董事会注意结构的构型视角

IF 4.6 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Eduardo Schiehll, Krista Lewellyn, Wenxi Yan
{"title":"董事会注意结构的构型视角","authors":"Eduardo Schiehll,&nbsp;Krista Lewellyn,&nbsp;Wenxi Yan","doi":"10.1111/corg.12493","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div>\n \n \n <section>\n \n <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\n \n <p>What combinations of board attributes and contextual factors explain boards' selective distribution of attention between their dual role of resource provisioning and monitoring? At the board level, we consider board structure and breadth of knowledge, while the context in which boards operate is captured by the degree of external scrutiny, operational complexity, performance, and ownership structure.</p>\n </section>\n \n <section>\n \n <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\n \n <p>Our study demonstrates that there are multiple ways board attributes bundle and combine with important elements of the context to promote similar board attention structures. Our findings provide evidence of the causal complexity underlying this phenomenon and corroborate the notions of equifinality and asymmetric causality among board-, firm-, and institution-level conditions conducive to boards allocating more attention to either their resource provisioning or monitoring roles.</p>\n </section>\n \n <section>\n \n <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\n \n <p>Our findings support the attention-based view (ABV), suggesting that boards' selective distribution of attention is regulated by the combination of skills and knowledge directors bring to the firm and the stimuli provided by contextual factors. In doing so, we underscore the need for an extended theory on board effectiveness, as resource dependence- and agency-based prescriptions about boards' behavior may be incomplete, since there is limited consideration by these theories of the bounded rationality of directors and the complex relationships between the factors that can frame boards' selective distribution of attention.</p>\n </section>\n \n <section>\n \n <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\n \n <p>Our study informs efforts to disentangle the conditions under which different attributes combine and regulate boards' distribution of attention, which has implications for nomination committees and powerful actors who have influence on board appointments. Because our results reveal several causal paths that can promote similar board attention structures, decision makers may wish to recruit directors with specific attributes that will be the best fit for the firm's contextual conditions.</p>\n </section>\n </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6000,"publicationDate":"2022-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.12493","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A configurational perspective of boards' attention structures\",\"authors\":\"Eduardo Schiehll,&nbsp;Krista Lewellyn,&nbsp;Wenxi Yan\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/corg.12493\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div>\\n \\n \\n <section>\\n \\n <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\\n \\n <p>What combinations of board attributes and contextual factors explain boards' selective distribution of attention between their dual role of resource provisioning and monitoring? At the board level, we consider board structure and breadth of knowledge, while the context in which boards operate is captured by the degree of external scrutiny, operational complexity, performance, and ownership structure.</p>\\n </section>\\n \\n <section>\\n \\n <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\\n \\n <p>Our study demonstrates that there are multiple ways board attributes bundle and combine with important elements of the context to promote similar board attention structures. Our findings provide evidence of the causal complexity underlying this phenomenon and corroborate the notions of equifinality and asymmetric causality among board-, firm-, and institution-level conditions conducive to boards allocating more attention to either their resource provisioning or monitoring roles.</p>\\n </section>\\n \\n <section>\\n \\n <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\\n \\n <p>Our findings support the attention-based view (ABV), suggesting that boards' selective distribution of attention is regulated by the combination of skills and knowledge directors bring to the firm and the stimuli provided by contextual factors. In doing so, we underscore the need for an extended theory on board effectiveness, as resource dependence- and agency-based prescriptions about boards' behavior may be incomplete, since there is limited consideration by these theories of the bounded rationality of directors and the complex relationships between the factors that can frame boards' selective distribution of attention.</p>\\n </section>\\n \\n <section>\\n \\n <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\\n \\n <p>Our study informs efforts to disentangle the conditions under which different attributes combine and regulate boards' distribution of attention, which has implications for nomination committees and powerful actors who have influence on board appointments. Because our results reveal several causal paths that can promote similar board attention structures, decision makers may wish to recruit directors with specific attributes that will be the best fit for the firm's contextual conditions.</p>\\n </section>\\n </div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48209,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Corporate Governance-An International Review\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-11-14\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.12493\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Corporate Governance-An International Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/corg.12493\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/corg.12493","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2

