2001 Fiscal Rules Conference (Archive)最新文献

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Transparent Frameworks, Fiscal Rules and Policy-Making Under Uncertainty 不确定性下的透明框架、财政规则和政策制定

2001 Fiscal Rules Conference (Archive) Pub Date : 2001-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2094468

A. Kilpatrick

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引用次数: 18

Fiscal Rules: Useful Policy Framework or Unnecessary Ornament? 财政规则:有用的政策框架还是不必要的装饰?

2001 Fiscal Rules Conference (Archive) Pub Date : 2001-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2094462

George Kopits

引用次数: 284

EMU Fiscal Rules: A New Answer to an Old Question? 欧洲货币联盟财政规则:一个老问题的新答案?

2001 Fiscal Rules Conference (Archive) Pub Date : 2001-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2094456

Fabrizio Balassone, D. Franco

{"title":"EMU Fiscal Rules: A New Answer to an Old Question?","authors":"Fabrizio Balassone, D. Franco","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2094456","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2094456","url":null,"abstract":"EMU fiscal rules aim at ensuring sound fiscal policies in EU Member States while allowing sufficient margins for stabilisation policy. The Treaty of Maastricht and the Stability and Growth Pact introduced a detailed framework of rules, surveillance procedures and sanctions that are tighter than those generally applying in federal countries. In this paper we try to assess to what extent the issue facing the founders of EMU was a new one in the field of public finance and to what extent the solution chosen can be regarded as innovative. To this end, we review the literature on budgetary rules from its very beginning to the years immediately before the Treaty of Maastricht. We consider the arguments brought forward to justify EMU fiscal rules and the novel feature of the problem faced at the EU level, represented by the interaction between its multinational nature and the lack of a political authority of federal rank. The solutions chosen, while drawing heavily on ideas that were central in the debate on fiscal rules, reflect this new aspect of the problem. The highly decentralised setting of fiscal policy in EMU gave prominence to moral hazard issues; it is probably at the roots of the rejection of both the dual budget approach and the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary finance; it motivated the adoption of a detailed multilateral surveillance procedure and the introduction of a predetermined limit for the annual deficit in a framework that envisages the targeting of a balanced budget over the cycle.","PeriodicalId":102995,"journal":{"name":"2001 Fiscal Rules Conference (Archive)","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124303978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 37