Revisiting Searle on Deriving "Ought" from "Is"最新文献

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Why Moral Norms Cannot Be Reduced to Facts: On a Trilemma in Derivations of Moral “Ought” from “Is” 为什么道德规范不能简化为事实:道德“应该”从“是”推导的三难困境

Revisiting Searle on Deriving "Ought" from "Is" Pub Date : 2019-12-20 DOI: 10.36280/afpifs.2019.2.63

W. Załuski

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引用次数: 0

How to Derive Is from Ought 如何从应当中推导出应当

Revisiting Searle on Deriving "Ought" from "Is" Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-54116-3_8

A. Conte

引用次数: 0

On the Regulative Functions of Constitutive Rules 论构成规则的调节功能

Revisiting Searle on Deriving "Ought" from "Is" Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-54116-3_6

F. Schauer

引用次数: 1