摘要

董事会属性和背景因素的什么组合解释了董事会在资源提供和监督的双重角色之间的选择性注意力分配?在董事会层面,我们考虑董事会的结构和知识的广度,而董事会运作的背景则由外部审查的程度、运营的复杂性、绩效和所有权结构来捕捉。研究结果/见解我们的研究表明,有多种方式将董事会属性与背景的重要元素捆绑和结合起来,以促进类似的董事会注意力结构。我们的研究结果为这一现象背后的因果复杂性提供了证据,并证实了董事会、企业和机构层面条件之间的等量和非对称因果关系的概念,这些条件有利于董事会将更多的注意力分配到资源供应或监督角色上。理论/学术启示我们的研究结果支持注意基础观点(ABV),认为董事会的选择性注意分配是由董事带给公司的技能和知识以及情境因素提供的刺激共同调控的。在此过程中,我们强调了对董事会有效性的扩展理论的必要性,因为基于资源依赖和代理的董事会行为处方可能是不完整的,因为这些理论对董事的有限理性和构成董事会选择性注意力分配的因素之间的复杂关系的考虑有限。从业者/政策启示我们的研究有助于理清不同属性组合和规范董事会注意力分配的条件,这对提名委员会和对董事会任命有影响的强大行为者有影响。由于我们的研究结果揭示了几种可以促进相似董事会注意力结构的因果路径,因此决策者可能希望招聘具有最适合公司背景条件的特定属性的董事。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

A configurational perspective of boards' attention structures

A configurational perspective of boards' attention structures

Research Question/Issue

What combinations of board attributes and contextual factors explain boards' selective distribution of attention between their dual role of resource provisioning and monitoring? At the board level, we consider board structure and breadth of knowledge, while the context in which boards operate is captured by the degree of external scrutiny, operational complexity, performance, and ownership structure.

Research Findings/Insights

Our study demonstrates that there are multiple ways board attributes bundle and combine with important elements of the context to promote similar board attention structures. Our findings provide evidence of the causal complexity underlying this phenomenon and corroborate the notions of equifinality and asymmetric causality among board-, firm-, and institution-level conditions conducive to boards allocating more attention to either their resource provisioning or monitoring roles.

Theoretical/Academic Implications

Our findings support the attention-based view (ABV), suggesting that boards' selective distribution of attention is regulated by the combination of skills and knowledge directors bring to the firm and the stimuli provided by contextual factors. In doing so, we underscore the need for an extended theory on board effectiveness, as resource dependence- and agency-based prescriptions about boards' behavior may be incomplete, since there is limited consideration by these theories of the bounded rationality of directors and the complex relationships between the factors that can frame boards' selective distribution of attention.

Practitioner/Policy Implications

Our study informs efforts to disentangle the conditions under which different attributes combine and regulate boards' distribution of attention, which has implications for nomination committees and powerful actors who have influence on board appointments. Because our results reveal several causal paths that can promote similar board attention structures, decision makers may wish to recruit directors with specific attributes that will be the best fit for the firm's contextual conditions.

求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
7.00
自引率
11.30%
发文量
79
期刊介绍: The mission of Corporate Governance: An International Review is to publish cutting-edge international business research on the phenomena of comparative corporate governance throughout the global economy. Our ultimate goal is a rigorous and relevant global theory of corporate governance. We define corporate governance broadly as the exercise of power over corporate entities so as to increase the value provided to the organization"s various stakeholders, as well as making those stakeholders accountable for acting responsibly with regard to the protection, generation, and distribution of wealth invested in the firm. Because of this broad conceptualization, a wide variety of academic disciplines can contribute to our understanding.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信