有条件援助有效性的激励措施

Q3 Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Journal of Globalization and Development Pub Date : 2014-01-01 DOI:10.1515/jgd-2012-0018

Francisco Candel-Sánchez

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引用次数: 0

摘要

对援助国的制裁能否提高有条件援助政策的可信度?如果这些政策受到时间不一致的影响，那么答案是肯定的。本文提出了一种机制来克服向发展中国家提供有条件援助缺乏可信度的问题。研究表明，通过提高有条件援助计划的可信度，向捐助国提供政策依赖型转移支付方案可以实现最优承诺结果。该计划旨在涵盖结构改革成本由接收国政府私人拥有的信息的情况。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Incentives for Conditional Aid Effectiveness

Abstract Can sanctions against foreign aid donors enhance the credibility of conditional aid policies? If such policies suffer from time inconsistency, the answer is positive. This paper proposes a mechanism to overcome the lack of credibility of conditional aid donations to developing countries. A scheme of policy-dependent transfers to the donor country is shown to achieve an optimal commitment outcome by improving the credibility of conditional aid programs. The scheme is devised to cover situations in which the cost of structural reforms is information privately owned by the recipient government.

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来源期刊

Journal of Globalization and Development Economics, Econometrics and Finance-Economics, Econometrics and Finance (all)

CiteScore

1.20

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Globalization and Development (JGD) publishes academic research and policy analysis on globalization, development, and in particular the complex interactions between them. The journal is dedicated to stimulating a creative dialogue between theoretical advances and rigorous empirical studies to push forward the frontiers of development analysis. It also seeks to combine innovative academic insights with the in-depth knowledge of practitioners to address important policy issues. JGD encourages diverse perspectives on all aspects of development and globalization, and attempts to integrate the best development research from across different fields with contributions from scholars in developing and developed countries. Topics: -Economic development- Financial investments- Development Aid- Development policies- Growth models- Sovereign debt