The Loyola University Chicago International Law Review最新文献

{"title":"A Social Justice Theory of Self-Defense at the World Court","authors":"James Kraska","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2040555","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2040555","url":null,"abstract":"This article offers a theory of social justice based on the work of John Rawls that helps to explain use of force or jus ad bellum jurisprudence at the World Court. More precisely, the theory provides a prism for understanding the interpretation of Article 2(4) and Article 51 of the U.N. Charter in cases before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The judgments and opinions of the ICJ offer an empirical basis for proposing that social justice rationale is a key driver of the Court’s major decisions on analyzing questions of jus ad bellum in the law of armed conflict. Social justice is derived from critical theory and pragmatism, and the term is used here to mean the use of plenary or administrative power (or in the context of international relations, transnational, or global authority) to achieve equal or at least equitable distribution of scarce resources among many peoples or nations.","PeriodicalId":357520,"journal":{"name":"The Loyola University Chicago International Law Review","volume":"150 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133578481","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Controversial Conceptions: The Unborn and the American Convention on Human Rights","authors":"Álvaro Paúl","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1776922","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1776922","url":null,"abstract":"This study interprets the ambiguous Article 4(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights, which establishes that life shall be protected “in general, from the moment of conception.” When doing so, it pays attention to different interpretive systems, and takes into account what is recorded in the travaux preparatoires of the Convention. Likewise, this study analyzes what the Inter-American Commission has determined on this issue, and assesses the value of these decisions. This article concludes that, even though one of the possible interpretations of the American Convention affirms that it would tolerate domestic legislations providing for abortion in exceptional circumstances, it declares the unborn’s personhood.","PeriodicalId":357520,"journal":{"name":"The Loyola University Chicago International Law Review","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125126712","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"WTO Law in a Fragmented, Decentralized International Legal Order: Symposium Introduction","authors":"G. Shaffer","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1507783","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1507783","url":null,"abstract":"This paper introduces a symposium issue on WTO law in a fragmented, decentralized international legal order, resulting from a conference which was held at Loyola University School of Law on February 15, 2008, and was co-sponsored by the American Society of International Law. The introduction introduces the five papers published in the issue by Padideh Ala’i, Raj Bhala, Tomer Broude, Jeffrey Dunoff, Merit Janow, and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann. The conference assessed the place of WTO law in a fragmented, decentralized legal order, examining on the one hand its relation to other international law, and on the other its relation to national law. That is, the papers examine WTO law in its vertical and its horizontal dimensions in terms of the allocation of authority, legitimacy and impact. The conference was organized into four sessions, complemented by a keynote address from Merit Janow on her reflections as a member of the WTO Appellate Body. Collectively, the articles in this issue demonstrate how the study of the interaction between the WTO, other international legal regimes and domestic legal orders will comprise a key part of the future of the discipline.","PeriodicalId":357520,"journal":{"name":"The Loyola University Chicago International Law Review","volume":"109 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124778204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Battle of Mars and Venus: Why do American and European Attitudes Toward International Law Differ?","authors":"R. Delahunty","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.899404","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.899404","url":null,"abstract":"Why do American and European attitudes towards international law appear to differ so profoundly? What explains the United States' (supposedly) characteristic \"unilateralism\" in international law? This essay examines one very plausible and attractive theory of the difference - that of Professor Jed Rubenfeld of the Yale Law School - and advances another. To be more exact, the essay analyzes Professor Rubenfeld's theory, which is framed primarily in terms of the differences between American and European constitutional values, and attempts to weight its merits against those of a theory that focuses instead on divergent political interests. Rubenfeld's theory depends on a contrast between two distinct conceptions of constitutional law: one that he calls \"democratic constitutionalism,\" and the other that he calls \"international constitutionalism.\" Democratic constitutionalism, which reflects a characteristically American outlook, traces the nation's organic law to a founding act of popular lawmaking. International constitutionalism sees constitutional law, not as deriving from an act of democratic self-government, but as deriving from universal, hence transnational, principles and rights. These principles and rights - in effect, an overarching structure of natural law in which particular national regimes should be embedded - operate to restrain rather than to express democracy. On Rubenfeld's account, international constitutionalism underlies the legal systems of at least some of the major western European nations. Each of these conceptions of constitutionalism generates, in turn, a distinctive approach to international law. In this essay, the author argues that an alternative theory seems to have equal, if not more, explanatory power. The author offers a theory of the international law divergence between the U.S. and Europe that sounds in interests rather than in values. On this alternative approach, both U.S. and European policymakers and elites use international law instrumentally, to promote and serve competing national interests in various ways. Finally, the author outlines a possible approach that seeks to reconcile Professor Rubenfeld's values-based theory with the theory that emphasizes national interests. Viewing Euro-American differences over international law as a two-level game, one can appreciate, first, that important European domestic political constituencies may have strongly critical views of American foreign and military policies, based on the values and norms that those constituencies espouse; second, that European governments, including of course their executive branches, will inevitably be highly sensitive to those constituencies' demands, and will reflect them in their policy deliberations and choices; but also that, third, those executive branches will be dealing with the United States across a wide array of matters of common concern, will look for the United States' support and cooperation on many of them, and will therefore be","PeriodicalId":357520,"journal":{"name":"The Loyola University Chicago International Law Review","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115679576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}