{"title":"时间问题：表现不佳持续时间对公司不当行为的影响","authors":"Amy Tong Zhao, Shufeng Xiao","doi":"10.1111/corg.12526","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div>\n \n \n <section>\n \n <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\n \n <p>This study examines firms' reactions to the duration of underperformance. We posit that firms are more likely to engage in misconduct to solve the problem of underperformance as the length of time a firm has been underperforming prolongs. Further, we investigate how divergent external governance actors shape underperforming firms' motivation for misconduct and consequently affect their responses to underperformance duration.</p>\n </section>\n \n <section>\n \n <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\n \n <p>Using bivariate probit estimations for panel data of 2662 Chinese publicly listed firms during 2007–2018, we uncover that underperformance duration is positively associated with the likelihood of a corporate misconduct commission. In addition, the positive relationship between the duration of firm underperformance and corporate misconduct is mitigated by the level of state ownership but reinforced by the number of analysts covering the firm.</p>\n </section>\n \n <section>\n \n <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\n \n <p>This study extends the behavioral theory of the firm by incorporating the construct of underperformance duration from a time perspective, which is a proactive signal of firms' illicit decisions. We show that the duration of underperformance is positively associated with the likelihood of corporate misconduct, which is moderated by the firms' external governance actors who have different time pressures to solve financial problems.</p>\n </section>\n \n <section>\n \n <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\n \n <p>This study offers insights for regulators interested in the prevention of ex-ant misconduct. Identifying underperformance duration as a critical predictor of illegal activities helps to improve regulators' vigilance. Moreover, a holistic executive evaluation system that shows more tolerance for short-term underperformance is needed.</p>\n </section>\n </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6000,"publicationDate":"2023-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A matter of time: The influence of underperformance duration on corporate misconduct\",\"authors\":\"Amy Tong Zhao, Shufeng Xiao\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/corg.12526\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div>\\n \\n \\n <section>\\n \\n <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\\n \\n <p>This study examines firms' reactions to the duration of underperformance. We posit that firms are more likely to engage in misconduct to solve the problem of underperformance as the length of time a firm has been underperforming prolongs. Further, we investigate how divergent external governance actors shape underperforming firms' motivation for misconduct and consequently affect their responses to underperformance duration.</p>\\n </section>\\n \\n <section>\\n \\n <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\\n \\n <p>Using bivariate probit estimations for panel data of 2662 Chinese publicly listed firms during 2007–2018, we uncover that underperformance duration is positively associated with the likelihood of a corporate misconduct commission. In addition, the positive relationship between the duration of firm underperformance and corporate misconduct is mitigated by the level of state ownership but reinforced by the number of analysts covering the firm.</p>\\n </section>\\n \\n <section>\\n \\n <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\\n \\n <p>This study extends the behavioral theory of the firm by incorporating the construct of underperformance duration from a time perspective, which is a proactive signal of firms' illicit decisions. We show that the duration of underperformance is positively associated with the likelihood of corporate misconduct, which is moderated by the firms' external governance actors who have different time pressures to solve financial problems.</p>\\n </section>\\n \\n <section>\\n \\n <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\\n \\n <p>This study offers insights for regulators interested in the prevention of ex-ant misconduct. Identifying underperformance duration as a critical predictor of illegal activities helps to improve regulators' vigilance. 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A matter of time: The influence of underperformance duration on corporate misconduct
Research Question/Issue
This study examines firms' reactions to the duration of underperformance. We posit that firms are more likely to engage in misconduct to solve the problem of underperformance as the length of time a firm has been underperforming prolongs. Further, we investigate how divergent external governance actors shape underperforming firms' motivation for misconduct and consequently affect their responses to underperformance duration.
Research Findings/Insights
Using bivariate probit estimations for panel data of 2662 Chinese publicly listed firms during 2007–2018, we uncover that underperformance duration is positively associated with the likelihood of a corporate misconduct commission. In addition, the positive relationship between the duration of firm underperformance and corporate misconduct is mitigated by the level of state ownership but reinforced by the number of analysts covering the firm.
Theoretical/Academic Implications
This study extends the behavioral theory of the firm by incorporating the construct of underperformance duration from a time perspective, which is a proactive signal of firms' illicit decisions. We show that the duration of underperformance is positively associated with the likelihood of corporate misconduct, which is moderated by the firms' external governance actors who have different time pressures to solve financial problems.
Practitioner/Policy Implications
This study offers insights for regulators interested in the prevention of ex-ant misconduct. Identifying underperformance duration as a critical predictor of illegal activities helps to improve regulators' vigilance. Moreover, a holistic executive evaluation system that shows more tolerance for short-term underperformance is needed.
期刊介绍：
The mission of Corporate Governance: An International Review is to publish cutting-edge international business research on the phenomena of comparative corporate governance throughout the global economy. Our ultimate goal is a rigorous and relevant global theory of corporate governance. We define corporate governance broadly as the exercise of power over corporate entities so as to increase the value provided to the organization"s various stakeholders, as well as making those stakeholders accountable for acting responsibly with regard to the protection, generation, and distribution of wealth invested in the firm. Because of this broad conceptualization, a wide variety of academic disciplines can contribute to our understanding.
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