高级管理层中的总法律顾问是否会影响证券集体诉讼?

IF 4.6 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Audrey Wen-Hsin Hsu, Sophia Liu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

研究问题/议题 本研究调查了公司最高管理团队中总法律顾问的存在对美国上市公司成为证券集体诉讼(SCA)目标的可能性的影响。 研究结果/见解 利用美国针对上市公司的集体诉讼样本,我们提供的证据表明,最高管理层中包括总法律顾问(TMC)的公司被卷入 SCA 的可能性较低。我们进一步研究了总法律顾问的存在与后续四种诉讼结果的关联:市场对诉讼的反应、诉讼过程的持续时间、诉讼的驳回以及法院批准的和解。我们发现,在诉讼结果的所有四个方面,拥有 TMC 的公司都会遇到更有利的后果。在控制了内生性、未观察到的与企业相关的遗漏变量偏差和监督机制后,结果仍然成立。 理论/学术启示 研究结果表明,建立 TMC 是降低公司诉讼风险和不利法律结果的有效治理机制。 实践者/政策启示 我们的证据表明,TMC 有助于监督运营和财务决策。本研究表明,《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》(Sarbanes-Oxley Act,SOX)第 307 条明确强调了总法律顾问的责任。因此,本研究为有志于加强公司总法律顾问影响资本市场的治理机制功能的政策制定者提供了启示。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Does the presence of a general counsel in top management affect securities class action lawsuits?

Research Question/Issue

This study investigates the effect of the presence of a firm's general counsel on the top management team on the likelihood that a US publicly traded company is targeted by a securities class action (SCA).

Research Findings/Insights

Using a US sample of class action lawsuits against publicly traded companies, we provide evidence that firms whose top management includes the general counsel (TMC) are less likely to be involved in SCAs. We further investigate the association of the presence of a TMC with the subsequent four litigation outcomes: market reaction to the lawsuits, duration of the lawsuit process, dismissal of the lawsuit, and the settlement approved by the courts. We find that firms with a TMC experience more favorable consequences on all four dimensions of litigation outcomes. The results hold after controlling for endogeneity, unobserved firm-related omitted variable bias, and monitoring mechanisms.

Theoretical/Academic Implications

The findings support that establishing a TMC acts as an effective governance mechanism in reducing corporate litigation risk and adverse legal outcomes.

Practitioner/Policy Implications

Our evidence suggests that a TMC can help monitor operating and financial decisions. This study suggests that Section 307 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) works in terms of explicitly emphasizing the general counsel's responsibility. Thus, this study offers insights to policymakers who are interested in enhancing the function of the governance mechanism by which a corporate general counsel can influence the capital market.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.00
自引率
11.30%
发文量
79
期刊介绍: The mission of Corporate Governance: An International Review is to publish cutting-edge international business research on the phenomena of comparative corporate governance throughout the global economy. Our ultimate goal is a rigorous and relevant global theory of corporate governance. We define corporate governance broadly as the exercise of power over corporate entities so as to increase the value provided to the organization"s various stakeholders, as well as making those stakeholders accountable for acting responsibly with regard to the protection, generation, and distribution of wealth invested in the firm. Because of this broad conceptualization, a wide variety of academic disciplines can contribute to our understanding.
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