CELS 2014 9th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (Archive)最新文献

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Bank Litigation, Bank Performance and Operational Risk: Evidence from the Financial Crisis 银行诉讼、银行绩效与操作风险:来自金融危机的证据
CELS 2014 9th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (Archive) Pub Date : 2014-07-07 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2463373
J. Mcnulty, A. Akhigbe
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引用次数: 6
How Do Judges Judge? Evidence of Local Effect on French Bankruptcy Judgments 法官如何判断?法国破产判决的地方效力证据
CELS 2014 9th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (Archive) Pub Date : 2014-02-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2470059
Stéphane Esquerré
{"title":"How Do Judges Judge? Evidence of Local Effect on French Bankruptcy Judgments","authors":"Stéphane Esquerré","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2470059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2470059","url":null,"abstract":"Courts must audit and then screen out viable but failing firms after their filing for bankruptcy. Yet the judgment and its decision process remain a black box. The bankruptcy literature claims it is an optimal arbitrage between the going concern and the liquidation value. Deviations from the efficient judgment should be mainly explained because of the characteristics of the legal system through its tradition or its orientation. The main concern of the literature is to determine how these characteristics affect the efficiency of the decision. The aim of this paper is to challenge these models and to consider another factor, the local environment. The paper switches from the usual perspective and focuses on the Courts rather than on the legal system. It assumes this institution takes into account the local unemployment rate to decide whether a firm should survive or not. Possible explanations by the bankruptcy literature are tested – rational behavior, the firms are more viable when there is an increase of local unemployment rate; strict application of national orientation, the effect is drawn by national economic climate; over-interpretation of law, judges try to promote social efficiency in their decisions; or another explanation, a behavioral bias due to political beliefs or network issues. The analysis is based an original dataset of all Redressement Judiciaire – French main continuation proceeding – since 2006. Through several tests – using survival analysis in a competing risk setting, the paper finds that only the behavioral bias seems to hold. It assesses that Courts are locally embedded institutions that guard the firms under their jurisdiction against local turmoil.","PeriodicalId":112489,"journal":{"name":"CELS 2014 9th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (Archive)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114236396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Can we Regulate 'Good' People in Subtle Conflicts of Interest Situations 在微妙的利益冲突情况下,我们能规范“好人”吗
CELS 2014 9th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (Archive) Pub Date : 2005-07-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2469346
Y. Feldman, E. Halali
{"title":"Can we Regulate 'Good' People in Subtle Conflicts of Interest Situations","authors":"Y. Feldman, E. Halali","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2469346","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2469346","url":null,"abstract":"The growing recognition of the notion of ‘good people’ suggests that many ethically relevant behaviors that were previously assumed to be choice-based, conscious, and deliberate decisions, are in many cases the product of automatic/intuitive processes that prevent people from recognizing the wrongfulness of their behaviour – an idea dubbed by several leading scholars as an ethical blind spot. With the rise of the focus on good people in psychology and management, the lack of discussion on the implications of this growing literature to law and regulation is quite puzzling. The main question, this study will attempt to explore is what are the implications of this literature to legal policy making. We examined, experimentally, using two m-Turk studies, the efficacy of deterrence- and morality-based interventions in preventing people who are in subtle conflict of interest from favoring their self-interest over their professional integrity and to behave objectively. Results demonstrate that while the manipulated conflict was likely to “corrupt” people under intuitive/automatic mind-set (Experiment 1), explicit/deliberative mechanisms (both deterrence- and morality-based) had a much larger constraining effect overall on participants’ judgment than did implicit measures, with no differences between deterrence and morality (Experiment 2). The findings demonstrate how little is needed to create a risk to the integrity of individuals, but they also suggest that a modest explicit/deliberative intervention can easily remedy much of the wrongdoing.","PeriodicalId":112489,"journal":{"name":"CELS 2014 9th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (Archive)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133713293","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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