{"title":"Navigating slippery slopes: A paradox of power in policy and cultural reform","authors":"Zachary Schaller","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107167","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107167","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study employs game theory to investigate how slippery slope problems drive policy impasses and sticky cultural practices. It identifies conditions under which hard-lining behavior, often perceived as fallacious, becomes rational. By endogenizing the probability of one policy leading to another, the model elucidates slippery slope equilibria, where players adamantly oppose all proposals, including those they want, in order to avoid those they hate. Aggressive negotiation tactics are ineffective against such equilibria, further exacerbating the political market failure. Notably, weaker reformers are able to avoid the slippery slope market failure and accomplish Pareto improving reform, whereas strong reformers can get stuck in a paradox of power.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"238 ","pages":"Article 107167"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145049387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pedro Bordalo , Nicola Gennaioli , Rafael La Porta , Andrei Shleifer
{"title":"Finance without exotic risk","authors":"Pedro Bordalo , Nicola Gennaioli , Rafael La Porta , Andrei Shleifer","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104145","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104145","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We address the joint hypothesis problem in cross-sectional asset pricing by using measured analyst expectations of earnings growth. We construct a firm-level measure of Expectations Based Returns (EBRs) that uses analyst forecast errors and revisions and shuts down any cross-sectional differences in required returns. We obtain three results. First, variation in EBRs accounts for a large chunk of cross-sectional return spreads in value, investment, size, and momentum factors. Second, time variation in these spreads is predictable from that in EBRs, holding constant scaled price variables (as proxies for time varying required returns). Third, firm characteristics often seen as capturing risk premia predict disappointment of expectations and low EBRs. Overall, return spreads typically attributed to exotic risk factors are explained by predictable movements in non-rational expectations of firms’ earnings growth.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"173 ","pages":"Article 104145"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145049571","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Nash equilibrium in insurance pricing and investment under common shocks","authors":"Jinjin Zhang, Caibin Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.frl.2025.108409","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.frl.2025.108409","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates a dynamic pricing and investment game between two competitive insurers, aiming to maximize their expected utility. Each insurer’s policy surplus is modeled as a diffusion process, with insurance demand assumed to be linearly dependent on their prices. Additionally, each can invest in a risky asset whose price is correlated with the surplus process. Using stochastic control theory, we derive explicit expressions for the equilibrium pricing and investment strategies, as well as the value functions. Our results indicate that an insurer will lower (raise) her price in response to a competitor’s price reduction (increase), though the magnitude of her adjustment is smaller. Furthermore, we find a negative relationship between an insurer’s change in investment level and her own price adjustment.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":12167,"journal":{"name":"Finance Research Letters","volume":"86 ","pages":"Article 108409"},"PeriodicalIF":6.9,"publicationDate":"2025-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145046969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Managerial overconfidence and pay-for-luck","authors":"Xiaoqin (Alex) Wei","doi":"10.1016/j.irfa.2025.104607","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irfa.2025.104607","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines how CEO overconfidence amplifies the “pay-for-luck” phenomenon in executive compensation. Using a decomposition of firm performance into exogenous “luck” and firm-specific “skill” components, we find that overconfident CEOs receive disproportionately higher rewards for positive market shocks while avoiding equivalent penalties for negative shocks. To address endogeneity concerns, we instrument CEO overconfidence using the industry-level density of overconfident CEOs and Lewbel’s (2012) internal IV approach. Our results remain robust across alternative overconfidence measures, empirical specifications, and governance conditions. Further analysis suggests that overconfident CEOs engage in greater risk-taking behaviors and higher R&D investments which reinforce the effects of CEO overconfidence on pay-for-luck. Additionally, we find that stronger corporate governance and DoDD-Frank Act mitigates the extent of overconfident CEOs’ pay-for-luck. These findings contribute to the literature on executive compensation and behavioral corporate finance, offering implications for incentive design and governance reforms.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48226,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Financial Analysis","volume":"107 ","pages":"Article 104607"},"PeriodicalIF":9.8,"publicationDate":"2025-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145049147","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Philip Schnorpfeil , Michael Weber , Andreas Hackethal
{"title":"Inflation and Trading","authors":"Philip Schnorpfeil , Michael Weber , Andreas Hackethal","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104166","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104166","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study how investors respond to inflation combining a customized survey experiment with trading data at a time of historically high inflation. Investors’ beliefs about the stock return–inflation relation are very heterogeneous in the cross section and on average too optimistic. Moreover, many investors appear unaware of inflation-hedging strategies despite being otherwise well-informed about prevailing inflation rates and asset returns. Consequently, whereas exogenous shifts in inflation expectations do not impact return expectations, information on past returns during periods of high inflation leads to negative updating about the perceived stock-return impact of inflation, which feeds into return expectations and subsequent actual trading behavior.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"173 ","pages":"Article 104166"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145049570","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An Economic Model of the French Revolution","authors":"Kishore Gawande, Ben Zissimos","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70057","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We offer a new economic perspective on the French Revolution by analyzing how an elite commitment problem and trade policy shaped revolutionary dynamics. We develop a complete-information game-theoretic model in which revolution can occur on the equilibrium path. By formalizing the interaction between democratization and trade policy, our model explains when revolution may occur with some probability. Unlike models with incomplete information, where revolutions may be mistakes, our approach shows that revolution occurs only when it is beneficial for the rest of society. Paradoxically, we show that revolution could occur only because there was sufficient trust in the Ancien Régime.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70057","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145037624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economic ModellingPub Date : 2025-09-10DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2025.107304
