, Bryan Early, Cale Horne, and Johannes Karreth, “Complying by Denying: Explaining Why States Develop Nonproliferation Export Controls,” International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2011), pp. 308–26.3 Peter Crail, “Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540: A Risk-Based Approach,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2006), pp. 355–99.4 Tanya Ogilvie-White, “Non-proliferation and Counter-Terrorism Cooperation in Southeast Asia: Meeting Global Obligations through Regional Security Architectures?” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2006), pp. 1–26.5 Richard Cupitt, Suzette Grillot, and Yuzo Murayama, “The Determinants of Nonproliferation Export Controls: A Membership-Fee Explanation,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2001), pp. 69–80.6 Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, “Trade, Knowledge Spillovers, and Growth,” European Economic Review, Vol. 35, Nos. 2–3 (1991), pp. 517–26.7 Scott Jones and Johannes Karreth, “Assessing the Economic Impact of Adopting Strateg","PeriodicalId":118564,"journal":{"name":"The Nonproliferation Review","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135893295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Nowhere to hide: the use of chemical agents during the Vietnam War","authors":"Martin Claar, Damir Kovačević","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2023.2245226","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2023.2245226","url":null,"abstract":"In what way has the impermissibility of chemical weapons affected the permissibility of chemical defoliants and incendiaries, namely Agent Orange and napalm? These two chemical agents were heavily used throughout the Vietnam War under three separate US administrations. Their novelty and effectiveness made them an important tool in US military operations in the region. During the Johnson and Nixon administrations, however, the weapons came under question and were ultimately re-evaluated before their use was restricted, but there is debate about what caused this shift in policy. The goal of this article is to investigate the forces that led to that restriction and to determine the role the chemical-weapons taboo may have played in this re-evaluated status. Thus, we are testing whether asocial factors such as deterrence and utility or social factors such as norms relating to chemical-weapons use and social-feedback mechanisms caused this policy shift. We conclude that social factors resulting from wartime experience—especially feedback from domestic, international, and epistemic communities—most influenced the status of Agent Orange and napalm.","PeriodicalId":118564,"journal":{"name":"The Nonproliferation Review","volume":"81 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135980717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Defining “dual-use items”: legal approximations to an ever-relevant notion","authors":"Ana Sánchez-Cobaleda","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2023.2202966","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2023.2202966","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThis article analyzes how the legal sources of nonproliferation regimes define “dual-use items,” a concept that lacks a universal and fixed definition despite its importance to international security and trade. The analysis shows how these legally binding and soft-law sources approach dual-use goods and technologies differently and classifies them based on the criteria they employ to define the potential uses of these strategic items: the dichotomies of peaceful versus non-peaceful and civil versus military, and the intentionality criterion. The article also traces the expansion of the concept beyond a concern with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It analyzes how the existence of multiple criteria to define such items affects their international control. It also considers the evolution that this notion may undergo, which may call into question the standards of legal certainty that the international regime of dual-use items aims to provide.KEYWORDS: dual-use itemsnonproliferationweapons of mass destruction (WMD)export-control regimesstrategic itemstrade controls AcknowledgmentsThe author would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers and the editorial team of the Nonproliferation Review for their helpful comments, as well as Milagros Álvarez-Verdugo and Alexandros Tokhi for their comments on earlier drafts. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the views of the organizations with which she is affiliated. All mistakes remain the responsibility of the author.Notes1 Caitríona McLeish, “Reflecting on the Problem of Dual Use,” in Caitríona McLeish and Brian Rappert, eds., A Web of Prevention: Biological Weapons, Life Sciences and the Governance of Research (London: Earthscan, 2007), pp. 189–208; David Resnik, “What Is Dual Use Research? A Response to Miller and Selgelid,” Science and Engineering Ethics, Vol. 15 (2009), pp. 3–5; Brian Rappert and Michael J. Selgelid, eds., On the Dual Uses of Science and Ethics: Principles, Practices, and Prospects (Canberra: ANU Press, 2013); Quentin Michel, “Dual-Use Exports Require a Common Definition,” in Friends of Europe, ed., Dual-Use Technologies in the European Union: Prospects for the Future (Brussels: Friends of Europe, 2015), pp. 40–42.2 Samuel A.W. Evans, “Revising Export Control Lists,” Flemish Peace Institute, 2014, p. 3, <https://vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/en/report/revising-export-control-lists/>.3 Ian Anthony, “The Evolution of Dual-Use Technology Controls: A Historical Perspective,” in Oliver Meier, ed., Technology Transfers and Non-Proliferation: Between Control and Cooperation (New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 27.4 Harald Müller and Carmen Wunderlich, “Not Lost in Contestation: How Norm Entrepreneurs Frame Norm Development in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 39, No. 3 (2018), p. 356.5 Andreas Persbo and Angela Woodward, “Detection, Deterrence and Confidence-Building: Improving Multilateral Technolo","PeriodicalId":118564,"journal":{"name":"The Nonproliferation Review","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135643258","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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