{"title":"Blame, Punishment, and Predominant Retributivism","authors":"D. Brink","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198859468.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198859468.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"Blame is a directed attitude that involves a core aversive reaction based on a belief that the target is blameworthy but gives rise to a syndrome of familiar expressive and communicative functions. Punishment involves blame and sanctions. Retributivist essentials are explained and defended, and it is argued that retributivism must be part of the truth about the justification of punishment. Predominant retributivism should be preferred to pure retributivism.","PeriodicalId":114124,"journal":{"name":"Fair Opportunity and Responsibility","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114546149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Partial Responsibility and Excuse","authors":"D. Brink","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198859468.003.0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198859468.003.0015","url":null,"abstract":"Responsibility and excuse are shown to be scalar. Though American criminal law is bivalent about responsibility and excuse, ideal criminal law theory should be scalar and pursue proportionate justice. Bivalence cannot be defended for non-ideal theory. Different feasible ways of recognizing partial responsibility and excuse are explored, including proportionate justice, trivalence, tetravalence and pentavalence. While there is anecdotal evidence against pentavalence, the remaining three models are all worth pursuing empirically.","PeriodicalId":114124,"journal":{"name":"Fair Opportunity and Responsibility","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114916611","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Prolegomena","authors":"D. Brink","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198859468.003.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198859468.003.0001","url":null,"abstract":"The main themes about the reactive attitudes, fair opportunity, and desert are introduced. The potential fragility of fair opportunity is explored. Cases of partial responsibility and excuse are introduced. The chapter concludes with methodological remarks about combining moral psychology and criminal law perspectives, disclaimers, remarks about the origins of the book, and acknowledgements.","PeriodicalId":114124,"journal":{"name":"Fair Opportunity and Responsibility","volume":"509 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122760240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Incompetence, Psychopathy, and Fair Opportunity","authors":"D. Brink","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198859468.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198859468.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"Fair opportunity supports a modified version of the Model Penal Code insanity test, against the narrower M’Naghten test. The Andrea Yates case is introduced as a paradigmatic insanity defense. Recent arguments that psychopaths should be excused because their psychological deficits prevent them from developing cognitive competence about moral norms are considered and rejected. Moral blindspots involving selective discrimination raise questions about selective incompetence. In general, the selective nature of these blindspots implies that agents with blindspots have the capacity to correct their moral ignorance and so should not be excused.","PeriodicalId":114124,"journal":{"name":"Fair Opportunity and Responsibility","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126989439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：