Xianling Ren, Jinbao Qiao, Jianyue Ji
{"title":"Population aging and intensified economic downside risk: Evidence from China","authors":"Xianling Ren, Jinbao Qiao, Jianyue Ji","doi":"10.1016/j.econmod.2025.107304","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econmod.2025.107304","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study investigates the impact of population aging on economic downside risk in China, providing new evidence on the consequences of aging in the literature. While previous research has shown the negative impact of population aging on economic growth, the relationship between aging and downside risk remains unclear. Using data from Chinese provinces (2000–2022), we employ Growth at Risk framework to measure provincial economic downside risk and explore the impact of population aging on it. We find that population aging significantly intensifies economic downside risk, particularly in regions with lower population scale or higher economic development. The intensified economic downside risk is driven by reduced technological innovation, higher fiscal deficits, and slower consumption growth. Additionally, population inflows are found to alleviate the economic risk. These results highlight the necessity of mitigating economic downside risks via coordinated measures addressing innovation, consumption, and fiscal deficits in aging societies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48419,"journal":{"name":"Economic Modelling","volume":"152 ","pages":"Article 107304"},"PeriodicalIF":4.7,"publicationDate":"2025-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145048951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Measuring small business dynamics and employment with private-sector real-time data","authors":"André Kurmann , Etienne Lalé , Lien Ta","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105477","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105477","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper proposes a novel methodology to distinguish true business openings and closings from sample churn in private-sector data and to evaluate the representativeness of the resulting estimates by leveraging supplementary high-frequency information on individual business activity. The methodology produces both real-time estimates using only concurrent information and retrospective estimates that incorporate additional information as it becomes available, reflecting a fundamental trade-off between timeliness and accuracy. The methodology is applied to a real-time sample of small businesses widely used during the COVID-19 pandemic to demonstrate its usefulness under extreme circumstances. The application highlights the importance of properly accounting for business openings and closings and at the same time yields two important insights about small business dynamics during the pandemic: (i) small business employment in in-person service sectors experienced larger swings at the beginning of the pandemic than employment of larger businesses, primarily due to a spike in temporary closings; (ii) delayed access to loans from the Paycheck Protection Program significantly increased small business closings but had minimal impact on employment of continuing businesses, suggesting the program’s effectiveness operated primarily through preventing closures rather than preserving jobs at operating businesses.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economics","volume":"250 ","pages":"Article 105477"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145027803","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Credit financing, accounting quality and distress under financial turmoil: Evidence from small partnerships","authors":"Panagiotis E. Dimitropoulos","doi":"10.1016/j.ememar.2025.101368","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ememar.2025.101368","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The impact of the recent financial crisis on the financing opportunities and viability of firms has been extensively studied in the literature, with a focus on large, listed corporations. Loss avoidance behavior allows managers to report a more stable income stream, assisting market participants to assess firm prospects. The scope of this study is to examine the impact of loss avoidance and earnings management on the credit financing of small private partnerships within Greece, which is a country that faced a huge backlash on the viability of small businesses. The study collected a sample from 1119 small partnerships which have published abbreviated financial statements over the period 2003–2018. Empirical evidence suggests that firms with higher loss avoidance and discretionary accruals during the sovereign debt crisis period were receiving more credit from their suppliers, a fact that is positively associated with higher viability (lower distress risk). This is the first study in the literature considering loss avoidance behavior and credit financing before and during a debt crisis, within small partnership firms.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47886,"journal":{"name":"Emerging Markets Review","volume":"69 ","pages":"Article 101368"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2025-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145049414","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Energy EconomicsPub Date : 2025-09-10DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2025.108898
Sunjin Kim, SongYi Paik, Doojin Ryu
{"title":"Military alliances, geopolitical risks, and international energy trade","authors":"Sunjin Kim, SongYi Paik, Doojin Ryu","doi":"10.1016/j.eneco.2025.108898","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2025.108898","url":null,"abstract":"Energy is a fundamental input for economic activity, and stable partnerships with trading nations are crucial for energy supply and economic stability. This study explores the effects of military alliances and geopolitical risks on the trade of multiple energy resources across 42 major countries. Employing a gravity model, we find that military alliances promote the trade of refined oil, coal, gaseous natural gas, and enriched uranium. Geopolitical risks in both importing and exporting countries reduce the trade of refined oil and coal. However, heightened risks in importing countries increase the trade of gaseous natural gas and enriched uranium, whereas risks in exporting countries raise the trade of natural uranium. These findings suggest heterogeneous and resource-specific effects of geopolitical risks on international energy trade.","PeriodicalId":11665,"journal":{"name":"Energy Economics","volume":"76 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":12.8,"publicationDate":"2025-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145059280","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}